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ABSTRACT
An amendment to the Internal Revenue Code in 1960 enabled one type of corporation
to be exempt from income tax if it met several criteria. It had to have over 100
shareholders distribute 95% of its net income, be managed by a board of trustees, and
behave as a "passive" corporation by and large. The bulk of its funds, although not
the entire sum, was to be invested in construction loans, equity positions in property,
and long term mortgages.
The purpose of this legislation was ambigious in the beginning. The rules and reg-
ulations subsequently enacted were confusing, conflicting and incomplete. As a result,
commercial banks, investment banks, developers, and advisors were left to use and
abuse a new institution which was structurally vulnerable to exploitation. Regulation
of the corporation, even careful evaluation, was made difficult by the lack of clear goals
and purpose against which performance could be measured.
In the climate of economic crisis in the mid-1970's, these entities were trampled by
high interest rates and low customer demand. They had built inadequate cash reserves
to weather the storm. Small investors, the intended beneficiary of the legislation, lost
billions in assets, and many of these corporations went out of business.
This paper chronicles the debacle of a misconceived piece of legislation, which was
a solution in search of a problem.
Chapter 1
In the Beginning
The original intent of Congressional legislation, in 1960, known as the Real
Estate Investment Trust Act was to generate new funds for real estate and to
provide the small investor with opportunities previously available only to big
investors. These large investors had the benefits of a diversified real estate
portfolio and sophisticated real estate analysis. Instead, the REIT legislation
led trusting novices into investments which boomed in the late sixties and early
seventies and then dramatically crashed in the middle seventies. Along the way,
numerous investors, many of them small, lost literally billions of dollars.
The concept of a business trust originated in the late 1800's in Massachusetts.
These business trusts were unincorporated associations that had trustees, bene-
ficiaries and business goals, namely profits. The Congressional legislation of the
REIT Act' enabled these trusts to compete actively for private capital based on
their tax free status. This tax free characteristic did have precedents in the mu-
tual funds, formally known as regulated investment companies. Mutual funds
allow small investors to ride the stock market trends much like large investors
through the diversified portfolio and professional management of the funds. Sim-
ilarly, Real Estate Investment Trusts, REITS, are supposed to be managed by
knowledgeable advisors who invest in an assortment of properties or mortgages,
thereby reducing risk.
'Congress in 1960 amended the Internal Revenue Code through the Real Estate Investment
Trust Act. I.R.C. section 856-858.
The REIT is an unincorporated association, overeen by trustees, that at-
tracts a pool of capital from at least 100 investors. Five or fewer people cannot
own more than fifty percent of the trust, thus REITs are designed for small
investors who want or are satisfied with minority positions. Trusts are generally
considered risk averse entities. But Real Estate Investment Trusts were allowed
from the beginning to issue debentures and other forms of debt which can be
riskier instruments than common stock, especially if subordinated. Trustees of a
REIT act much like directors of operating companies and yet they confer day to
day operating responsibility to outside advisors much like a mutual fund. Thus,
the REIT is a hybrid: a little like a mutual fund, a little like a public operating
company.
The REITs must live under very precise rules regarding their sources of
income and how their assets are deployed. In summary, seventy-five percent
of their gross income must come from rental income or sale of stocks in other
REITs. Another fifteen percent must come from rents, dividend interest, or sale
of stocks. Furthermore, not more than thirty percent of their income can come
from capital gains from assets held less than four years. Short term capital
gains are those that are held less than six months. Long term are held from six
months to four years. Property held for more than four years does not have any
restrictions. The IRS, thus, defines a special class of long term capital gains just
for the REITs.
Additional features of acceptable income peculiar to the REITs include the
definition of active versus passive. Rental income must be passive and the REIT
and its tenant can not be partners in an operating business. The tenant must
be a tenant only, and the REIT is to be a landlord. This rule is meant to
prevent the REITs from establishing subsidiaries as tenants and vice versa. But
the passive nature becomes obscure when the REITs invest in construction and
development projects. The decisions of what capital improvements to fund are
made by these REITs on a daily basis, making the REIT de facto very much
like a developer, hardly a passive role if there was one.
Further restrictions on REITs include the limits on where their assets are
invested. For example, not more than twenty-five percent of their assets can be
in any stock and the trust cannot hold more than ten percent of the shares of
any company. Both of these restrictions seem acceptable on the surface. They
are intended to ensure the trusts stay in their legislated business and that their
position be passive. But a closer look reveals that these limitations can have
a major impact on a REIT when either the economy or some of their specific
investments go sour. For example, if the REIT had an acceptable twenty-five
percent of its assets devoted to stocks but some of its real estate mortgages
or properties failed, then the percentage of its assets invested in stocks would
by default increase past the legal limit. Similarly, the REIT could hold ten
percent of the stock of a company that eventually had to file for Chapter XI.
In the process of reorganization, the REIT could find itself owning more than
10%, thus jeopardizing its own tax status. These regulations, then, work when
times are good. But when times were bad, as they were in the mid-seventies,
the REITs were forced to interpret liberally the many rules and in the process
abuse them.
Not all REITs are alike, though. There are three main types. The earliest
REITs were equity trusts. These entities buy real estate and hold it as an
investment. By and large, these REITs are debt free. The REITs' assets are
invested in income-producing apartments, shopping centers and other rental
properties. Management of the property is undertaken by the REIT's advisor.
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During the heyday of the REITs, these trusts performed strongly but only half
as strongly as the other forms of REITs, as measured by the stock market prices
of their shares. During the precipitous decline of the mid-seventies, these REITs
held their value reasonably well and most have survived.
The mortgage trusts are divided into short term and long term. These two
types of trusts act like banks and finance real estate projects. They make their
profits by borrowing cheaply and lending at a higher rate of return. Borrowing
can be in the form of selling equity or debt issues or directly borrowing money
from commercial banks. While some of the REITs were long term mortgage
lenders, the fastest growing sector of the REIT industry invested in short term,
construction and development loans. They did this in part because it was most
profitable. It was so because the risks during construction and development are
higher. When the economy took a deep dive, these were the real estate projects
that were hit first and hardest. The second, and perhaps dominant reason the
REITs invested so heavily in short term, high yielding mortgages was they were
forced to do so in order to compete with other financial institutions for profits
and investors.
The REITs got off to a slow start in the early to mid sixties. Inflation was
increasing and the relatively fixed income from the REITs' properties provided
a decent if not eye-catching rate of return. The REITs were dependable in their
earnings and there were no noticeable trust failures.
By 1968, REITs had barely reached ten figures in their total assets. Soon
some of the larger REITs, especially the ones sponsored by commercial banks,
began experimenting with more speculative, shorter term mortgages. This was
the beginning of the rise, and even more dramatically the fall, of the REITs.
The riskiness of these REITs was compounded by their growing tendency to
8
leverage to the hilt.
First they leveraged equity, then they leveraged debt, then they began re-
peated cycles of debt-equity leveraging. In a matter of ten short years, these
"passive" trusts became masters of exploiting a complex strategy of finance.
This required keeping a very fast series of financing events moving forward.
Namely, the REITs raised equity by having high yielding returns on their debt.
This new equity enabled further rounds of debt to be issued, and so on. All
would have been fine if the assets behind the equity and the borrowers making
payments on the mortgages were solid. But in fact they weren't. Many of the
REIT's mortgages went into default during the mid-seventies. The REITs were
making loans at very high interest rates. Unfortunately, the projects that had
the highest carrying costs were the first to suffer in the economic crisis. These
high interest paying projects were the bulk of the REITs' portfolios. The REITs
had no choice. Because they were new and had no track record, the REITs had
a higher cost of capital than their competitors and thus were forced to look for
higher yielding albeit riskier projects.
Exacerbating the problem was the fact that the REITs had all of their in-
vestments in real estate. So, unlike commercial banks that had a diversified
portfolio of loans, REITs were narrowly positioned and in the highest risk por-
tion of the real estate business at that. This was hardly the secure and profitable
investment vehicle that Congress had intended for the "small guy."
The other major goal of Congress was to attract significant new funds into
real estate. However, little thought was given to the role the REITs would play
within the set of institutions already committed to real estate. The REITs had
to compete with many established institutions, most of which had stable, lower
cost sources of capital.
Despite this early REITs were in fact reasonably successful. Their profits
were substantial and therefore the dividends they were required by law to dis-
tribute were hefty. In fact, during the early seventies when wage and price
freezes were initiated causing most stock prices to fall, the REITs were the stars
of Wall Street because they were forced to pay out ninety-five percent of their
income as dividends.
There were, however, many factors which led to the demise of the REITs.
The most obvious one, the lack of regulation, has been noted. The scholarly
focus on regulatory inadequacies may be a result of the fact that the REITs have
often been compared to mutual funds, and indeed there are many similarities.
These mutual funds are among the most highly regulated of entities while the
REITs are the least regulated of institutions. This paper describes other aspects
of the problems with the REITs, the decline of the REITs by 1974 and the re-
emergence of the REITs through 1985, the year of their comeback.
Chapter 2
The Test
Under the REITS Act-specifically, Section 856 of the Internal Revenue Code-
the rules governing tax exemption are so strict and so tortuous that the costs of
qualifying can exceed the benefits. The effort and attention required to live up
to ambiguous and often contradictory restrictions and regulations -compounded
by the seemingly purposeful obfuscation of the rules by the Internal Revenue
Service-probably have contributed significantly to the ultimate collapse of the
REITs.1
Not the least of the REITs' difficulties have stemmed from the requirement of
the Act that they behave very much like corporations and, at the same time, very
differently. On the one hand, the rules insist that REITs share with corporations
several of the latter's most salient characteristics. Like corporations, REITs are
to have associates; to stay in business for an extended time; to have centralized
management structures and systems; to be liable for their property; to exist for
the purpose of doing business and dividing the profits; and to have ownership
represented by freely transferrable shares.
This transferrable beneficial interest in the trust is to be divided among
at least 100 people, says the Act 2 ; except that the trustees might decide not
to transfer shares in order to meet some other qualification for recognition as
'This chapter draws heavily on the IRS rulings on REITs which are encoded in I.R.C. Sec.
856-858.
2 IRC Sec. 856(a)(2), (5).
a REIT.3 This exception is itself qualified, however, by the law's admonition
that, in order to avoid classification as a personal holding company, a REIT
must not be more than 50 percent owned, directly or indirectly, by five or fewer
shareholders.'
On the other hand, according to the Act, if a REIT looks or acts too much
like a corporation, it will be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. To avoid
corporation status, the REIT should be unincorporated, and its management
should be the responsibility of one or more trustees with sole responsibility for
running the trust's business and for the disposition of its property. 5
The Act makes a crucial distinction between the shares of a trust and the
common stock of a corporation. Initially, at least, the basis for the distinction
seems clear enough from the language of the Act itself: "In general, a trust
means an unincorporated trust.. .the beneficial ownership of which is evidenced
by transferable certificates of beneficial interest." Although there seems little
possibility of an individual shareholder being held liable for a trust's obligations,
the possibility is not explicitly excluded by the language of the Act in Section
1.876. It is possible, though by no means guaranteed, that shareholders are
protected against individual liability by the requirement that REIT shares, like
all transferrable shares, must be registered as securities.
On top of all these definitions and distinctions, the REIT Act piles layer
upon layer of rules, regulations, prescriptions, and stipulations. The would-be
realty trust is told what sources it can earn income from; what kinds of assets it
can own, and how much of each; and the derivation of the rents it can collect. In
3 IRC §1.856-1(2).
4 IRC §856(a)(b); Reg. §1.856-1(a)(5).
1.R.C. §856(a), 856 (a)(1), 856(d)(i).
almost every area in which the Act specifies and defines, however, the Act also
creates complexity, confusion, ambiguity, and contradiction; contributing finally
to the failure of many REITs and the inadvertent stunting of what promised to
be a significant and vigorous segment of the real-estate industry.
Of a REIT's gross income, for example, the Act specifies that only 10 percent
may come from unspecified sources. Fully 75 percent of the gross must represent
rental income; gains from the sale or other disposition of stock in other REITs;
and tax abatements and refunds. Another 15 percent must come from dividend
interest; profits from the sale of stocks, other securities, and real property; and
rents from real property.6 The IRS, under the Act, requires a trust to distribute
at least 95 percent of its ordinary net income. 7
In the total profits of a realty trust, capital gains are a major, even a dom-
inant, factor. The realization of capital gains can be used as an index to the
REIT's success; indeed, some REIT investment advisors peg their remuneration
to a percentage of capital gains.
The REIT Act makes important distinctions among different kinds of capital
gains. The Act's Sections 1.856(c)(4)(A) and (B) define an overall limit on
capital gains of 30 percent of gross income. The limit can be earned from two
kinds of capital gains: short-term gains from the sale of stocks or other securities
owned for less than six months; and long-term gains on real property owned for
less than four years. While requiring 95 percent of the trusts' ordinary net
income to be distributed, the Act makes no stipulation about the distribution
of net long-term capital gains.
In calculating capital gains, the full value of the property-its total sale price,
GIRC @856(c).
IRC §57(a)(1) required distribution of 90%, but this has been increased to 95%.
not only the excess of sale price over cost-is counted. In effect, therefore, the
Act makes it disadvantageous for a REIT to sell income property it has held for
less than four years.
REITs are strictly limited by the Act in the interest they can charge borrow-
ers. Section 1.856-2(c)(2)(h) specifically prohibits "usurious or illegal interest,
or fees imposed upon borrowers which are in fact a charge for services in addition
to the charge for borrowed money...[which]...shall not be included as interest."
The allusion to usurious interest became important in 1969 and 1970, as interest
rates everywhere rose to levels that were defined as usurious by many state laws.
In California, for example, the usury laws allowed commercial banks and other
financial corporations to charge interest rates of ten percent and more, while
REITs, like individuals and certain other entities, could not. An attempt to put
REITs on an equal footing with competing lenders by means of an amendment
to the California constitution was defeated in November 1970.
"Where a mortgage comes from both real and other property," the Act con-
tinues, "an apportionment of interest income must be made for the purposes of
the 75 percent requirement." The need to allocate interest income is especially
difficult for the many trusts with investments in such special properties as mo-
tels, hotels, hospitals, and nursing homes, for which mortgage loans customarily
cover the costs of very expensive fixtures and equipment along with the costs of
land and actual construction, without differentiating between the two. In order
to comply with the interest-income provisions of the Act, most trusts investing
in or making loans to these kinds of properties restrict their interests to the
bricks-and-mortar portion of the total cost.
Rental income' is especially perilous for any REIT whose ancillary income
'IRC Sec. 856 (c)(5).
approaches the statutory limit of 10 percent of gross income.
The rules governing REITs' rental income are among the most complicated
in the Act. The crucial distinction in the eyes of the law between permissible
and forbidden rental income is that permissible rental income has to be "pas-
sive". The "passive income" requirement was intended by Congress to make
it impossible for a REIT to set up a tenant subsidiary corporation or to have
any substantial business affiliation with its own tenants. The law deems rental
income to be passive if it meets two criteria:9
1. The amount of the rental income received by the REIT must be completely
independent of the income or the profits that the real estate yields to its
tenant. Nevertheless, the rule permited rentals to be pegged to a fixed
percentage of receipts or sales. In addition, a lease is permitted to use
differing bases to calculate rents for different departments or floors of a
retail establishment, providing that the percentages are stipulated when
the lease becomes effective. The same Committee report also allows the
gross receipts on which rents are to be based to be adjusted for taxes paid,
merchandise returned for credit, and similar items.
2. Rental income is not considered passive if it is collected from a corporation
of which the REIT owns either 10 percent or more of its voting shares, or
10 percent or more of its total shares. Passive rents also do not include
rents from any type of tenant in whose assets or net profits the REIT owns
a 10 percent or greater interest.
The Act provides that at least 75 percent of a REIT's total assets should be
in the form of real property; cash and other liquid assets, such as receivables;
'IRC Sec. 856(d).
and government securities.10 Receivables included among the REIT's assets,
the law specifies, must be derived from the trust's own ordinary operations, not
simply bought from another person or institution.
The Act's restrictions on 75 percent of the REIT's assets are a potential
cause of inadvertent errors that might make a trust liable to disqualification.
A trust might be disqualified, for example, simply for holding in its securities
portfolio stocks whose market value comes to exceed 25 percent of the trust's
total asset value, regardless of the stocks' book value or the percentage of assets
they represented when they were purchased. Under the Act, stocks are assessed
at market value, while a good-faith estimate is sufficient for untraded securities
and other assets.
The nature of the assets that make up the other 25 percent of a trust's total,
the law allows, is not restricted. Nevertheless, the unrestricted 25 percent can
only include securities whose value totals no more than 5 percent of the total
assets of the trust, while representing less than 10 percent of the outstanding
voting shares of any single stock issue.
In order to avoid running afoul of the Act's "10 percent prohibition," most
trusts restrict their equity participations to such non-voting securities as war-
rants, convertible debentures, or even convertible preferred shares. Nevertheless,
because many of their investments have been in public entities, whose near-
equity interests are closer to the market-and to a market value-than the trusts
realize, many REITs have inadvertently risked disqualification on this score.
Some trusts have owned warrants and convertibles representing a high percent
ownership of the borrower if they were exercised.
The 10 percent-equity restriction can also inhibit trusts from protecting
'11IRC Sec. 856 (c)(5).
themselves if a borrower seems headed for bankruptcy. In such an event, pru-
dence and normal business practice dictate that the trust take all appropriate
steps-including the exercise of its warrants and other convertible interests-to
protect its investment. Such a step would be costly, however, if it would give
the trust more than 10 percent ownership of the borrower's voting stock, auto-
matically disqualifying the trust under the REIT Act. The REIT's only course
of action in these circumstances would be to dispose of the offending shares by
the end of the quarter, possibly at a disadvantage, although buyers at such a
distress sale might be hard to find.
Even under more favorable circumstances, the 10 percent rule puts the REIT
at a disadvantage in the equity market. If the trust cannot come to the end
of a quarter owning more than 10 percent of the voting shares of any entity,
then even warrants or convertible debentures representing more than 10 percent
equity must be sold without being converted. The trust's only other course is
to convert or exercise its interest gradually, selling its interest at a rate that
maintains its holdings of voting shares under the limit. In any event, if the trust
incurs disqualification for exceeding the 10 percent limit at the end of a quarter,
it has 30 days' grace to correct its position.
The Act's requirement that a trust's assets pass muster at the end of each
quarter can make trouble for trusts that are involved in sizeable private place-
ments or underwritings, which yield large lump-sum payments. In the case
of private placements, the trust can usually spread the flow of proceeds over
enough time to allow them to be safely invested in qualifying assets; but the
proceeds from underwritings are invariably paid at one time, creating potential
difficulties.
Most trusts are careful to schedule secondary offerings to coincide with the
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retirement of bank borrowings, thus absorbing the proceeds of the offering with-
out changing the trust's asset picture. Trusts may have problems, nevertheless,
with the proceeds from large issues of warrants. Since the trust cannot effec-
tively determine when warrants will be exercised and when the proceeds will be
paid, a trust may be overwhelmed by a massive exercise of warrants as their
expiration date nears.
The REIT Act also considers the special case of a trust that owns an asset in
partnership. " In the case of a real estate investment trust- which is a partner in
a partnership," says the Act, "the trust will be deemed to own its proportionate
share of each of the assets of the partnership...." The Act also makes the trust
in such a case entitled to its proportionate share of the partnership's income.
This section of the Act gives a REIT the advantages of the partnerships,
joint ventures, and other shared investments common in real estate. It also puts
the REIT in jeopardy, however, if the partnership should sell property in the
ordinary course of business. In that case, the trust will also be seen by the IRS
as selling property, a clear infraction of the REIT Act, punishable by loss of
REIT tax status.
In regard to income taxation, the law treats REITs and their beneficiaries in
very much the same way that it treats mutual funds and their shareholders. The
special tax treatment of REITs is detailed in Section 857 of the Act. According
to its terms, REITs calculate their taxes exactly as though they were ordinary
corporations, then adjust their earnings according to the special guidelines es-
tablished by the law.
First, from their total earnings, REITs are entitled to subtract their net
long-term capital gains, as well as any dividends they have received from other
corporations. REITs are not, however, entitled to carry forward losses incurred
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in previous tax years to offset current profits. The Act further states:
1. Taxable income does not include any excess of net long-term capital gains
over net short-term capital losses; but,
2. Taxable income does include any partially tax-exempt interest on United
States government obligations.
3. If a REIT claims a deduction for more than 95 percent of its ordinary net
income paid out in the form of dividends to its beneficiaries, the undis-
tributed balance of its ordinary net income is taxable at the rates ap-
plicable to corporations; while the distributed dividends will be taxed as
ordinary net income to the beneficiaries, without deductions, credits, or
exclusions.
4. Any or all of a trust's long-term capital gains, on the other hand, can be
distributed and designated as such to the beneficiaries without losing their
favored tax status. Net long-term capital gains that are not distributed
by the trust to its beneficiaries are subject to a 25 percent tax rate.
5. The REIT regulations include specific qualifications for income to be treated
as long-term capital gains. If the real property in question is sold at a profit
after it has been owned by the trust for more than six months but less than
four years, then the profit is taxable as a long-term gain according to Sec-
tion 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code. If that same profit, combined with
the REIT's other profits from the sale or transfer of securities held for less
than six months, totals 30 percent or more of the REIT's gross income,
however, the long-term capital gain will be taxed as ordinary income under
Section 856(c) (4).
The issue of "passivity" as a qualification for REIT status raises persistent
questions and difficulties. According to the Act, a trust is passive if it "...does
not hold property primarily for sale to its customers in the ordinary course of
business."" Subsequent IRS rulings have confirmed that the intention of this
rule is to require trusts to hold property for investment purposes.
Confusion arises, however, in the case of so-called "development trusts,"
which are specifically organized to purchase raw land and add improvements-
buildings, for example-that produce income for the trust. Such purposeful and
potentially profitable activity certainly appears more "active" than "passive";
nevertheless, the regulations permit trusts to develop and to construct while
remaining passive in the eyes of the IRS.
The powers of REIT trustees, detailed in Section 1.856-4(b), also do not
apparently accord with the image of the trust as a "passive" entity. Among the
activities permitted to the Trustees, according to the Act, along with setting
rents and making leases, is the expenditure of capital to improve trust property.
Thus the trustees can buy unimproved property and have it developed through
the trust, all without causing the trust to lose its "passive" status in the eyes
of the IRS. Such blurring of distinctions by the IRS, operating under the terms
of the REIT Act, has done little to make the task of trusts, also subject to the
Act and the IRS, any easier.
Similarly, trusts are barred by the terms of the Act from subdividing their
property for wholesale or retail resale. A difficulty arises, however, in the case
of mortgage trusts that sell participations in their loans to other trusts. Such
sales of mortgage interests seem to risk violating the prohibition against resale.
REITs engaging in these types of interest transfers have usually taken pains,
"IRC Sec. 856(a)(4), (1976).
therefore, to establish that the sales were justified by valid considerations other
than profit, such as the need to repay existing loans or to build cash reserves to
back new borrowing.
A variety of other justifications have also been offered for the sale of mort-
gage loan participations by REITs. Such sales are vital as controls on the flow
of investment funds, it is suggested; or as a way for trusts to participate in in-
vestment opportunities that would ordinarily be denied them under the terms
of their charters; or as a means of prudent, risk-reducing diversification. In
other instances, the IRS has agreed that a REIT is not violating the prohibi-
tion against holding property for sale when it grants a tenant an option to buy,
providing such an option is incidental to a lease and standard practice in the
area. Nor is it a violation of the law for a REIT to resell property on which it
has foreclosed a mortgage loan, in which case, it is argued, the acquisition of the
property by the trust is involuntary and its resale is only an incidental adjunct
to the trust's main business.
It is not sufficient merely for a trust to conform to all these IRS strictures
in order to qualify as a REIT for tax purposes: the trust must explicitly seek
the tax treatment to which it has become entitled. Once a trust has filed for
REIT status, moreover, it can never change its mind; according to the rules,
the choice of REIT status is irrevocable. Trusts that incur operating losses.,
therefore, sometimes file for tax treatment as corporations, which can carry
losses forward to offset future profits, while REITs cannot. Even after a REIT's
favored tax status has been requested and granted, however, it can be revoked
at any time by the IRS for violations of the Act.
For a trust, therefore, it is extremely important to be scrupulous in obser-
vance of the IRS regulations established under the REIT Act. The consequences
21
of disqualification are severe. If a trust loses its REIT status it becomes immedi-
ately subject to full taxation as an ordinary corporation; and the corporate levy
will fall after the trust will already have paid out the statutory 95 percent of its
earnings to its beneficiaries. The corporate tax would be, in effect, subtracted
from the capital of the trust. The REIT industry has persistently argued for an
amendment to the regulations that would give them a grace period to correct
alleged deficiencies; or that would impose the increased tax on only the defective
portion of their income. So far, however, the industry has petitioned in vain.
Chapter 3
The Structure
For a would-be sponsor-a bank, perhaps, or an insurance company, or some
other organization, inside or outside the real-estate business-the first step toward
establishing a REIT is to draw up a Declaration of Trust for submission to
the prospective underwriters and the appropriate government agencies. The
Declaration of Trust defines the REIT: it establishes the policies it will follow,
and the legal and financial terms under which it will exist and operate. The
Declaration also specifies the respective rights and responsibilities of the trustees,
the financial advisors, and the shareholders. The trustees and advisors are
named in the Declaration, subject to the decisions of the shareholders at the
first annual meeting.
Once the REIT is established under the Declaration of Trust, the trustees
wield the ultimate power over all property investments and other business ac-
tivities. Indeed, according to the law the trustees can run the REIT with much
the same discretion as they would enjoy if it were their personal property. In
fact, the trustees do own the trust's property, holding legal title as joint tenants
during their individual terms as trustees.
In practice, of course, the very extent of the trustees' powers, prerogatives,
and responsibilities makes it impractical for them to operate unassisted. Once
the REIT has been set up, most of its management revolves upon the staff.
Similarly, many routine investment and other business functions are ordinarily
entrusted to the financial advisor, subject to policies set by the trustees and to
the trustees final review. Ultimate responsibility for investment decisions be-
longs solely to the trustees under the terms of the Declaration of Trust. The
trustees may, if they choose, name two or more of their number to an invest-
ment committee; but the responsibility for approving transactions may not be
delegated by the trustees to any other party.
Most Declarations specify certain minimum requirements for trustees; typ-
ically, they must be "not less than 21" years of age, for example, and "of the
highest character and integrity." In practice, trustees are usually recruited from
the ranks of established real-estate professionals.
The number of trustees-or sometimes a minimum and a maximum number-
is fixed in the original Declaration, subject to subsequent amendment. The
initial trustees named by the sponsor in the Declaration may be retained by the
shareholders at the first annual meeting or replaced. Trustees are elected by a
two-thirds vote of the shareholders; a simple majority of the shareholders, at
an annual meeting or any special meeting, is sufficient to remove a trustee. All
trustees' terms end at each annual meeting. In the period between meetings,
the trustees, by majority vote, are empowered to remove sitting trustees, or to
elect new trustees to fill vacancies created by death, removal, resignation, or
enlargement of the board. Trustees are not required to be stockholders.
To carry on the trust's regular and ordinary business, the trustees elect
such officers as they deem necessary and fix their salaries. The trustees also
vote on their own compensation, which may include not only their fees, plus
any expenses they may incur in connection with their responsibilities, but also
such "fringe" benefits or perquisites as free use of recreational property or other
facilities belonging to the REIT.
Being trustee of a REIT is not usually a full-time job. Demands on the
trustees' time are hardly severe: meetings are held at specified intervals, and
the dates are set well in advance. The investment committee, which makes
investment decisions subject to ratification by a majority of the board, meets
more often than the full board. Committee meetings can be informal, however,
and at the members' mutual convenience.
Trustees are permitted to maintain control of their own businesses. Because
trustees are often recruited specifically for their experience and demonstrated
competence in business areas similar to the REIT's, their own business is likely
to be in this area as well. In theory, continuing in their own businesses maintains
the trustees' competence, increasing their value as trustees to the REIT.
Once a trustee has been elected by the shareholders, his authority can be
neither curtailed or appealed during his term in office. Dissatisfied shareholders
have no real control over the trustees short of voting for alternative candidates
at the next annual meeting. Trustees are protected against personal liability
for their conduct of the REIT's affairs, unless they are found guilty of willful
malfeasance, gross negligence, or disregard of their duties in their conduct of the
REIT's business.
Shareholders are entitled to quarterly and annual financial reports to keep
them abreast of the REIT's progress. Ordinarily, however, shareholders play
only a passive role in the business activities of the trust. Their influence is felt
mainly at the annual meetings, which are held on dates set by the trustees; or at
special meetings, which are called by the trustees or by shareholders representing
a specified minimum number of shares, usually a significant fraction of all the
shares outstanding. Although the shareholders can act at the meetings to amend
the Declaration, even to vote the trust out of business entirely, they usually do
nothing more than ratify the slate of trustees put forward by the sitting board.
It is the financial advisor who actually operates the REIT. In addition to
administering the trust's day-to-day investment activities, the advisor consults
with the trustees on overall investment and business policy and makes specific
investment recommendations. The advisor also negotiates with lawyers, ac-
countants, builders, developers, and other contractors for the various services
required by the REIT; and oversees the performance of all contracts.
The terms of the advisor's relationship to the REIT and its trustees are
defined in a formal Advisory Agreement. The advisor's compensation, set by
the trustees, can take a variety of forms. In addition to payment for ordinary
advisory services to the REIT, the advisor is normally entitled by contract to
various service fees for such functions as loan closings, registrations, and others.
Like the trustees in their sphere, the advisor enjoys a great deal of autonomy
in the operation of the trust. Under the terms of the Advisory Agreement, the
advisor is legally liable only for acts of bad faith, malfeasance, gross negligence,
or disregard of duties.
This seemingly straightforward working relationship is complicated in prac-
tice by various commonalities of interest between the advisory organization and
the REIT's sponsor organization. In a strict legal sense, all connection between
the sponsor and the REIT is dissolved at the moment the REIT is established
as an independent entity under its own Declaration of Trust. In fact, however, it
is common for the two organizations to remain closely related through overlap-
ping ownership and management, creating the possibility of conflicts of interest,
especially when-as is often the case-the sponsor and the advisory organization
have overlapping business interests in addition to the REIT. In an effort to limit
abuses, the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association's so-called "blue sky"
rulings require that a majority of a REIT's trustees be "unaffiliated" with the
trust's sponsor or its financial advisor.
Diagram 1 (following page) illustrates the organizational structure of a typ-
ical REIT, PNB Mortgage and Realty Investors, which was established in Oc-
tober 1970. The diagram follows the trust's 1973 prospectus. PNB Mortgage
and Realty Investors was a creation of Colonial Mortgage Service Company
(Colonial), then one of the largest mortgage banking companies in the coun-
try. Colonial is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Philadelphia National Bank
(PNB), which is itself a subsidiary of a one-bank holding company called the
Philadelphia National Corporation (PNC). The trust gets its investment advice
from Colonial Advisors, Inc., which is a subsidiary of the same Colonial that
sponsored the REIT in the first place. Colonial Advisors gets legal services
from Morgan, Lewis & Coekuis and accounting services from Arthur Young &
Company.
PNB Mortgage and Realty Investors has 4,767 shareholders. Of the eight
trustees, five can be considered independent; each of the other three is affiliated
in some way with the various organizations involved in establishing, advising,
and running the REIT. The chairman of the REIT is also one of its trustees; and
also the chairman, president, and chief operating officer of both the Philadelphia
National Bank and the Philadelphia National Corporation. The REIT's presi-
dent is another of its trustees, while serving as president and CEO of Colonial
Mortgage Service Company, the REIT's sponsor. A third trustee of the REIT
serves also as a director on the boards of both PNC and PNB.
Among the five independent trustees are the head of a real-estate service
company, the president of a savings bank, the head of an insurance company, an
attorney who was formerly head of an insurance company, and the vice-president
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of a regional merchandising corporation. The trust's secretary and treasurer also
have positions in the sponsoring company, in the bank that owns the sponsoring
company, and in the advisory company that serves the trust.
In such a Byzantine maze of interconnections, the possibilities for conflicts of
interest and attendant abuses are obvious, virtually limitless-and perhaps un-
avoidable. The REIT's financial advisor, Colonial Advisors, is a subsidiary of the
Pennsylvania National Bank; a number of the REIT's trustees also have direct or
indirect connections-sometimes both-with the bank. The REIT, therefore, will
be in direct competition with its own advisors and the bank for investment op-
portunities and other business advantages. Colonial Advisors, meanwhile, may
have other clients that are in direct competition with the trust, which therefore
cannot be assured of its advisors' best advice.
Even independent trustees may well have personal real-estate interests that
run counter to or compete with those of the trust. In the Colonial case, the
REIT's law firm, which counsels the advisory firm on the REIT's affairs while
also serving the advisory firm in its outside operations, cannot help but be
torn between two masters whose interests do not necessarily coincide. With
such fundamental, inherent conflicts of interest built into the structure of the
REIT, its shareholders risk having their interests ill-served and being virtually
powerless to act effectively in their own behalf.
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In general, REITs concentrate their capital in three types of real-estate invest-
ments: short-term mortgage loans; long-term mortgage loans; and ownership of
real property. A particular REIT may devote itself solely ~or mostly to one type
of investment; or it may diversify its investments among two or three types.
The language used to define investment policy in Declarations of Trust is inten-
tionally general enough to allow broad latitude to the trust's financial advisors,
managers, and trustees.
Realty trusts that concentrate on short-term mortgages are known in the
business as "C and D REITS" because short-term mortgages are almost invari-
ably "construction and development" loans. Such loans, with terms that may
be as brief as a year or less and are rarely longer than three years, are sought
by real-estate developers to support the early phases of their projects.
In such a situation, the borrower may begin with only a small development
loan to prepare the site for construction. The site itself serves as the primary
collateral for the development loan, which is usually made by a REIT in the
expectation of following it with a second loan to cover the construction phase
of the project.
The second loan's maturity is calculated to coincide with the completion of
construction, when the outstanding balance will be paid out of the proceeds of a
new, long-term loan. The source of this long-term mortgage-called a "take-out"
in the trade-may be a life-insurance company, a savings-and-loan association, a
pension fund, or another traditional financing institution; or a REIT dealing in
long-term mortgage investments.
The REIT making a construction loan takes a first mortgage on the site or
the improvements, or both, as collateral. In addition, in order to protect itself
against the possibility of losing its investment in the event the developer goes
bankrupt, the REIT usually takes prudent steps to insure that the full amount
of the construction loan is spent on the project, according to the plans that
provided the original basis for the loan.
One precaution usually taken by the REIT is to release the loan amount in
installments, either periodically or as landmarks in the work are achieved. If
disbursements are scheduled at regular intervals, their amount is usually limited
to the actual costs incurred during the preceding period. The REIT usually
requires an inspection to certify that the work is on schedule and up to standards
before making a disbursement. The careful REIT will also audit the borrower's
books to make sure that subcontractors and suppliers are actually being paid as
reported.
REITs sponsored by commercial banks were the first to get involved in con-
struction and development loans. After a slow start in the 1960s, short-term
mortgage lending by REITs expanded very rapidly. By mid-1971, as Table 1
illustrates, the C and D REITs boasted assets of $3.3 billion-55.5 percent of
all REIT assets. Of a total of 113 REITs in operation at that time, 51, or 45
percent, were involved in short-term mortgage loans.
As popular as they quickly became, however, these short-term loans-and the
REITs that rushed to make them-also were soon to prove vulnerable to sudden,
catastrophic failures. The riskiness of short-term mortgages was anticipated in
the rates of return they offered. In 1970 and 1971, while the prime rate was still
about 6 percent, C and D loans were yielding as much as 16 percent-more than
2.5 times the prime.
Long-term mortgages, usually on apartment or commercial real estate, ma-
ture in fifteen to thirty years. Such conventional loans never attracted the same
interest from REITs as the short-term loans did. The 18 long-term-mortgage
REITs in business in 1971 held assets totaling $1.2 billion, only 19.5 percent of
all REIT assets.
REITs that specialize in long-term financing often invest also in short-term
mortgages. In some cases, the short-term development and construction loans
can later be converted directly into long-term, permanent mortgages. Mean-
while, the higher interest rates on short-term loans also offer the advantage of
increasing the trust's return to its shareholders.
Equity REITs specialize in the actual ownership of real property-office build-
ings, for example, or shopping centers, or apartment houses, or just vacant land.
The real property may be mortgaged or otherwise encumbered. The ownership
may even be in the form of a purchase-leaseback arrangement on the land un-
der a building that the REIT does not own. Whatever the status of its equity,
however, the REIT derives rental income from the property.
A REIT can acquire equity interest in any of several ways. A property
may simply be bought outright, for cash; or acquired in an exchange of money
plus stock. A trust may also accept an equity interest-an "equity kicker" in
the parlance of the trade-in a piece of real estate as an inducement to make a
mortgage loan to the principal owner. In other cases, a REIT may become the
owner of a property through foreclosure on a bad loan or enforcement of a lien.
The trust may also buy property for future development in a joint venture, often
with an established builder or developer as the other partner.
In 1971, as Table 1 illustrates, equity REITs owned 23.6 percent of all REIT
assets-some $1.253 billion of a total $6.136 billion. Of the 113 trusts in opera-
tion, 38 were primarily engaged in owning real property. If the equity holdings
of those trusts primarily interested in short- and long-term mortgages were in-
cluded, the total equity ownership by REITs would be almost doubled.
In addition to the three major forms of REIT investment, two other kinds
of loans are significant factors in trust assets. A special-purpose, short- or
intermediate-term loan called a "first mortgage on implemented properties" is
sometimes sought by a developer who hopes that a successful operating history,
however brief, will improve a project's chances for long-term mortgage financing.
A REIT may also offer this type of loan as a temporary help to a developer who
is having trouble obtaining regular, long-term mortgage financing to pay off a
construction loan. In any case, such mortgages usually have terms of less than
ten years, and they are not amortized during their term.
A small number of REITs specialize in junior, or second, mortgages, which
represent only a small fraction of total lending. Second mortgages are sometimes
useful as "wraparound mortgages" in the refinancing of an existing building.
Instead of specializing in one or another type of activity, many REITs elect
an eclectic, or hybrid investment approach, spreading their capital among short-
term C and D loans, long-term mortgage loans, and equity participations. To
the extent that a reverse in one type of investment would not be felt by a REIT's
other investments, such diversification would tend to increase the strength and
resiliency of the individual REIT and, by the same token, of the REIT industry.
A rise in interest rates might that would depress investments in mortgages,
for example, might have little effect on equity investments; while changing demo-
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graphic patterns and competitive pressures would have more immediate impact
on an equity investment's return from rentals than on the interest income from
long-term mortgages. Diversification, both by individual REITs and by the
industry, thus worked to counter the problems that soon arose.
TABLE 1
ASSETS OF REALTY TRUSTS - MID-1971
GROUP SUMMARY
No. of Assets
Trust Category Trusts (Millions $)
Short-Term Mortgage
Independent 10 $ 916
Mortgage Banker 17 703
Commercial Bank 14 1,709
Miscellaneous Financial 10 578
SUBTOTAL 51 $3,276
Equity 38 1,253
Mortgage, Intermediate 3 238
Mortgage, Long-Term 18 1,189
Private 3 180
TOTALS 113 $6,136
Source: Realty Trust Review, Audit Investment Research, Inc., New York, Au-
gust 16, 1971, p. 4.
Chapter 5
Institutions See An Opportunity
Following passage of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960, the organi-
zation of REITs began at a slow pace. By March 1962, only five trusts made
public offerings of $10 million or more. During the next -six years, until June
1968, only three major REIT offerings were made to the public. It was clear
that the major potential institutional sponsors-banks, insurance companies, and
others-were holding back.
The REIT boom began to gain momentum in 1969 and 1970, when 53 new
trusts with initial public offerings of more than $10 million came to market, sell-
ing a total of almost $2.7 billion worth of shares-more than six times the total
sold in the preceding seven years.[Table 1] By the end of the decade, the major
institutional sponsors were apparently catching the REIT spirit, and the enthu-
siasm was quickly picked up by financial conglomerates, real-estate developers,
and other independent entrepreneurs.
If the REITs' time seemed to have come quite suddenly after several years of
unremarkable activity, it might simply have taken investors that long to realize
that REITs were a good thing. Another factor in the sudden attractiveness of
the REITs to both sponsors and investors was certainly the onset of a prolonged
period of tight money, which created new opportunities for REITs while making
traditional forms of real-estate investments less attractive.
Real estate has traditionally been financed by long-term investments, such
as mortgages and other debt instruments, with fixed interest rates-rates that
do not change no matter what happens to economic conditions. As the 1960s
drew to a close, however, such long-term investments became unattractive. The
highest inflation rates in history made lengthy commitments to fixed interest
rates risky; while frequent shortages of credit in the nation's money markets
made such long-term lending more difficult. As a result, the institutions that
supply long-term capital to the real estate industry were sitting on the sidelines.
In the mid-1960s, meanwhile, the success of some pioneering short-term
mortgage trusts, or C and D REITs, suggested to both potential REIT sponsors
and investors that there was money to be made. Short-term mortgage trusts be-
came popular on Wall Street as "perpetual money-making machines" 1 through
the magic of leveraged ownership. As commercial banks began to get involved
in REIT sponsorship, they naturally gravitated toward short-term-loan trusts,
which are consonant with their traditional areas of operation. Similarly, insur-
ance companies were likely sponsors of long-term mortgage REITs, because of
their familiarity with this kind of financing activity.
The first REIT sponsored by a commercial bank was established in 1969; by
the middle of 1971 there were 21 more, and nine of the 25 largest banks in the
country had either become REIT sponsors or gone into the business of advis-
ing others' REITs. Among the REIT-owning banks were Bank of America and
Chase Manhattan. REITs affiliated with commercial banks held approximately
one-third of the short-term mortgages held by all REITs; their commitment to-
taled $1 billion(see Table 1, Chap. 4). The bank-connected REITs' domination
'The term "perpetual growth machines" is based on successive equity and debt leveraging
to increase trust assets. See, for example, H. Stevenson, "What went wrong with REITs?,"
Harvard Business School, January 1976.
of the short-term mortgage market was due only in part to their traditional ex-
perience and expertise in this field. The banks' easy access to lines of short-term
bank credit and commercial paper markets also gave them an advantage in this
area over REITs without bank connections.
As the traditional source of more than half of the short-term construction
financing required by the real-estate industry, commercial banks were natural
candidates to sponsor REITs that would carry on this activity. In 1969 and
1970, as money became scarce and the prime rate passed 8 percent on the way
up (Table 2), other business borrowers preempted the available loan funds at
commercial banks, which were forced to curtail new construction lending or to
sell participations in their construction loans to the REITs that were beginning
to arrive on the scene.
The latter course, while freeing their loan funds for their business customers,
also demonstrated to the banks that REITs were not subject to some of the
banking regulations aimed at limiting the expansion of credit. It required only
a short leap of imagination for the banks to conclude that by sponsoring REITs
themselves, they could hold onto their real-estate borrowers while operating in
a relatively regulation-free environment.
It also did not escape the banks' notice that there were fees to be had for
the trouble of managing a trust. Since the standard agreement between REITs
and their financial advisors pegged the advisors' fees to the trusts' total invested
assets, without reference to liabilities, the banks perceived that the fees could
be worthwhile indeed. Indeed, the advisory fee became one of the strongest
inducements for banks to sponsor REITs.
Table 3 lists the advisory fees, as a percentage of invested assets, paid by
REITs with various types of sponsors. Advisory fees typically varied from 0.5
percent to 1.2 percent of the REIT's invested assets. Banks that set up realty
trusts with themselves as advisors generally awarded themselves fees ranging
from 1.0 to 1.2 percent of assets-at the top end of the range. Almost 25 percent
of the bank-sponsored REITs paid advisory fees on a sliding scale, beginning at
about 1.0 percent of assets and rising as total assets reached various specified
levels. More than 25 percent of the bank-sponsored REITs paid their advisors
"special" fees, including incentive payments, in addition to the basic fee. These
special fees were pegged to the net capital gains or net profits achieved by the
trust, or to some other measure.
As a REIT sponsor, a commercial bank was assured of another profit as
the repository of the trust's funds. To the balance maintained in the bank
by the REIT, the bank could also add the balances deposited by the REIT's
borrowers. For these clients the bank would also anticipate providing additional,
profitable financial services, acting as transfer agent, registering the shares of
beneficial interest, and providing credit, collection, and accounting. The bank's
real estate lending department would keep profitably busy serving the REIT
and its borrowers. In tandem with its REIT, the bank could offer real-estate
developers appropriate financing for every stage of their projects. No longer
would a C and D loan customer have to go elsewhere for a long-term mortgage
commitment.
There were other advantages: In the eyes of the Internal Revenue Service,
REITs were not affiliates of bank holding companies; the REIT's annual report
was not consolidated with the bank's. Any profit the sponsoring bank earned
for advising its REIT, therefore, could go straight to the bottom line as profit.
Through a REIT, the bank could make real estate loans without being in-
hibited by the regulations that limit other lending institutions. REITS, can do
39
business wherever they can meet local requirements. Banks, on the other hand,
are bound by their charters to operate in a specific state or region; S&Ls are
limited to a hundred-mile radius of their home offices.
With their ability to range widely in search of investment opportunities in
mortgages and equities, REITs can enjoy the stability that comes with diversi-
fication. If the real-estate economy of one city or region declines, chances are
that some other city or region will offer alternative opportunities to a mobile
lender.
By mid-1971, ten life insurance companies had sponsored REITs. Seven
of the trusts specialized in equities and long-term mortgages; only three were
in short-term C and D loans. Although the seven long-term mortgage REITs
sponsored by insurance companies comprised only about 40 percent of all long-
term-mortgage trusts, they held 66 percent of the total assets of these trusts.
Five of the 25 largest life insurance companies in the country had sponsored
REITs; their trusts were among the 11 largest.
Life insurance companies responded to many of the same factors that encour-
aged banks to form REITs. The scarce money and high interest rates of 1969-
1970 forced many policy holders to borrow against their life insurance. At the
same time, many of the insurance companies' mortgage borrowers were having
difficulty repaying their loans on time. The resulting shortage of conventional
funds for long-term real-estate financing encouraged the insurance companies
to sponsor REITs as alternative mortgage lenders. Like the banks, insurance
companies considering REIT sponsorship had little worry about establishing
adequate lines of credit or selling commercial paper in the markets.
Sponsorship of a REIT also afforded the life insurance companies, as it did
the banks, a profitable outlet for the efforts of their able and experienced real-
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estate-lending staffs, which had been idled by the lack of activity in their sector of
the economy. Advising the REITs also earned significant fees for their sponsors.
Sponsorship of REITs was a natural extension of traditional business practice
for mortgage bankers, who were the traditional primary sources for real estate
financing in the United States. The activities of the mortgage bankers, prior
to the debut of the REITs, went far beyond the origination of mortgage loans
to include selling and servicing mortgages for life insurance companies, savings
banks, savings and loan associations, pension funds, and other institutions.
Because originating and selling mortgage loans are the mortgage bankers'
principal reason for existence, their business activity varies directly with the
supply of loan funds. The mortgage bankers, therefore, were severely affected
by the scarce money and high interest rates in 1969 and 1970.
In such a difficult financial climate, REITs were attractive new sources of
investment capital for the mortgage bankers. In addition, REITs enabled them
to add a wide range of new services. REITs were able to offer initial short-
term loans for land purchase and preparation before construction, and long-term
"take-out" loans, if necessary, after the project was built. Mortgage bankers were
also attracted to REIT sponsorship by the promise of large advisory fees and
efficient employment for their staffs of real-estate and mortgage specialists.
All of the 17 REITs sponsored by mortgage bankers were primarily in-
volved in short-term mortgage loans. This concentration on a single part of
the mortgage-lending spectrum enabled the mortgage bankers, despite competi-
tion from the giant, full-service commercial banks, to command some 20 percent
of the total REIT market for this type of loan. (see Table 1, Chapter 4).
In mid-1971, approximately one-half the total number of REITS, and a
roughly equal proportion of total REIT assets, were associated with financial
conglomerates, real-estate developers, and other independent sponsors. These
independently sponsored REITs took a variety of forms, according to the vari-
ous motives of their sponsors. Most of the sponsors in this group were attracted
to REITs primarily by the potential they saw for earning substantial advisory
fees. At the same time, the sponsoring organizations gained the advantage of
easy access to REIT financing for their own real-estate projects; and access to
the REIT's clients as potential customers for the sponsor's services as well.
The following list illustrates the varieties of REIT sponsorship that emerged
during the years of active trust formation, and the purposes the REITs served
for their sponsors.
1. Two of the largest REITs active in 1970 were Continental Mortgage In-
vestors and First Mortgage Investors. Both were founded in 1961, soon
after the passage of the REIT Act, as prototypical short-term-mortgage
trusts. By 1969-1970, however, the sponsors of both trusts organized new
REITs to deal in intermediate-term mortgages.
2. Typical of the REITs sponsored by financial conglomerates in 1969 and
1970 were C.I. Mortgage Group and Mortgage Trust of America, both
short-term-mortgage trusts, organized by City Investing and Transamer-
ica Corporation respectively; and U.S. Leasing Real Estate Investors, an
equity REIT organized by U.S. Leasing International.
3. In the medical field, in 1969, American Medicorp, Inc. sponsored Medical
Mortgage Investors as a long-term-mortgage and equity REIT to finance
hospitals, nursing homes, and other health-care facilities. Hospital In-
vestors, a long-term-mortgage trust organized in 1971, concentrated on
financing hospitals, clinics for multi-specialty group practices, office build-
ings for medical tenants, laboratories, and nursing homes.
4. A small,specialized REIT, Hotel Investors, was organized in 1969 for the
principal purpose of making long-term mortgage loans to hotels and mo-
tels.
5. Mobil Home Communities, set up in 1969, invests in equity financing of
mobil home parks.
Before 1968, REITs were a rather small factor in the total mortgage market in
the United States. The sudden growth of the trusts' piece of the action between
1968 and 1970 was accounted for by the formation of numerous new REITs that
absorbed existing mortgage debt from other lending institutions. The REITs
were encouraged to buy into outstanding debts by "blue sky" laws, in effect in
some states, requiring them to seek participations in existing mortgages.
Most new REITs bought into outstanding mortgages in the construction-
loan portfolios of commercial banks. The growth of REIT assets, therefore, did
not qualify as a net increase in outstanding mortgage indebtedness. According
to the commercial banks' reports to the Federal Reserve Board, the new REITs
may have bought as much as $1 billion of the banks' outstanding real-estate
loans.
Largely due to the REITs' substantial and growing positions in both short-
and long-term mortgages, the mortgage debt held by commercial banks began
to decrease in 1968. Graph 1, showing the portions of total mortgage debt held
by various lenders from 1965 to 1970, clearly reflects the scarce-money, high-
interest periods in 1966 and 1969-70, when the REITs emerged as significant
factors in mortgage markets.
By 1971, REITs were making a fairly substantial portion of the total short-
term, C and D loans, supplying some $3.2 billion to the real-estate industry.
The REITs' share of this segment of the market was increasing as the REITs
made loan commitments in increasing volume, reaching as much as $630 million
per month in 1971 and growing fast. As construction activity in 1971 grew to
$73.5 billion, with total construction lending amounting to about $40 billion, the
REIT's accounted for some 10 percent of the financing-an impressive showing
for a new player in an old game.
The REITs' success was not altogether cheering for some oldtime participants
in the real-estate business. By mid-1971, for example, some major mortgage
brokers were complaining that their business had fallen off by 40 percent or
more. The REITs were doing such a thorough job of identifying and making
lending opportunities that builders and developers no longer felt the need of
brokers to introduce them to potential lenders-the lenders were now coming
after them.2 With the short-term-mortgage REITs out beating the bushes for
customers, in effect stimulating both borrowing and lending, the shortage of
construction funds that frustrated builders and developers in 1967-1970 was
turned into a sufficiency of funds in many areas.
In 1971, in fact, Audit Investment Research, the industry's leading inde-
pendent research organization, alerted small investors to an imminent glut of
funds in the short-term mortgage market and counseled caution to prospective
investors in short-term REITs. By this time, after just three years in the field,
the short-term REITs had already captured 9-12.5 percent of the United States
market in these loans. The REITs' success was widely credited to the shortages
2 Kenneth Campbell, The Real Estate Trusts: America's Newest Billionaires, (New York: Audit
Investment Research, Inc., 1971), p. 5 0 .
of loan funds felt by the commercial banks. Past experience had demonstrated
that bank loan funds are among the earliest pools of money to dry up when
money is scarce and the earliest to refill when money is easy. Observers specu-
lated about how the REITs would do when the banks, which paid 3 to 4 percent
less than the REITs for their money, were once again flush with funds and
looking for loans to make.
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TABLE 3
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The Flow of Funds
Congress had two ostensible motives for legislating REITs into existence in 1960:
to increase the funds available for residential real-estate construction in the
United States; and to make investment in real estate accessible to the individual
small investor. In practice, these two objectives might have been mutually ex-
clusive to some extent. That is, the best way to direct money to the residential
real-estate market might have been to encourage the domination of the field by
large, institutional investors, in whose company the small investor was likely to
get killed: the best way to attract and protect the small investor might have
been through disincentives for the big investors from the field, or from part of
it. In the event, however, the question of what might have been is moot: the
evidence suggests that neither of Congress' laudable objectives was ever attained
because of the REIT legislation.
On the question of whether the REITs encouraged individual small investors
to invest in the real-estate markets, little unambiguous quantitative evidence
is available. Perhaps the most that can be said with any certainty is that no
student of the REIT phenomenon could claim that the trusts provided - or even
tried to provide - unsophisticated investors with expert, objective real-estate
investment advice. Nor, in the light of the abuses the REITs permitted - even
encouraged - could anyone claim that the REITs offered the small investor a
measure of investment safety resulting from prudent management of diversified
portfolios.
More good evidence is available on the question of whether the REITs in-
creased the money available for residential construction. The evidence suggests
that they did not. The financial institutions' share of total mortgage loans out-
standing remained virtually constant from 1968, when REITs made their debut,
until REITs' downfall in the mid-1970s. From 1971 through 1973, private finan-
cial institutions held a fairly steady 80 percent of total mortgage debt.[Tables
9-11] If REITs had attracted new capital into real estate, the total pool of avail-
able mortgage money would have grown, while the share held by the traditional
financial institutions would have declined.
Instead, the REITs seem to have enabled the funds' sponsors and advisors
to improve their own mortgage portfolios. During the late 1960's outstanding
mortgage loans with low, legally mandated interest ceilings were quickly sold to
the REITs. Prospective mortgage borrowers with deals the REIT sponsors and
advisors found less attractive were simply referred to the trust. As the sponsors'
mortgage holdings diminished, the trusts' grew.
In a more general sense, the REITs facilitated the overall redistribution of
existing real-estate mortgage funds among a larger number of financial institu-
tions. During the early 1970s, as bank advisors and trust sponsors stopped lay-
ing off inferior assets on their REITs, the relative shares of mortgage loans held
by commercial banks and REITs tended to move in lockstep as both lenders in-
creased their investments in home, commercial, and multifamily mortgages. Life
insurance companies, meanwhile, were steadily diversifying out of mortgage as-
sets and diminishing their shares of outstanding mortgage debt. As outstanding
mortgage loans were repaid, the funds were redeployed into other investments.
Prospective borrowers, finding that the life insurance companies had less money
for mortgage loans, turned instead to other lenders - commercial banks and
REITs.
The REITs probably played no more than a minor, facilitating role in this
redeployment of funds by large institutional investors. With or without REITs
in the picture, it is reasonable to assume that the same portfolio decisions,
including those to reduce mortgage commitments between 1968 and 1975, would
have been made. The stock market was booming during much of this period:
investors had better things to do with their money than leave it in long-term,
fixed-rate mortgages.
In any event, the REITs were simply not big enough, especially in the early
years, to have any pronounced effect on the vast mortgage markets. As long
as they concentrated their relatively small assets in mortgage loans, the REITs
might at best have mitigated the effects of the flight of larger investors out
of that market. By the late 1970s, however, the REITs became increasingly
committed to equity investments, and any effect they might have had on the
availability of mortgage credit diminished to virtually nil.
Even the capital from small investors that the REITs brought into the mort-
gage markets did not necessarily represent any net increase in available mortgage
funds. In many cases, certainly, small investors put into the REITs savings that
they withdrew from other depository institutions, some of which were them-
selves mortgage lenders. New issues of debt and equity securities by the trusts,
amounting to more than $1.6 billion in 1971, also tended to draw savings from
other mortgage lenders. In all, therefore, the net contribution of the REITs
to the supplies of available real-estate investment capital and mortgage credit
cannot be equated with the REITs' assets.
A credible estimate of the REITs' overall effect on mortgage credit would
require detailed information on all transactions between the trusts and other
financial institutions, and on the extent to which investment decisions were
distorted by relations between trusts and their advisors. Some of this infor-
mation, at least, is available for several years. From 1968 to 1970, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston and Audit Investment Research, Inc. made careful esti-
mates of the mortgages held by REITs. These estimates, supplemented by other
data when necessary, enabled economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to profile the mortgage-lending activities of various types of sponsoring
institutions and their affiliated trusts.' While the economists' profile does not
include portfolio transactions between REITs and unaffiliated intermediaries,
such transactions were rare compared with those between REITs and sponsors.
In 1968, the outstanding mortgage debt in the United States totalled $410.1
billion, of which $120.8 billion was for multifamily and commercial real estate.
Fully 81.3 percent of the total mortgage debt, including 82.3 percent of the
multifamily and commercial portion, was held by private financial institutions.
Commercial banks held 16 percent of the total mortgage debt and 19.2 percent
of the multifamily and commercial fractions. Life insurance companies held
17.1 percent of the total mortgage debt and 29.1 percent of the multifamily
and commercial debt. Of the rest of the mortgages held by private financial
institutions, savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks held the
bulk. In 1968, then, the share of the total mortgage debt held by the new REITs
was negligible.
'Korobow, Leon and Richard J. Gelson, Op. Cit. Korobow and Gelson's data on mortgage
debt outstanding and market shares of banks and life insurance companies have been up-
dated to reflect revisions reported in the 1984 Flow of Funds Accounts. In most cases, these
changes were fairly minor. However, their estimates of REITs' market shares, where REITs
are classified by type of sponsor, have not been revised because these data are not available.
Two years later the situation had changed somewhat. The commercial banks'
share of multifamily and commercial mortgages had fallen a full point to 18.2
percent; while REITs sponsored by these same commercial banks were holding
0.6 percent of the total, picking up more than half the holdings dropped by their
sponsors.2 The implication of these statistics is that the commercial banks had
started referring applicants for mortgage loans to their REITs, or they had sold
their affiliated trusts some of their mortgage assets and reinvested the proceeds
more profitably.
The same shift occurred in the holdings of the life insurance companies and
their affiliated REITs. As the insurance companies' share of multifamily and
commercial mortgage debt slipped from 29.1 to 28.8 percent between 1968 and
1970, the trusts sponsored by the insurers increased their holdings to 0.4 percent.
Through the early 1970s, life insurance companies - as well as retirement and
pension funds - continued to lighten their commitment to mortgage lending.
Their proportion of assets invested in mortgages and their share of the total
mortgage debt declined dramatically. In 1971, the insurance companies held
14.5 percent of the outstanding mortgage debt [Table 9]; by 1975 their share was
only 11.1 percent [Table 13]. The declining role of the life insurance companies
was felt in all mortgage-loan categories: home, multifamily, and commercial
[Tables 9-10].
The most dramatic decline in the insurance companies' share of the mortgage
market was in multifamily-home loans. Between 1971 and 1973, the amount of
outstanding mortgage debt in this category increased by 33 percent, from $70
billion to $93.1 billion. [Tables 14-16] The value of these mortgages held by
life insurance companies, however, increased by only 10.8 percent, while the
2 Korobow, Leon and Richard J. Gelson, Op. Cit.
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insurers' market share fell from 23.9 to 19.8 percent. [Tables 9, 11]
Despite the defection of the life insurance companies from the mortgage
markets, private financial institutions maintained their approximate 80 percent
share of total mortgage debt through 1973. [Tables 9-11] The slack in the market
was taken up by commercial banks and REITs, which increased their shares of
multifamily-home loans during this period. Increasing their holdings by $4.4
billion, the REITs alone more than made up for the share of the total market
vacated by the life insurers. [Tables 14, 16] Two years later, the trusts' share
of the market in multiple-home mortgages rose from 3.1 to 7.1 percent. [Tables
9,11]
The commercial banks also played a role, increasing their share of multifamily-
home mortgages from 5.7 percent in 1971 to 7.4 percent in 1973. [Tables
9,11] Savings institutions, private pension funds, and state and local govern-
ment retirement funds, however, all substantially reduced their commitments
to multifamily-home mortgages. As a result, the private financial institutions'
aggregate share of this market fell from 79.1 to 78.8 percent. [Tables 9-11]
In the area of mortgages on commercial properties, the REITs' role in cush-
ioning the effect of the insurance companies' rapid withdrawal from the market
was notably effective. Between 1971 and 1973, the total of outstanding commer-
cial mortgage debt rose 35 percent, from $95.8 billion to $131.7 billion. [Tables
14-16] The life insurance companies, however, increased their holdings of these
loans by only 28 percent, as their share of total commercial mortgage debt de-
clined from 29.7 percent in 1971 to 27.7 percent in 1973. [Tables 9,11]
To maintain their previous share of the market in commercial mortgages,
the life insurers would have had to invest an additional $10.7 billion between
1971 and 1973. Had they done so, their holdings of these mortgages would
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have totalled $39.2 billion. Their actual investment fell $2.7 billion shy of the
mark [Table 16]; but the shortfall was more than made up by the REITs, which
increased their holdings of commercial mortgages by $4.3 billion, increasing their
share of this market from 3.3 to 5.7 percent in just two years. [Tables 9,11]
Commercial banks were also enthusiastic buyers of commercial mortgage
debt, increasing their share of the market from 27.5 to 29.4 percent between
1971 and 1973. [Tables 9,11] Private pension plans were shy of this market:
their holdings actually declined from $1.3 billion to $1.1 billion during these
two years. [Tables 14,16] The market shares of other holders of commercial
mortgages held relatively steady, as the total share of commercial mortgage
debt held by private financial institutions rose from 88.6 percent in 1971 to 91.5
percent in 1973. [Tables 9,11)
In the field of mortgages on 1-4 family homes, however, the financial institu-
tions' share fell from 82 percent in 1971 to 81.4 percent two years later, as the
life insurers' share dropped from 7.6 to 5.0 percent. In this case, the commer-
cial banks took the lead in filling the gap, increasing their 1-4 family mortgage
commitments by 42 percent [Tables 14,16], and their market share from 14.9 to
16.6 percent. [Tables 9,11] The REITs played a lesser role in this area, more
than doubling their holdings from $0.8 billion to $1.9 billion as their share of
the market increased from 0.2 to 0.5 percent. [Tables 9,11,14,16]
The importance of the REITs in the mortgage-credit markets peaked in 1973,
when the short-term construction and developent loans in which the trusts'
mortgage assets were concentrated began to go sour. In December 1973, Kas-
suba Development Corp., a very large apartment developer, filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. The ensuing publicity included the news that more than
20 REITs had lent Kassuba money, which they stood to lose. Among the po-
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tential losers: First Mortgage Investors, one of the oldest and seemingly most
stable REITs, which had loaned Kassuba $47.5 million.3
Alerted by the Kassuba disaster, auditors descended on the REITs and began
sifting through their books. The ready reserves that the trusts were required
to maintain against potential losses were greatly increased. More and more
borrowers went belly-up, as conditions in the real-estate marketplace contin-
ued to deteriorate during 1974. Some 20 percent of second-home developers
went bankrupt, sales at some industrial parks were down. by 80 percent, office
buildings remained vacant, and condominiums were going begging. 4 Loan losses
began to outnumber new loans on the REITs' books.
REIT assets reached more than $21 billion in 1974; they never went higher.
Indeed, they declined slightly the following year. [Table 8] Some of the assets
were not exactly solid, either. An increasing fraction of the trusts' assets were
financed by disadvantageous bank loans. As their financial positions weakened,
the REITs found other sources of capital, such as the commercial paper mar-
kets, suddenly closed to them. As the real-estate business slid into recession in
1974-1975, some REITs that specialized in short-term construction loans were
liquidated.
By the spring of 1974, the REITs that survived had virtually stopped making
new loans. More than one-third of REITs' remaining assets were in multifam-
ily and nonresidential mortgages, as the REITs' share of total mortgage debt
declined from its high of 2.4 percent in 1973 to a mere 1.5 percent in 1975.
[Tables 11,13] Prompted by Federal Reserve Bank officials, commercial banks
3 Robertson, Wyndham, "How the Bankers Got Trapped in the REIT Disaster," Fortune, Vol.
XCI, No. 3, March 1975, p. 115.
4
"The Great Land Bust," U.S. News and Word Report, Vol. 78, No. 15, April 14, 1975, p.
153-4.
began belatedly to assist the REITs they sponsored, buying some of their better
mortgage assets for much-needed cash.
The life insurance companies, too, continued to withdraw from ownership
of mortgage assets. Even the commercial banks, despite their $10-to-12 billion
commitment to REITs, did their best to get out of the mortgage-loan business.
As a result, between 1973 and 1975, the percentage of total outstanding mort-
gage debt held by private financial institutions fell from 79.8 percent to 76.3
percent. [Tables 11,13
Even at the height of their success, however, the REITs' contribution to
residential mortgage credit - the ostensible reason for their existence under the
REIT Act - was negligible at best. Even at inflated values, REITs' assets were
only a fraction of those deployed by the big players in the mortgage markets.
The REITs invested only a modest fraction of their modest assets - never more
than 12.5 percent between 1968 and 1975 - in the home mortgages they were
established specifically to finance. [Table 8]
Of the mortgages on 1-4 family homes that they did hold, moreover, the RE-
ITs bought most - 95 percent in 1971, 75 percent in 1972 - from other lenders in
the secondary market. [Tables 19,20] When it came to multifamily and commer-
cial mortages, however, the situation was the reverse: the REITs provided the
original financing at least 90 percent of the time. [Tables 19-21] Despite their
Congressional mandate, REITs actually, made very few residential loans in the
primary market, where they made almost all their multifamily and commercial
loans. From this analysis, REITs hardly emerge as an important creative force
in financing new residential construction, as their Congressional creators hoped
they would be.
Had the situation been reversed, with the REITs making most of their mul-
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tifamily and commercial loans in the secondary market, while acting as the
primary lender for 1-4 family mortgages, the outcome might have been much
happier. If the REITs had purchased their nonhome mortgages from other
lenders, who would have been required to adhere to prudent regulations, the
REITs' loans might have been safer, the industry's untimely collapse in the
mid-1970s might have been less complete, and the real-estate recession might
have been less severe.
In the event, however, the influence of the REITs was to make the recession
worse, not better. To the extent that REIT assets grew at the expense of
S&Ls and thrift institutions, both of which earmark a large part of their assets
for residential mortgages, the REITs exacerbated an already serious housing
shortage and the host of troubles attendant upon it. Between 1965 and 1975,
just as the REITs were coming on the scene, the median sales price of new homes
in the United States increased by 95 percent, from $20,000 to $39,000. By 1975,
housing starts were at their lowest level since World War II; unemployment in
the construction trades was running 19.3 percent, almost double the national
rate.5
If it was the intent of Congress precisely to avoid, or at least to mitigate,
these calamities, then surely Congress would have done well to have designed
the REIT Act more carefully to achieve its desired objectives. Specific measures
might have been adopted to ensure that savings were diverted into the housing
market, and that mortgage credit was available.
It is interesting to consider what might have happened if REIT legislation had
'Continuation of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Reg-
ulation and Insurance on Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy (FINE), "Discus-
sion Principles," Part 2, Dec. 11, 12, 16, 17, 1975. See Insertion by the National Association
of Home Builders (NAHB), Dec. 16, 1975, p. 1306.
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been designed to encourage institutional investors to buy real-estate assets, thus
increasing the availability of mortgage money. In 1965, the financial assets of
private pension funds and life insurance companies were $73.6 billion and $154.2
billion, respectively. Ten years later, the private pension funds had grown more
than 150 percent to $186.6 billion. Life insurance companies' assets increased
81.4 percent to $279.7 billion. The assets of state and local government employee
retirement funds tripled in ten years from $34.1 billion to $104.8 billion. [Tables
1-3]
Without any encouragement from the law, private pension funds in 1965
invested 4.6 percent of their financial assets in mortgages. Ten years later the
share was down to 1.3 percent. [Table 2] Mortgages made up fully 38.9 percent
of life insurers' financial assets in 1965; only 31.9 percent in 1975. [Table 1]
Similarly, 10.9 percent of state and local government employee retirement fund
assets were invested in mortages in 1965, and only 7.2 percent in 1975. [Table
3]
Only minor changes in these percentages would have been sufficient to pro-
duce major effects in the mortgage markets, and major alterations in the United
States housing situation. Had private pension funds been persuaded to commit
10 percent of their 1975 assets to mortgages - less than 20 percent of their com-
mitment to stocks - they would have provided $18.7 billion in mortgage credit
instead of only $2.4 billion. [Table 2] If state and local government retirement
funds had committed 15 percent of their assets to the same cause, they would
have created $15.7 billion in mortgage loans instead of $7.5 billion. [Table 3]
If Congress had acted more purposfully in the matter, it might have written
legislation that would have induced these institutions to invest as much of their
assets in mortgages in 1975 as they had invested 10 years earlier, simply reversing
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the disinvestment that took money out of mortgages during that decade. The
effect would have been to increase the pool of mortgage credit in 1975 by $29.7
billion. This increase in available mortgage money would have far exceeded
the REITs' total assets, and more than doubled their investment in mortgages.
[Table 81
In other words, if Congress truly wanted to attract more capital into real-
estate markets, it would have done better to provide incentives for existing insti-
tutional investors to maintain or increase their mortgage lending. Had Congress





LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES' FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)














$ % $ % $ % $ % $ % $ %
1.5 1.0 1.5 0.9 1.6 0.9 1.7 0.9 1.6 0.8 1.8 0.9
9.1 5.9 8.8 5.4 10.9 6.3 13.2 7.2 13.7 7.2 15.4 7.7
137.8 89.4 145.9 89.9 153.3 88.8 160.7 87.8 167.6 87.6 174.6 86.9











































(In Billions of Dollars)
FINANCIAL ASSETS
1972 1973
% $ % $
1974 1975





1.8 0.8 2.0 0.9 2.1 0.9 2.0 0.8 1.9 0.7
20.6 9.6 26.8 11.5 25.9 10.6 21.9 8.6 28.1 10.0
Credit Mar-








4.5 2.1 4.6 2.0 4.3 1.8 4.4 1.7 6.2 2.2
79.6 37.0 86.6 37.3 92.5 37.8 96.4 37.8 105.5 37.7
75.5 35.1 76.9 33.1 81.4 33.3 86.2 33.8 89.2 31.9
10.0 4.6 11.1 4.8 12.0 4.9 13.4 5.3 15.1 5.4
215.2 100.0 232.4 100.0 244.8 100.0 255.0 100.0 279.7 100.0
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and
rovernors, Washington, D.C., 1984.







PENSION FUNDS' FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)
1967 1968 1969














0.9 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
40.8 55.4 39.5 52.1 51.1 57.2 61.5 60.6 61.4 60.0 67.1 60.8
29.1 39.5 31.9 42.1 32.8 36.7 33.8 33.3 34.6 33.8 36.6 33.2
3.0 4.1 2.8 3.7 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.7
22.7 30.8 25.2 33.2 26.4 29.5 27.0 26.6 27.6 27.0 29.4 26.6
3.4 4.6 3.9 5.1 4.1 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.2 3.8
2.8 3.8 3.6 4.7 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.1






(In Billions of Dollars)
FINANCIAL ASSETS
1972 1973 1974 1975
% $ % $ % $ % $ %
Demand Deposits












88.7 68.2 119.7 74.6 97.4 66.4 70.6 50.9 102.1 54.7
35.0 26.9 38.6 24.1 45.4 31.0 56.9 41.1 75.4 40.4
2.7 2.1 5.7 3.6 8.6 5.9 12.4 8.9 24.9 13.3
28.6 22.0 29.4 18.3 32.9 22.4 39.5 28.5 43.9 23.5
3.7 2.8 2.7 1.7 2.4 1.6 2.4 1.7 2.4 1.3
5.1 3.9 0.5 0.3 2.3 1.6 9.6 6.9 7.4 4.0
130.1 100.0 160.4 100.0 146.6 100.0 138.6 100.0 186.6 100.0
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-8S. Federal Reserve Board of
;overnors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
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TABLE 3
COMPOSITION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT FUNDS' FINANCIAL
ASSETS
1965-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)
Asset 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
% $ % $ % $ % $ % $ %
Demand Deposits












2.5 7.3 2.8 7.3 3.9 9.1 5.8 12.1 7.3 13.7 10.1 16.7
31.3 91.8 34.9 91.6 38.3 89.9 41.6 86.7 45.5 85.5 49.6 82.3
7.6 22.3 7.8 20.5 7.0 16.4 7.3 15.2 7.0 13.2 6.6 10.9
17.2 50.4 20.2 53.0 23.9 56.1 26.6 55.4 30.6 57.5 35.1 58.2
3.7 10.9 4.5 11.8 5.0 11.7 5.4 11.3 5.6 10.5 5.9 9.8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34.1 100.0 38.1 100.0 42.6 100.0 48.0 100.0 53.2 100.0 60.3 100.0
TABLE 3 (continued)
COMPOSITION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT FUNDS' FINANCIAL
ASSETS
1965-1975















1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
$ % $ % $ % $ % $ %
0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.3
15.4 22.3 22.2 27.5 20.2 23.8 16.4 18.6 24.3 23.2
52.9 76.7 57.4 71.2 63.1 74.5 69.8 79.3 79.1 75.5
5.4 7.8 5.7 7.1 5.8 6.8 6.2 7.0 7.8 7.4
39.0 56.5 43.2 53.6 48.4 57.1 54.9 62.4 61.8 59.0
6.3 9.1 6.5 8.1 7.1 8.4 7.7 8.8 7.5 7.2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69.0 100.0 80.6 100.0 84.7 100.0 88.0 100.0 104.8 100.0
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and
,overnors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-88. Federal Reserve Board of
TABLE 4
COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR'S FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
















309.9 91.0 328.1 90.7 365.7 90.9 405.8 90.8 423.4 90.9 460.5 91.2
66.0 19.4 62.9 17.4 72.4 18.0 75.7 16.9 65.7 14.1 76.4 15.1
38.8 11.4 41.2 11.4 50.3 12.5 58.9 13.2 59.5 12.8 70.2 13.9
1.3 0.4 1.3 0.4 2.3 0.6 2.5 0.6 1.9 0.4 3.0 0.6
203.8 59.8 222.6 61.5 240.6 59.8 268.7 60.1 296.2 63.6 310.8 61.6
49.7 14.6 54.4 15.0 58.9 14.6 65.5 14.7 70.5 15.1 72.8 14.4
45.2 13.3 48.2 13.3 51.7 12.9 58.5 13.1 63.4 13.6 65.6 13.0
96.9 28.4 106.4 29.4 112.9 28.1 126.7 28.4 144.0 30.9 151.2 29.9
Open-Market
Paper 2.7 0.8 3.7 1.0 5.8 1.4 5.4 1.2 6.7 1.4 8.2 1.6
Security Credit 9.3 2.7 9.9 2.7 11.3 2.8 12.7 2.8 11.5 2.5 13.0 2.6
Vault Cash 4.9 1.4 5.5 1.5 5.9 1.5 7.2 1.6 7.3 1.6 7.0 1.4
Member Bank
Reserves 18.4 5.4 19.8 5.5 21.1 5.2 21.9 4.9 22.1 4.7 24.2 4.8
Other Financial 7.5 2.2 8.5 2.3 9.5 2.4 12.0 2.7 12.9 2.8 13.2 2.6
Assets
TOTAL Financial 340.7 100.0 361.9 100.0 402.2 100.0 446.9 100.0 465.7 100.0 504.9 100.0
Assets
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve Board of
overnors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Asset
TABLE 4 (continued)
COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR'S FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)
(continued)









$ % $ % $ % $ % $ %
511.7 91.0 587.0 91.6 668.3 91.7 733.1 91.6 764.6 91.6
83.6 14.9 90.0 14.0 88.8 12.2 89.5 11.2 119.5 14.3
82.8 14.7 90.0 14.0 95.7 13.1 101.1 12.6 102.9 12.3











341.3 60.7 401.6 62.7 478.1 65.6 535.7 67.0 533.6 63.9
82.5 14.7 99.3 15.5 119.1 16.3 132.1 16.5 136.2 16.3
74.3 13.2 87.0 13.6 99.6 13.7 103.0 12.9 106.1 12.7
162.2 28.8 188.5 29.4 237.3 32.6 278.4 34.8 266.1 39.1
8.5 1.5 8.3 1.3 7.0 1.0 9.2 1.1 10.3 1.2
13.8 2.5 18.6 2.9 15.2 2.1 13.0 1.6 15.0 1.8









2.7 19.5 3.0 22.7 3.1 29.6 3.7 31.6 3.8
100.0 640.7 100.0 728.8 100.0 800.1 100.0 834.6 100.0
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve Board of
overnors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Asset
TABLE 5
COMPOSITION OF SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS' FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970














108.1 84.8 113.2 85.3 119.5 84.6 128.4 85.4 137.9 86.3 147.3 85.1
2.2 1.7 2.3 1.7 2.4 1.7 2.6 1.7 2.9 1.8 3.4 2.0
2.9 2.3 2.3 1.7 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.2 0.7
- - 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3
8.2 6.4 8.6 6.5 10.3 7.3 10.7 7.1 10.4 6.5 11.0 6.3
- - - - - - 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.8 1.0
6.0 4.7 6.2 4.7 6.9 4.9 6.8 4.5 6.6 4.1 7.8 4.5
127.4 100.0 132.7 100.0 141.3 100.0 150.4 100.0 159.7 100.0 173.1 100.0
Asset
TABLE 5 (continued)
COMPOSITION OF SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS' FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975














1972 1973 1974 1975
$ 
_ $ 
_ $ % $ % $ %
169.2 84.2 200.0 84.4 227.1 85.0 246.1 84.2 273.5 82.1
3.7 1.8 3.5 1.5 6.5 2.4 7.4 2.5 8.2 2.5
0.9 0.4 1.2 0.5 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.3 1.3 0.4
2.3 1.1 3.4 1.4 2.9 1.1 3.6 1.2 8.1 2.4
0.5 0.2 0.9 0.4 2.2 0.8 4.8 1.6 3.8 1.1
13.5 6.7 15.0 6.3 15.4 5.7 14.9 5.1 19.6 5.9
2.8 1.4 3.3 1.4 2.0 0.7 1.8 0.6 2.7 0.8
8.1 4.0 9.6 4.0 10.1 3.8 12.7 4.3 15.9 4.8
201.0 100.0 236.9 100.0 267.2 100.0 292.3 100.0 333.1 100.0
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and
tovernors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve Board of
COMPOSITION OF MUTUAL
TABLE 6
SAVINGS BANKS' FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)














0.8 1.4 0.8 1.3 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.3
2.3 3.9 2.0 3.3 2.5 3.7 2.4 3.4 2.5 3.4 2.8 3.5
55.0 93.1 57.7 93.8 62.7 93.3 67.0 93.6 69.8 93.7 73.5 92.7
6.3 10.7 5.8 9.4 5.5 8.2 5.5 7.7 5.0 6.7 5.4 6.8
2.9 4.9 3.2 5.2 5.3 7.9 6.6 9.2 6.9 9.3 8.1 10.2
44.6 75.5 47.3 76.9 50.5 75.1 53.5 74.7 56.1 75.3 57.9 73.0
1.0 1.7 1.0 1.6 1.2 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.5
59.1 100.0 615.5 100.0 67.2 100.0 71.6 100.0 74.5 100.0 79.3 100.0












0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0
3.5 3.9 4.5 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.4 4.4 3.6
82.8 91.9 92.4 91.0 96.8 90.6 99.4 91.1 110.1 90.9
6.3 7.0 7.7 7.6 7.2 6.7 7.0 6.4 10.9 9.0
12.0 13.3 14.2 14.0 13.1 12.3 14.0 12.8 17.5 14.5
62.0 68.8 67.6 66.6 73.2 68.5 74.9 68.7 77.2 63.7
2.9 3.2 3.6 3.5 4.7 4.4 4.9 4.5 5.4 4.5
TOTAL 90.1 100.0 101.5 100.0 106.8 100.0 109.1 100.0 121.1 100.0
urce: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve Board of




OF FINANCIAL COMPANIES' FINANCIAL ASSETS
1965-1975
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ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve Board of



























OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS' PHYSICAL & FINANCIAL ASSETS
1968-1975
(In Billions of Dollars)
1968 1969 1970 1971
$ % $ % $ % $ %
0.3 27.3 0.7 25.9 0.9 18.8 1.3 16.9
0.1 9.1 0.2 7.4 0.3 6.3 0.4 5.2
0.2 18.2 0.5 18.5 0.6 12.5 0.9 11.7
0.8 72.7 2.0 74.1 3.9 81.3 6.4 83.1
- - 0.2 7.4 0.6 12.5 0.8 10.4
0.7 63.6 1.3 48.1 2.0 41.7 3.2 41.6
0.1 9.1 0.5 18.5 1.3 27.1 2.2 28.6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 2.6
1.1 100.0 2.7 100.0 4.8 100.0 7.7 100.0
TABLE 8 (continued)
COMPOSITION OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS' PHYSICAL & FINANCIAL ASSETS
1968-1975





















% $ % $ %
2.5 18.0 3.3 16.2 4.3 19.7 7.3 34.3
0.8 5.8 1.1 5.4 1.4 6.4 2.4 11.3
1.7 12.2 2.2 10.8 2.9 13.3 4.9 23.0
11.4 82.0 17.0 84.0 17.5 80.3 14.0 65.7
1.2 8.6 1.9 9.4 1.7 7.8 1.4 6.6
5.0 36.0 7.5 37.1 7.7 35.3 7.0 32.9
4.2 30.2 6.6 32.6 6.8 31.2 4.8 22.5
1.0 7.2 1.0 4.9 1.3 6.0 0.8 3.8
13.9 100.0 20.2 100.0 21.8 100.0 21.3 100.0
urce: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and
overnors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve Board of
TABLE 9
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN MORTGAGE LENDING BY TYPE
OF MORTGAGE (%)
1971
































































ource: Derived from the Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83.
ederal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 10
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN MORTGAGE LENDING BY TYPE
OF MORTGAGE (%)
1972
































































ource: Derived from the Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83.
ederal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 11
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN MORTGAGE LENDING BY TYPE
OF MORTGAGE (%)
1973






























































)urce: Derived from the Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83.
deral Reserve Board of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 12
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN MORTGAGE LENDING BY TYPE
OF MORTGAGE (%)
1974






























































ource: Derived from the Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83.
ederal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 13
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN MORTGAGE LENDING BY TYPE
OF MORTGAGE (%)
1975




























































ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83.
































































$ 415.3 $ 264.6
$ 520.6 $ 322.6
$ 55.4
$ 70.0
$ 84.9 $ 10.1
$ 95.8 $ 32.2
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83.
soard of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
Federal Reserve
TABLE 15





























































$ 475.2 $ 298.4
$ 596.2 $ 365.1
$ 65.2
$ 82.7
$ 100.7 $ 10.8
$ 112.6 $ 35.8
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve
oard of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 16



























































$ 540.3 $ 334.4
$ 676.9 $ 410.8
$ 73.4
$ 93.1
$ 120.6 $ 11.8
$ 131.7 $ 41.3
ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve
oard of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 17





















Private Pension Funds 2.4
State and Local










$ 577.6 $ 354.2




























$ 134.9 $ 12.7
$ 146.9 $ 46.3
surce: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve
oard of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 18














































$ 610.5 $ 376.2

















ource: Flow of Funds Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1960-83. Federal Reserve
loard of Governors, Washington, D.C., 1984.
TABLE 19
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1971
(millions of dollars)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
COMMERCIAL BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 12598 1130 13728 1971
Multi-Family 726 6 732 34
Non-Residential 7104 108 7212 242
Farm Properties 1554 68 1622 15
TOTALS 21982 1312 23294 2262
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 3540 1874 5414 175
Multi-Family 1870 266 2136 59
Non-Residential 1611 270 1881 36
Farm Properties 14 24 38 0
TOTALS 7036 2433 9469 270
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 26603 6635 33238 1654
Multi-Family 3711 467 4179 187
Non-Residential 3363 354 3717 173
Farm Properties 94 51 145 0
TOTALS 33770 7508 41278 2013
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 333 185 519 37
Multi-Family 1708 149 1857 8
Non-Residential 3744 300 4043 19
Farm Properties 478 2 481 1
TOTALS 6263 636 6900 65
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 40 15 55 235
Multi-Family 35 0 36 270
Non-Residential 170 4 174 67
Farm Properties 0 16 16 4
TOTALS 246 36 281 576
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 12487 403 12890 12394
Multi-Family 1960 12 1972 1583
Non-Residential 1967 0 1967 1790
Farm Properties 11 0 11 10
TOTALS 16425 415 16840 15777
TABLE 19
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY






1-4 Family Homes 11757 7493 4264
Multi-Family 698 430 268
Non-Residential 6970 5120 1850
Farm Properties 1607 1732 -125
TOTALS 21031 14774 6257
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 5239 4001 1237
Multi-Family 2077 481 1597
Non-Residential 1845 927 918
Farm Properties 38 109 -70
TOTALS 9199 5518 3681
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 31584 15433 16151
Multi-Family 3992 1528 2464
Non-Residential 3544 1422 2122
Farm Properties 145 70 75
TOTALS 39265 18452 20812
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 481 2530 -2049
Multi-Family 1849 1140 709
Non-Residential 4024 1730 2295
Farm Properties 480 520 -40
TOTALS 6834 5920 914
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes -180 117 -297
Multi-Family -234 77 -311
Non-Residential 107 30 78
Farm Properties 12 0 12
TOTALS -295 223 -519
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 496 243 253
Multi-Family 389 14 375
Non-Residential 177 22 155
Farm Properties 1 0 1
TOTALS 1063 279 784
TABLE 19
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1971
(millions of dollars)
(continued)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 10 155 165 17
Multi-Family 193 5 198 0
Non-Residential 579 35 614 0
Farm Properties 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 782 195 977 17
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 197 192 388 1
Multi-Family 358 69 426 0
Non-Residential 109 20 130 0
Farm Properties 20 3 23 0
TOTALS 683 284 957 1
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 1798 3733 5531 1853
Multi-Family 1372 242 1614 56
Non-Residential 384 42 426 12
Farm Properties 1919 227 2145 542
TOTALS 5473 4243 9717 2464
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 0 3947 3974 197
Multi-Family 0 52 52 8
Non-Residential 0 12 12 6
Farm Properties 0 542 542 227
TOTALS 0 4554 4554 438
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 183 24 207 0
Multi-Family 520 6 526 14
Non-Residential 219 3 222 0
Farm Properties 53 19 72 0
TOTALS 975 51 1026 14
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 57788 18292 76081 18534
Multi-Family 12455 1275 13729 2220
Non-Residential 19250 1148 20398 2345
Farm Properties 4143 952 5095 799
TOTALS 93636 21668 115304 23899
TABLE 19
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY





REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 148 81 68
Multi-Family 198 50 148
Non-Residential 614 224 390
Farm Properties 0 0 0
TOTALS 961 355 605
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 387 303 84
Multi-Family 426 141 286
Non-Residential 130 116 14
Farm Properties 23 43 -20
TOTALS 966 602 364
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 3678 1476 2202
Multi-Family 1558 253 1306
Non-Residential 413 259 154
Farm Properties 1603 893 710
TOTALS 7253 2880 4373
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 3750 157 3594
Multi-Family 44 8 35
Non-Residential 6 6 0
Farm Properties 316 113 202
TOTALS 4116 285 3831
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 207 142 65
Multi-Family 512 11 502
Non-Residential 222 1 221
Farm Properties 72 38 34
TOTALS 1021 190 822
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 57546 31974 25573
Multi-Family 11509 4131 7378
Non-Residential 18053 9856 8197
Farm Properties 4296 3518 778
TOTALS 91408 49479 41925
upply of Mortgage Credit, 1970-79, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1980
ote: Sum of components may not equal totals due to rounding.
TABLE 20
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1972
(millions of dollars)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
COMMERCIAL BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 17710 1046 18756 2245
Multi-Family 1347 40 1386 93
Non-Residential 10109 149 10257 389
Farm Properties 2007 2 2009 1
TOTALS 31173 1236 32409 2727
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 5052 2708 7761 202
Multi-Family 1929 263 2193 59
Non-Residential 2358 251 2609 80
Farm Properties 23 0 23 0
TOTALS 9363 3222 12585 341
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 36739 9502 46241 2886
Multi-Family 5285 622 5907 425
Non-Residential 4129 404 4532 268
Farm Properties 139 23 162 3
TOTALS 46292 10550 56842 3582
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 401 207 607 5
Multi-Family 1826 107 1933 1
Non-Residential 4581 292 4872 13
Farm Properties 676 1 676 0
TOTALS 7483 606 8089 19
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 120 3 123 405
Multi-Family 23 1 24 286
Non-Residential 135 2 136 204
Farm Properties 0 4 5 10
TOTALS 278 10 288 905
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 13326 1431 14757 14315
Multi-Family 2698 18 2716 2257
Non-Residential 1534 13 1547 1212
Farm Properties 57 0 57 47
TOTALS 17615 1452 19077 17831
TABLE 20
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY






1-4 Family Homes 16511 9383 7128
Multi-Family 1293 499 794
Non-Residential 9869 5444 4425
Farm Properties 2009 1447 561
TOTALS 29682 16773 12909
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 7559 4895 2664
Multi-Family 2134 965 1169
Non-Residential 2529 1124 12
Farm Properties 23 11 12
TOTALS 12245 6995 5250
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 43356 20073 23282
Multi-Family 5481 2371 3111
Non-Residential 4265 1405 2859
Farm Properties 159 54 104
TOTALS 53260 23903 29357
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 603 2859 -2257
Multi-Family 1931 1341 590
Non-Residential 4860 1993 2867
Farm Properties 676 597 79
TOTALS 8070 6790 1280
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes -282 132 -414
Multi-Family -262 84 -346
Non-Residential -68 97 -165
Farm Properties -5 2 -7
TOTALS -617 316 -933
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 442 458 -16
Multi-Family 459 29 430
Non-Residential 335 102 233
Farm Properties 10 0 10
TOTALS 1246 589 657
TABLE 20
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1972
(millions of dollars)
(continued)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 47 266 313 111
Multi-Family 327 20 347 0
Non-Residential 913 108 1021 0
Farm Properties 3 0 3 0
TOTALS 1290 394 1683 111
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 237 96 333 5
Multi-Family 72 29 100 3
Non-Residential 77 124 201 0
Farm Properties 53 4 57 0
TOTALS 439 253 692 8
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 2044 4996 7040 3799
Multi-Family 1444 346 1790 204
Non-Residential 436 59 495 11
Farm Properties 2767 151 2918 776
TOTALS 6690 5553 12243 4791
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 0 4756 4756 157
Multi-Family 0 322 322 9
Non-Residential 0 15 15 6
Farm Properties 0 789 789 151
TOTALS 0 5882 5882 323
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 188 65 253 1
Multi-Family 476 53 529 1
Non-Residential 261 3 264 8
Farm Properties 58 17 74 0
TOTALS 982 138 1120 10
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 75864 25076 100939 24129
Multi-Family 15427 1820 17247 3339
Non-Residential 24532 1419 25951 2191
Farm Properties 5783 991 6773 988
TOTALS 121605 29305 150911 30647
TABLE 20
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY





REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 202 119 83
Multi-Family 347 86 260
Non-Residential 1021 309 711
Farm Properties 3 0 3
TOTALS 1573 515 1057
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 328 294 34
Multi-Family 97 145 -48
Non-Residential 201 54 147
Farm Properties 57 18 39
TOTALS 683 512 171
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 3240 2222 1018
Multi-Family 1586 290 1296
Non-Residential 484 358 126
Farm Properties 2142 1112 1029
TOTALS 7452 3983 3470
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 4599 520 4079
Multi-Family 313 20 293
Non-Residential 9 1 9
Farm Properties 638 127 511
TOTALS 5559 668 4891
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 252 154 98
Multi-Family 527 46 481
Non-Residential 256 6 251
Farm Properties 74 30 44
TOTALS 1110 236 873
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 76810 41111 35699
Multi-Family 13907 5877 8030
Non-Residential 23760 10892 12868
Farm Properties 5785 3400 2386
TOTALS 120264 61281 58983
upply of Mortgage Credit, 1970-79, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1980
ote: Sum of components may not equal totals due to rounding.
TABLE 21
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1973
(millions of dollars)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
COMMERCIAL BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 18782 925 19708 2010
Multi-Family 1122 24 1146 75
Non-Residential 11484 214 11699 634
Farm Properties 2179 12 2191 4
TOTALS 33568 1176 34743 2723
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 5912 1958 7870 161
Multi-Family 2088 275 2363 64
Non-Residential 2484 284 2768 41
Farm Properties 7 0 7 0
TOTALS 10491 2517 13009 266
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 38441 5862 44303 2759
Multi-Family 4171 539 4710 414
Non-Residential 4024 615 4639 243
Farm Properties 194 3 197 0
TOTALS 46830 7109 53849 3416
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 380 247 628 8
Multi-Family 2293 124 2417 1
Non-Residential 6338 408 6746 8
Farm Properties 964 0 964 0
TOTALS 9975 780 10755 17
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 13 6 18 131
Multi-Family 26 4 30 79
Non-Residential 89 23 112 67
Farm Properties 0 3 3 21
TOTALS 127 36 163 297
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 12657 1382 14039 14980
Multi-Family 928 11 939 1871
Non-Residential 623 3 626 827
Farm Properties 43 0 43 49
TOTALS 14251 1396 15647 17727
TABLE 21
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY






1-4 Family Homes 17698 8954 8744
Multi-Family 1071 815 256
Non-Residential 11065 5862 5203
Farm Properties 2187 1504 683
TOTALS 32021 17134 14886
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 7709 5169 2540
Multi-Family 2299 959 1340
Non-Residential 2727 1064 1663
Farm Properties 7 6 2
TOTALS 12742 7197 5545
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 41545 20999 20545
Multi-Family 4297 1880 2416
Non-Residential 4396 1917 2478
Farm Properties 197 257 -60
TOTALS 50434 25054 25380
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 620 2458 -1838
Multi-Family 2416 1370 1046
Non-Residential 6738 1975 4763
Farm Properties 964 651 312
TOTALS 10738 6455 4283
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes -112 116 -228
Multi-Family -49 47 -96
Non-Residential 45 54 -9
Farm Properties -18 0 -18
TOTALS -134 218 -352
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes -941 374 -1315
Multi-Family -932 82 -1015
Non-Residential -202 40 -242
Farm Properties -6 0 -6
TOTALS -2080 497 -2577
TABLE 21
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1973
(millions of dollars)
(continued)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 28 13 41 39
Multi-Family 611 17 628 0
Non-Residential 1175 68 1242 1
Farm Properties 8 0 8 0
TOTALS 1822 97 1919 40
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 217 302 519 24
Multi-Family 64 71 135 41
Non-Residential 257 252 509 0
Farm Properties 10 114 124 7
TOTALS 547 740 1287 73
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 2351 7396 9748 4315
Multi-Family 2218 701 2920 306
Non-Residential 724 82 806 7
Farm Properties 3664 191 3855 551
TOTALS 8958 8371 17328 5180
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 0 4178 4178 436
Multi-Family 0 268 268 15
Non-Residential 0 7 7 14
Farm Properties 0 552 552 191
TOTALS 0 5007 5007 656
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 345 302 647 0
Multi-Family 500 109 609 0
Non-Residential 200 2 202 0
Farm Properties 59 16 75 0
TOTALS 1103 430 1532 0
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 79126 22473 101700 24862
Multi-Family 14022 2144 16166 2866
Non-Residential 27397 1959 29356 1844
Farm Properties 7128 891 8019 822
TOTALS 127673 27567 155240 30395
TABLE 21
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY





REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 1 172 -171
Multi-Family 628 273 355
Non-Residential 1241 549 692
Farm Properties 8 2 6
TOTALS 1879 996 882
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 495 327 168
Multi-Family 94 163 -69
Non-Residential 509 39 470
Farm Properties 117 14 103
TOTALS 1214 542 672
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 5432 2491 2942
Multi-Family 2613 502 2111
Non-Residential 798 482 317
Farm Properties 3305 1357 1948
TOTALS 12149 4831 7317
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 3743 794 2949
Multi-Family 254 17 236
Non-Residential -7 2 -9
Farm Properties 361 198 163
TOTALS 4351 1012 3339
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 647 117 530
Multi-Family 609 56 552
Non-Residential 202 9 193
Farm Properties 75 34 40
TOTALS 1532 1532 1315
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 76837 41971 34866
Multi-Family 13299 6166 7134
Non-Residential 27512 11994 15518
Farm Properties 7197 4023 3174
TOTALS 124846 64153 60692
upply of Mortgage Credit, 1970-79, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1980
ote: Sum of components may not equal totals due to rounding.
TABLE 22
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1974
(millions of dollars)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
COMMERCIAL BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 16128 372 16500 1623
Multi-Family 749 144 893 60
Non-Residential 9844 594 10438 747
Farm Properties 2054 3 2056 0
TOTALS 28775 1112 29887 2430
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 3929 1039 4968 228
Multi-Family 1532 261 1793 77
Non-Residential 1578 221 1800 71
Farm Properties 11 0 7 11
TOTALS 7051 1521 8572 378
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 30932 4824 35756 3093
Multi-Family 3262 433 3695 228
Non-Residential 3588 608 4196 206
Farm Properties 49 0 49 0
TOTALS 37832 5865 43697 3527
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 359 179 538 24
Multi-Family 2046 128 2174 5
Non-Residential 6468 351 6819 4
Farm Properties 957 1 958 0
TOTALS 9870 659 10489 33
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 32 25 57 1
Multi-Family 58 6 64 5
Non-Residential 64 12 76 10
Farm Properties 0 0 1 2
TOTALS 154 44 198 17
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 13026 880 13906 14886
Multi-Family 595 9 603 639
Non-Residential 748 1 749 620
Farm Properties 7 8 15 19
TOTALS 14375 899 15274 16164
TABLE 22
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY






1-4 Family Homes 14877 7890 6986
Multi-Family 832 670 162
Non-Residential 9691 5956 3735
Farm Properties 2056 1478 578
TOTALS 27456 15994 11462
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 4740 4307 432
Multi-Family 1716 883 833
Non-Residential 1729 995 734
Farm Properties 0 11 -2
TOTALS 8196 6199 1997
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 32663 18457 14206
Multi-Family 3467 1518 1949
Non-Residential 3990 1578 2412
Farm Properties 49 104 -56
TOTALS 40169 21658 18511
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 514 1872 -1358
Multi-Family 2170 1066 1104
Non-Residential 6815 2265 4550
Farm Properties 958 627 330
TOTALS 10456 5829 4626
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 56 82 -26
Multi-Family 60 33 27
Non-Residential 67 70 -3
Farm Properties -1 1 -2
TOTALS 181 186 -5
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes -980 324 -1303
Multi-Family -36 4 -40
Non-Residential 126 31 97
Farm Properties -3 0 -3
TOTALS -891 359 -1249
TABLE 22
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1974
(millions of dollars)
(continued)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 12 9 21 0
Multi-Family 309 11 320 0
Non-Residential 779 42 821 8
Farm Properties 6 0 6 0
TOTALS 1106 62 1168 8
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 86 250 336 28
Multi-Family 97 98 195 18
Non-Residential 203 241 444 6
Farm Properties 5 21 26 19
TOTALS 392 609 1001 71
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 2467 8801 11268 2534
Multi-Family 2870 805 3675 395
Non-Residential 355 156 511 20
Farm Properties 4507 388 4895 844
TOTALS 10199 10151 20350 3794
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 0 6305 6305 692
Multi-Family 0 316 316 35
Non-Residential 0 20 20 16
Farm Properties 0 844 844 388
TOTALS 0 7485 7485 1132
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 538 354 891 0
Multi-Family 759 173 932 8
Non-Residential 353 1 354 1
Farm Properties 66 5 71 0
TOTALS 1716 533 2249 10
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 67508 23039 90546 23111
Multi-Family 12277 2383 14660 1471
Non-Residential 23982 2247 26229 1708
Farm Properties 7663 1270 8933 1272
TOTALS 111429 28939 140368 27562
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TABLE 22
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY





REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 21 56 -35
Multi-Family 320 259 61
Non-Residential 814 524 290
Farm Properties 6 6 -0
TOTALS 1160 845 315
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 308 237 71
Multi-Family 177 94 83
Non-Residential 438 13 425
Farm Properties 7 74 -67
TOTALS 930 419 511
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 8734 2215 6519
Multi-Family 3280 545 2735
Non-Residential 492 405 86
Farm Properties 4051 1489 2562
TOTALS 16556 4655 11902
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 5612 984 4628
Multi-Family 281 15 266
Non-Residential 4 1 2
Farm Properties 456 189 267
TOTALS 6353 1189 5164
STATE & LOCAO CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 891 172 719
Multi-Family 924 41 882
Non-Residential 353 12 341
Farm Properties 71 37 34
TOTALS 2239 262 1977
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 67435 36596 30839
Multi-Family 13190 5128 8062
Non-Residential 24521 11851 12670
Farm Properties 7661 4019 3641
TOTALS 112806 57594 55212
)upply of Mortgage Credit, 1970-79, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1980
;ote: Sum of components may not equal totals due to rounding.
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TABLE 23
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1975
(millions of dollars)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
COMMERCIAL BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 14450 236 14686 2932
Multi-Family 767 30 796 27
Non-Residential 9956 165 10121 427
Farm Properties 1889 1 1890 1
TOTALS 27062 431 27494 3386
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 4333 1103 5436 235
Multi-Family 1459 343 1805 32
Non-Residential 1325 304 1629 3
Farm Properties 11 1 12 0
TOTALS 7127 1751 8879 269
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 41242 7167 48409 4726
Multi-Family 3562 393 3955 102
Non-Residential 4910 898 5808 406
Farm Properties 95 13 108 0
TOTALS 49809 8471 58280 5234
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 251 126 377 25
Multi-Family 1139 76 1215 0
Non-Residential 5832 310 6143 3
Farm Properties 1075 0 1075 0
TOTALS 8297 513 8810 28
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 3 11 14 10
Multi-Family 90 8 97 25
Non-Residential 123 13 136 21
Farm Properties 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 216 31 247 57
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 13992 785 14777 14451
Multi-Family 778 24 802 807
Non-Residential 1159 11 1170 1067
Farm Properties 1 0 1 0
TOTALS 15930 820 16750 16324
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TABLE 23
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY






1-4 Family Homes 11755 9550 2204
Multi-Family 770 1143 -374
Non-Residential 9694 5964 3730
Farm Properties 1889 1571 318
TOTALS 24107 18228 5880
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
1-4 Family Homes 5202 4338 854
Multi-Family 1770 970 800
Non-Residential 1626 912 715
Farm Properties 12 14 -2
TOTALS 8610 6244 2366
SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOC.
1-4 Family Homes 43683 21606 22077
Multi-Family 3853 1844 2009
Non-Residential 5402 2464 2938
Farm Properties 108 85 23
TOTALS 53046 25999 27047
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 353 1780 -1427
Multi-Family 1215 1216 -1
Non-Residential 6140 2493 3647
Farm Properties 1075 646 429
TOTALS 8782 6135 2647
PRV. NON-INSURED PENSION FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 4 96 -92
Multi-Family 72 23 49
Non-Residential 115 62 53
Farm Properties 0 0 -0
TOTALS 191 181 10
MORTGAGE COMPANIES
1-4 Family Homes 326 271 55
Multi-Family -5 7 -11
Non-Residential 103 42 62
Farm Properties 1 0 1
TOTALS 426 319 107
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TABLE 23
ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY
ELEVEN MAJOR LENDING GROUPS FOR THE YEAR, 1975
(millions of dollars)
(continued)
Total Loan Loan Gross Loan
Originations Purchases Acquisitions Sales
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 34 6 40 4
Multi-Family 227 8 235 9
Non-Residential 419 26 445 18
Farm Properties 2 0 2 0
TOTALS 682 40 722 31
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 146 138 284 87
Multi-Family 147 156 303 21
Non-Residential 110 202 312 25
Farm Properties 7 12 19 7
TOTALS 410 508 918 139
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 2867 10732 13599 6722
Multi-Family 1725 1261 2986 892
Non-Residential 378 160 538 18
Farm Properties 4779 373 5152 1052
TOTALS 9749 12526 22774 8694
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 0 11156 11156 454
Multi-Family 0 594 594 32
Non-Residential 0 17 17 12
Farm Properties 0 1062 1062 373
TOTALS 0 12829 12829 871
STATE & LOCAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 594 420 1015 7
Multi-Family 749 263 1012 250
Non-Residential 16 0 16 0
Farm Properties 76 0 76 0
TOTALS 1434 684 2118 257
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 77913 31881 109793 29652
Multi-Family 10642 3154 13797 2196
Non-Residential 24228 2106 26334 1999
Farm Properties 7934 1462 9397 1443
TOTALS 120717 38604 159320 35290
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ANNUAL GROSS FLOWS OF LONG-TERM MORTGAGE LOANS BY





REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
1-4 Family Homes 36 60 -24
Multi-Family 226 269 -42
Non-Residential 427 592 -165
Farm Properties 2 3 -1
TOTALS 691 923 -232
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT FUNDS
1-4 Family Homes 198 245 -47
Multi-Family 282 120 162
Non-Residential 287 55 232
Farm Properties 12 17 -5
TOTALS 779 437 342
FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 6877 6475 4230
Multi-Family 2094 906 1188
Non-Residential 520 223 297
Farm Properties 4089 1745 2345
TOTALS 13580 5521 8060
MORTGAGE POOLS
1-4 Family Homes 10702 1235 9466
Multi-Family 562 66 495
Non-Residential 5 1 4
Farm Properties 689 145 544
TOTALS 11957 1447 10510
STATE & LOCAO CREDIT AGENCIES
1-4 Family Homes 1008 280 728
Multi-Family 762 130 632
Non-Residential 16 17 -2
Farm Properties 76 31 45
TOTALS 1861 458 1403
TOTALS FOR ELEVEN GROUPS
1-4 Family Homes 80142 42117 38024
Multi-Family 11601 6694 4907
Non-Residential 24335 12823 11512
Farm Properties 7953 4258 3696
TOTALS 124031 65892 58113
upply of Mortgage Credit, 1970-79, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 1980




The entrance of the major financial institutions-banks, insurance companies,
savings and loans-into the field in 1969 touched off the explosive growth of the
REIT industry. From $1 billion, total REIT assets doubled to $2 billion in
1969; then increased by 135 percent in 1970, by 72 percent in 1971, and by
75 percent in 1972. [Table 1] To raise new capital to buy these assets, REITs
became significant factors in Wall Street's generally booming business in new
issues. [Table 2]; [Chart A]
Between 1968 and 1971, as the total number of new issues increased from 19
to 74 (Table 2), the REITs' gross proceeds from public offerings grew from only
$138 million to more than $1.6 billion. (By 1974, when the bloom was definitely
off the REIT rose, there were only 12 new REIT issues, raising less than $200
million.) At their most active, REITs very suddenly came to represent fully 12
percent of total public offerings of new stock issues and 4.5 percent of all new
bond issues in the U.S.
At the outset of the REIT boom in 1969, almost 90 percent of the primary
issues was for shares of beneficial interest, while the remaining 10 percent was
almost entirely made up of convertible debt. Straight debt instruments were
virtually unused as sources of capital. During the next two years, as the forma-
tion of new REITs continued at high speed, convertible debt came to represent
a larger share of the new capital, growing as much as fivefold in a single year.
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At the same time, straight debt emerged as a modest but real factor in REIT
capitalizations. Straight equity offerings, meanwhile, were declining in impor-
tance, both relatively and absolutely. ([Table 3]; [Appendix I] lists the monthly
amounts of new capital raised by equity and debt from 1969 through 1974.)
The reason for the changes in the relative importance of equity and debt for
raising capital is suggested by a comparison of the stock prices of equity and
mortgage REITs with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. [Graph B] Beginning
at 100 in January 1967, the price of mortgage-trust stocks passed the 400 mark
in two years, and equity-trust stocks passed 200, while the Dow was still stuck
in the neighborhood of 100, where it started. Evidently, the market was valuing
the REITs, especially the mortgage REITs, as growth stocks.
The short-term construction-and-development trusts, the C and D REITs,
were the first to be recognized for their potential as growth stocks. According to
its annual reports Continental Mortgage Investors, the stellar performer among
the three earliest C and Ds, increased its assets from $25 million in 1962 to $400
million in 1971, while its per-share earnings improved at an annual rate of about
20 percent.
This kind of performance which led to the practice known as "equity leverag-
ing," becomes feasible when enthusiasm for a stock raises its market price above
its book value-the actual value of the share of the company's assets represented
by a share of stock. Under such conditions, equity becomes readily saleable, as
the booming sales of REIT stocks during this period illustrate.
In theory, at least, equity leveraging should have been followed soon by debt
leveraging. Robust equity sales had so lowered the debt-to-equity ratios of the
REITs that new debt could be sold without raising the ratios to unacceptable
levels. The potential for combined equity and debt leveraging led to REITs
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being described as "perpetual growth machines"1
As early as 1969, however, investors' faith in the "perpetual" quality of the
REIT stocks began to falter as the prices of mortgage trust shares dropped rather
sharply, then proceeded on a disconcertingly bumpy road. Investors began to
believe that REIT stocks, just like all stocks, entailed risks as well as rewards.
Wall Street decided that what the REITs ought to do was to switch to selling
convertible bonds instead of the straight, simple kind. [Table 31
A convertible bond, in short, gives its owner the right to collect interest on
the debt it represents, like an ordinary bond; as well as to buy an amount of the
company's common stock at a certain price. Most convertible bonds carry with
them the right of the issuer to buy them back-to call them-at some premium
over the face value, as well as the buyer's right to return them to the issuer for
shares of stock.
The REITs' willingness to issue convertible bonds in huge quantities has
provoked analysis from a number of commentators. In general, it has been
pointed out, companies use convertible debentures for very specific reasons:
.convertibles tend to be issued by the smaller and more speculative
firms. They are almost invariably unsecured and generally subor-
dinated. Now put yourself in the position of a potential investor.
You are approached by a small firm with an untried product line
that wants to issue some junior unsecured debt. You know that if
things go well you will get your money back but, if they do not,
'The term "perpetual growth machines" or any variant thereof, is one to which many writers
have referred. It is based on successive equity and debt leveraging to increase trust assets.
See, for example, Howard H. Stevenson, "What went wrong with REITs?" Harvard Business
School, Boston, MA 1976; and Kenneth D. Campbell, "The Real Estate Trusts: America's
Newest Billionaires", "Chapter 6, Audit Investment Research, Inc., New York, 1971.
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you could easily be left with nothing. Since the firm is in a new
line of business, it is very difficult to assess the chances of trouble.
Therefore you don't know what the fair rate of interest is. Also,
you may be worried that once you have made the loan, management
will be tempted to run extra risks. It may borrow additional senior
debt or it may decide to expand its operations and go for broke on
your money. In fact, if you charge a very high rate of interest, you
could be encouraging this to happen. What can management do to
protect you against a misestimate of the risk and to assure you that
its intentions are honorable? In crude terms, it can give you a piece
of the action. You don't mind the company running unanticipated
risks, as long as you share in the gains as well as the losses.
Convertible securities and warrants make sense whenever it is un-
usually costly to assess the risk of debt or whenever investors are
worried that management may not act in the bondholder's interest.2
In the event, the REITs followed Brearly and Meyers' scenario almost to the
letter, selling extraordinary quantities of convertibles-debentures and warrants
between 1969 and 1972. The REITs' use of convertibles to raise capital was
encouraged by the underwriters, for whom convertibles promised rich rewards
for relatively slight additional risks. Normally, the underwriting "spreads" on
bonds-are less than 100 basis points, or 1 percent. On the REITs' convertible
bonds, however, the underwriters were able to take spreads of more than 200
basis points, or 2 percent. Indeed, in 1971 the average underwriting spread for
a sample of convertible offerings was 319 basis points, or 3.19 percent, while the
2 Brealey, Richard A., and Stewart C. Meyers, Principles of Corporate Finance, New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1981), p. 516.
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largest spread was 600 basis points. [Table 4]
In ordinary circumstances, convertible debentures are often considered "cheap
debt" because they typically yield less than ordinary, "straight debt" instru-
ments. The investor is compensated for the lower face yield by the call-option
"sweetener"- the right to convert the debenture into common stock. The value
of the call option is approximately the difference between the face yield of the
convertible debenture and the face yield of an ordinary debenture, aside from
slight discrepancies due to imperfections in the market. The debtor issuing the
debenture, meanwhile, saves money on the lower yield.
In the case of the REITs' convertibles, however, investors were persuaded
by a superb Wall Street marketing effort that the REITs were hot enough to
justify spreads of 300 to 400 percent between the conversion price and the stock
price at issue, instead of the typical spread of perhaps 20 percent of the stock
price. Convinced of the stock's premium value, the investors were willing to
accept greatly reduced yields on the debenture's bond portion. Neither the
premium nor the saving accrued to the REIT, however; both were absorbed by
the underwriters.
The underwriters also profited more than generously from the REIT war-
rants, options to buy stock at a specified price. Warrants are most often used in
private placements; they are often packaged with stocks or bonds, or issued to
investment bankers as compensation for their underwriting services. By 1973,
REITs had sold packages of stocks and warrants worth a total of $1.5 billion.
This activity in warrants provided another opportunity for the underwriters to
make profits.
Finally, the underwriters profited from unusually generous rewards for under-
writing the REITs' common stock issues. Ordinarily, the underwriting compen-
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sation for a common stock issue valued at between $10 million and $20 million
would be about 5 percent[2), less for larger issues, which can be handled by
the underwriters with correspondingly greater efficiency. In fact, however, the
compensation collected by REIT underwriters averaged about 8 percent, despite
an average issue size exceeding $20 million.[Table 5) Of the Builders Investment
Group's issue of $60 million, for example, the underwriters got 8.2 percent for
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109.4 575.7 607.8 186.0 60.0
11.5 30.0 155.5 335.0 518.0
1,079.3 1,576.4 1,641.0 1,114.4 980.7
Note: Includes REIT securities registered for cash sales only.











Beneficial Standard Mtg. Inv.
Capital Mortgage Inv.
Colwell Mortgage Trust





Sutro Mortgage Inv. Trust
Mixed
Connecticut General Mtg. and Rity Inv.
First Union RE Equity and Mtg. Trust
Hotel Investors
Massachusetts Mtg. and Realty
Realty Income Trust
B.F. Saul REIT
Office of Economic Research


















































NEW UNDERWRITTEN OFFERINGS BY REIT'S: 1971
Exchange Amount Share Underwriter's
Name Listing of Offering Offering Price Spread
($ millions) (dollars) (in %)
Mortgage Trusts
Baird & Warner Mtg. & Rity Inv. OTC 12.5 20,000 6.5
Cabot, Cabot Forbes Lant. Tr. NYSE 25.0 20,000 5.5
Dominion Mtg. & Rity Trust OTC 6.0 12,000 10.0
First Wisconsin Mtg. Inv. NYSE 30.0 25,000 7.6
Gulf South Mtg. Inv. ASE 15.0 20,000 8.5
Hamilton Inv. Trust OTC 25.0 20,000 8.5
Heitman Mtg. Inv. ASE 10.0 10,000 6.0
ICM Realty ASE 23.0 23,000 7.6
Larwin Mtg. & Realty Trust ASE 60.0 20,000 8.0
Lomas & Nettleton Mtg. Inv. NYSE 37.2 41,375 5.3
National Mtg. Fund NYSE 12.4 11,000 10.2
North American Mtg. Inv. NYSE 20.6 26,750 5.0
Property Capital Trust ASE 15.8 21,000 6.8
Realty Refund Trust ASE 20.0 20,000 8.5
Texas First Mtg. Inv. OTC 20.0 20,000 8.2
USF Investors OTC 50.0 25,000 8.2
Equity Trusts
Arien Property Inv. OTC 16.5 16,500 8.0
Continental Illinois NYSE 25.0 25,000 5.6
First Fidelity OTC 7.5 15,000 9.0
GREIT Realty Trust ASE 8.8 17,500 8.3
Washington REIT ASE 5.8 11,500 8.4
Wisconsin REIT OTC 7.2 11.000 10.0
Mixed
American Realty Trust ASE 9.6 9,625 9.5
Builders Inv. Group NYSE 60.0 25,000 8.2
Clevetrust OTC 50.0 20,000 8.5
Gulf Mortgage & Realty Inv. NYSE 40.0 20,000 8.2
HNC Mortgage & Realty Inv. OTC 15.0 20,000 5.0
Hospital Investors (Atlanta National) OTC 25.0 20,000 8.5
Investors Realty Trust ASE 18.0 15,000 9.0
HJB Prime Inv. ASE 15.0 20,000 6.7
NW Mutual Life Mtg. & Rity Inv. NYSE 50.0 20,000 5.0
Realty & Mtg. Inv. of the Pacific OTC 25.0 20,000 6.5
State Mutual NYSE 25.0 20,000 5.5
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7
RAPID GROWTH - HOW THE CAPITAL WAS RAISED








































































Source: Office of Economic Research, Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Thanks to their rare ability to inspire investment, the REITs quickly raised a
lot of money, which they lost little time in translating into assets. Between 1968
and 1974, total REIT assets grew twentyfold, from $1.03 billion to $21.02 billion.
[Table 1], most of it in loans for land acquisition, development, and construction.
These REIT loans, which amounted to only $260 million in 1968, grew to $4.25
billion in 1971, and to $10.98 billion in 1974. In only seven years, the REITs
grew by an astonishing 4,123 percent.
In the same period, other REIT loans, including mortgages on completed
projects, as well as second mortgages, increased by 3,983 percent; while equity
investments lagged behind, increasing a mere eightfold. At the outset of their
existence, the REITs were putting their money into lending, rather than into
outright ownership; they evidently believed that simple, well leveraged debt was
a surer bet for making money than the capital appreciation that would accrue
to a property owner.
While their assets were growing, the REITs, unfettered by regulatory re-
quirements that they stick close to home, were also extending their geographic
reach. The distribution in the 10 top states of loans and investments by 172
REITs, representing 90 percent of total REIT assets, illustrates the geographic
range of their activity. [Table 21 The most striking feature of the distribution: of
the 172 REITs covered by the data, 127 were operating in Florida, 121 in Texas,
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102 in Georgia, and large numbers in the other states. Such data suggests that
many of the REITs were operating in more than one state.
The top ten states absorbed about two-thirds of the total capital invested
by the 172 REITs. The ten states were not equally attractive to the REITs,
however. Florida alone accounted for fully 18 percent of all the loans and in-
vestments made by the 172 trusts, which put 50 percent of their total capital
into the "Sun Belt" states.
Not surprisingly, the REIT's Sun Belt investments followed the general pat-
tern of economic activity in those burgeoning states, heavily favoring the residen-
tial and commercial sectors of the real estate industry, while investing relatively
lightly in Sun Belt industrial property. [Table 3] More than half the total invest-
ment was in residential real estate, of which 18.7 percent was in condominiums
and 22.8 percent in rental housing. The 45.2 percent of total investment that
was in commercial real estate was almost equally shared among four categories:
office buildings; shopping centers; hotels and motels; and others. Industrial
property absorbed only 3.1 percent of the investment in commercial real estate.
The preponderance of the growth in REIT investment was represented by
loans for land acquisition, development, and construction, with construction
alone accounting for fully 70 percent of these loans. More than one-third of all
construction lending by REITs was for condominiums; 22 percent was for rental
units. Thus, a total of 57 percent of the REITs' investments in construction
was invested in precisely those types of buildings that experience has shown to
be the most economically unstable and volatile, and therefore the most risky for
investors [Table 4].
Such investment practices, while they may have made the REITs vulnerable
to the vicissitudes of the most volatile segment of the real-estate market, also
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quickly propelled them to a major position among financial institutions involved
in lending for land acquisition, development, and construction. Indeed, from
almost nothing in the mid-1960s, the REITs' share of the United States short-
term C&D mortgage market increased to 12.3 percent in 1970, then almost
doubled to 23.4 percent in just three years. [Table 5] In the field of C&D
loans, in fact, the REITs outgrew the commercial banks, which only doubled
their holdings of C&D loans between 1970 and 1975, while the REITs were
quadrupling theirs.
Whether or not the entry of the REITs into the existing C&D loan market
stimulated a net increase in the total activity of that sector is a controversial
question. Did the REITs win their share of the market totally at the expense
of other lenders, such as the commercial banks? Or did the REITs satisfy a
demand for new lending capacity that the commercial banks could not supply
quickly enough, thus enlarging the total market? Or - another alternative - did
the REITs offer the commercial banks, acting as REIT sponsors and advisors,
a channel for making investments that the banks would not choose to make in
their own names, thus expanding the total C&D mortgage market in a dubious
direction?
There is evidence to suggest that the commercial banks in fact did not choose
to direct their own real-estate departments into the same investments they ad-
vised for their REIT trustees; and that the investments into which the banks
encouraged the REITs to venture alone, especially multi-family housing, land
acquisition, and development, were the riskiest areas in the construction and
development sectors of the mortgage business. In terms of total investment in
C&D loans, by June of 1974 REITs ranked right behind commercial banks and
savings and loan associations. Of a total investment of $38.2 billion, the com-
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mercial banks held $17.0 billion, the S&Ls held $10.5 billion, and the REITs
held $9.1 billion. [Table 6]
When the aggregate totals are broken down by sectors of the C&D loan mar-
ket, however, the rankings change significantly. The REITs held only a modest
share of the loans for single-family and 2-to-4 family homes - only $1.2 billion,
versus the banks' $6.5 billion; but the REITs led the market in the multifamily
homes and condominiums sectors, holding $4.4 billion in loans, compared to $3.5
billion held by the banks. In the other construction areas, mostly commercial
and industrial construction, the REITs' share of the loan market corresponded
more closely to their share of the total, while for land acquisition and develop-
ment, REITs made a disproportionate share of the loans.
While the REITs were becoming major actors in the relatively risky and
volatile short-term C& D mortgage market, they were playing a much more
modest and declining role in the safer, steadier market for long-term mortgage
loans. By 1974, out of a total $478.5 billion held by all long-term lenders,
REITs accounted for a mere $3.5 billion - less than 1 percent. [Table 7] Within
the long-term mortgage market, the REITs were most lightly committed in loans
for one-to-four-family homes, which is the most important segment of the long-
term mortgage market. The largest share of the REITs' long-term mortgage
portfolio was devoted to commercial and industrial properties, in which they
held more than 2 percent of the loans in 1974.
The relatively high risk of the REIT's real-estate investment pattern, with
its heavy concentration of short-term C&D loans, was compounded by the lack
of other, leavening interests in the total REIT portfolio. Thus, the REITs had
about half of their total assets in C&D loans, and 100 percent of their assets in
real-estate. Other major real-estate lenders benefited from the diversification of
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their total loan commitments. The commercial banks, for example, held some
$17 billion in C&D loans, dwarfing the REITs in this field and making the
banks by far the largest C&D lenders in the field. At the same time, however,
the banks balanced their C&D exposure with almost $100 billion in long-term
mortgages, while committing only part of their total assets to real estate loans
and spreading the bulk of their assets among a variety of alternative investments.
For the potential investor, a REIT clearly included elements of risk that were
minimized by investments in other real-estate financial institutions; or in other
competing investment vehicles, such as mutual funds.
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS (INVESTMENTS) FOR ALL REITS,
1968-1974














1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
0.26 0.85 2.58 4.25 7.56 10.92 10.98
0.12 0.26 0.64 1.51 3.07 4.19 4.90
0.55 0.70 0.95 1.35 2.48 3.31 4.28
0.10 0.22 0.56 0.61 1.07 1.77 1.64
1.03 2.03 4.73 7.72 14.18 20.19 21.02
Source: NAREIT Factbook, various editions.
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TABLE 2
































Source: NAREIT Factbook, 1975, page 96
(Data from published financial statements
REITs.)


























SOURCE: NAREIT Factbook, 1975.



















Mobile Home Parks 1.0%
Industrial 1.6%
SOURCE: NAREIT Factbook, 1975.
Based on survey of 172 REITs controlling 90 percent of all REIT assets.
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TABLE 5
Share of Market Construction, Land and Development Loans
($ billions)




































































Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development releases reporting re-
sults from monthly surveys of mortgage lending. Commercial bank figures do
not include construction loans which are included in a commercial and industrial





































18.9 16.7 17.8 18.2
62.7 ~2.5 2.8 3.0
49.0 10.2 11.5 12.1
0.2 0.5 0.9 0.9
Total For Five
Lender Groups 279.8 309.9
Source: Department of Housing and Urban
322.0 47.6 52.5 55.1
Development releases reporting
results from monthly surveys of mortgage lending. Commercial bank
not include construction loans which are included in a commercial and












and Loans 14.2 16.6 18.2
arance Companies 30.2 34.8 36.9
rcial Banks 25.4 29.9 31.6




































Th -e-Fall of Ws
The fall of the REITs was almost symmetrical with their rapid rise. At the
beginning of 1973, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood only slightly
above its 1966 level, a leading Wall Street firm's index of equity trust stocks
stood at twice its 1966 level; the index of mortgage REITs had reached 400
percent of its 1966 level. Two and one-half years later, the Dow Jones was still
around its 1966 level; but by this time so were the REIT indexes.[Chart A]
As the prices of REIT stocks declined [Table 1], so did their dividends. The
dividends lagged, however, so there was a paradoxical period of rising dividends
and falling stock prices. In 1973, for example, REIT stock prices fell rapidly;
while REIT dividend payments totalled $600 million, up fully $136 million from
the previous year's level. [Table 2] In 1974, as stock prices continued to soften,
the REITs still managed to pay $277 million in dividends in just the first six
months.
The depth and suddenness of the REIT's decline was accentuated by the
heights to which they had risen. During their heyday, from 1961 to 1972, a
study by San Diego State University professor Brian M. Neuberger indicates,
the REITs did better than outperform the stock market. According to the
professor's comparison of the REITs' record with the Standard and Poor 500
Composite Index, the REITs also outperformed stocks on the basis of their
'For this chart Dow Jones Industrial was indexed to 100 on December 30, 1966.
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"beta" rating-a measure of an individual stock's sensitivity to movements in
the market as a whole. According to this test, REITs were significantly less
risky as investments than the common stocks included in the S&P index.2
When the REITs' decline began in earnest after 1972, the trusts behaved
quite differently, according to their types, their terms, and their sponsors. There
were significant differences in the behavior of equity trusts, subordinate land
trusts, long-term and short-term trusts, and hybrids that mixed two or more
activities under the same institutional umbrella. There were also differences
between trusts of the same type with different kinds of sponsorship. Among the
sponsors were commercial banks, mortgage banks, and various other financial
institutions. In addition, there were a number of independent trusts, operating
on their own without sponsorship from larger corporations.
The different performances of the various REIT models during the decline
can be seen clearly by a comparison of the performance of a $100 investment
in each from the end of 1972, just before the REIT boom began to go bust,
to the end of March, 1975. Invested in equity REITs-those specializing in the
outright ownership of real property-the $100 investment would have lost almost
half its value, declining to $52. During the same period, the same investment in
a portfolio of REITs making long-term mortgage loans would have dropped to
just $26, losing 75 percent of its value. Worse yet, a $100 investment in short-
term, C&D REITs would have shrunk to $16. [Tables 3A, 3B1 Among the C&D
REITs, those sponsored by commercial banks fared especially poorly: a $100
investment in these trusts at the end of 1972 would have lost 89 percent of its
2 Testimony of Prof. Brian Neuberger of San Diego State University, before Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Hearings on Sec. 2721, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 297
(1976), pp. 49-50. (Henceforth referred to as "Hearings on REITs.")
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value by the first quarter of 1975, when it would have been worth a mere $11.
A fundamental reason for the precipitous decline of all sectors of the REIT
mard.kt between the e11d of 1972 a11d the~ eay part of 1975 was simply that
the REITS were paying fees to their advisors, distributing dividends to their
shareholders, and-most egregious of all-raising capital, on the basis of assets
which were generally insubstantial or shakey.
A particularly revealing picture of the REITs' decline is provided by a break-
down of the trusts' incomes at two moments during the period in question. For
both classes of REITs-the short-term C&D trusts and the equity and long-term
trusts-the changes in every income category between the second quarter of 1972
and the same period two years later were both dramatic and suggestive. [Tables
4A, 4B] In that short period, for example, the hard-hit C&D trusts' net income
as a percentage of total gross income shrank from almost 50 percent to a mere
1 percent. For the equity and long-term trusts, meanwhile, the same index had
dropped from 47 percent to 23 percent.
The cause of this precipitous drop in the net income category was the com-
mensurate growth in the interest the REITs were paying on their non-convertible
debt. For the short-term C&Ds, this expense rose from about 26 percent of gross
income in the second quarter of 1972 to about 70 percent in 1974. By this time,
interest payments and reserves to cover anticipated losses accounted for more
than 87 percent of the REITs' gross income. For the same period, the long-term
and equity trusts' interest payments increased from 17 percent of gross income to
47 percent; they were well-off only by comparison with their short-term cousins.
These rapidly increasing fractions of total REIT income earmarked for in-
terest payments look all the worse in light of the rapid growth of gross income
for all types of REITS. Indeed, during this two year boom period, the average
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quarterly gross incomes of REITs in both classes, short-term as well as long-
term and equity, more than doubled. For investors, however, the good news
a~bout - oirn was evide~ntly moreI thani offset by the~ average 600 percenIt
increase in interest payments, because investors bid the REIT stocks down on
good news.
It is clear that the REITs had plunged deeply-perhaps over their heads-into
debt. At the close of 1973, REITs held assets in the form of short-term mortgages
amounting to almost $11 billion; but the trusts' short-term borrowing added up
to $10.5 billion. The REITs had borrowed $6.5 billion from the banks, which
also gave the REITs lines of credit to back their own commercial paper to make
up the balance. The banks' lines of credit, in turn, were backed by the REITs'
non-interest-bearing deposits equal to at least 10 percent of the credit lines. As
the REITs found it increasingly difficult to raise capital by the sale of their own
securities, and as their activities became increasingly skewed toward short-term
lending the REITs came to depend increasingly on their own commercial paper,
and on the banks that backed it with lines of credit.
For their part, the banks, flush with funds looking for investments during the
years from 1970 to 1973, were only too happy to accomodate the REITs' growing
appetite for credit. More than $5 billion was made available to REITs by the
country's ten biggest banks, including Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, Chemical,
and Bankers' Trust. Their generosity was generously rewarded: the REITs were
required to pay 30 percent more than the prime rate- the interest rate the banks
charged their best, most worthy customers- for the money they borrowed. As
long as the REITs were riding high, the high interest was nothing to worry
about. The trusts passed their interest costs right along to their customers, the
real-estate developers; and the developers, in turn, could in those happy days
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simply add their increased costs-and a little more-to the price tags on their
products.
With the banks' encouragement, and more lendable money than there were
investments worth lending money to, the REITs began to make real estate deals
that the banks themselves would not have considered. An 1975 article in [Busi-
ness Week] described the situation of a REIT called BIG, the eighth largest in
the industry, known for its creativity in swapping assets to hide its credit prob-
lems. When BIG finally came up cash short and had to scramble for an infusion
of capital, an official of one of its largest creditors told the magazine, "If you
look at BIG's assets, you can get pretty discouraged." Of the loans in BIG's
portfolio, the officer noted, "I can remember when I was a bank officer rejecting
loans. I thought I had killed some of them....Many of these loans were never
viable in the first place."3
Things began to turn sour for the overextended REITs in 1974, when the
Arab oil embargo and the Federal Reserve Board's anti-inflation measures com-
bined to hoist the prime interest rate to 12 percent. The banks simply raised
the rate to the REITs; the REITs simply passed the bill to the developers; the
developers added the increase to their prices; and the prices kept the consumers
away in droves.
Many developers, with few sales to pay the inflated costs for labor and ma-
terials, as well as the usurious interest rates for the money borrowed from the
REITs, either went out of business, or went broke, or both. For most REITs, the
revenge of the marketplace was not quite so swift or so sure, but their discom-
fort was real nonetheless. With few exceptions, the short-term C&D REITs,
with about 75 percent of all REIT assets, were in very hot water. As their
'Business Week, July 25, 1975, p. 48.
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borrowers defaulted on their loans, the C&Ds were left holding the bag as the
owners of unfinished projects that were prohibitively expensive to finish, neither
saleable nor rentable, and not worth what they cost. As tThe real estate m-nark1cet
deteriorated, the REITs experienced increasing difficulty in renewing or rolling
over most of their $4 billion outstanding in commercial paper. In order to stay
afloat, therefore, the trusts were forced to replace their own commercial paper
with direct bank loans, calling on the banks to convert their back-up lines of
credit into actual loans.
Not all REITs were hit equally hard. Indeed, while the C&D REITs, special-
izing in short-term loans, were devastated, REITs specializing in equity-direct
ownership of real-estate-and in long-term mortgages were able in most cases to
continue to make money. In some cases, these more solid REITs even managed
to improve their profitability during the general decline of the industry. As the
dust of the decline was settling, in the first quarter of 1976, 49 trusts, represent-
ing approximately 25 percent of all REIT assets, were still able and willing to
pay dividends to their investors.4
To identify the characteristics that made the difference, enabling some RE-
ITs to continue to prosper during hard times while other REITs suffered disas-
trous declines, Professor Brian Neuberger, at San Diego State University, has
employed an analytical tool called Multiple Discriminate Analysis (MDA). Di-
gesting tremendous amounts of raw data, MDA enables researchers to define
significant differences in performance between subgroups and then to identify
specific variables that are associated with these differences. Dr. Neuberger's cri-
terion for differentiating between successful and unsuccessful REITs was whether
4 Ibid., p. 63.
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the trust increased its net income during the 1973-1975 period. 5
At the outset of his work, using MDA, Dr. Neuberger was able to select
a, group of characteristics that, taken together, would account for more than
92 percent of the variation in success among the C&D REITs. The significant
characteristics were: debt structure, growth pattern, leverage, and overall size.
Among these four characteristics, debt structure proved to be the most impor-
tant factor in predicting earnings performance.
According to Dr. Neuberger's MDA, the earnings performance of a trust was
inversely related to the percentage of the trust's non-convertible debt to its total
capital. That is, trusts that carried a relatively large amount of non-convertible
debt, measured against their total capital, performed less well than trusts that
were relatively free of such debt. In addition, different kinds of non-convertible
debt seemed to have different implications for REIT earnings. Fixed-rate, short-
term bank debt was better for earnings, it appeared from this analysis, than bank
revolving loans, which have interest rates that fluctuate according to the prime
interest rate. REITs with high percentages of these floating-interest-rate loans
found themselves in great difficulty in the mid-1970s.
Dr. Neuberger was also able to distinguish successful trusts on the basis
of their leverage-the ratio of their debt to their capital equity. The results
of the MDA suggest that high leverage-that is, a relatively high debt-to-equity
ratio-can produce high profits in a booming market, when risks are low, because
leverage acts to magnify gains. Leverage is undiscriminating, however: in bad
times, when risks are high, it magnifies losses. Not surprisingly, REITs that
were relatively highly leveraged also were relatively vulnerable to disaster.
The Neuberger analysis also identified some less expected predictors of REIT
5 lbid., p. 65.
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performance. Among these was growth rate: the REITs that grew faster than
average tended also to earn more money in the process. But only up to a point.
While fast-growing trusts posted good -arnings, large trusts did not. in other
words, the REITs would have been well advised to obey a paradox: grow fast
and stay small. No sooner would a fast-growing REIT achieve a notable size
than its earnings per share would begin to decline.
Further analysis suggests that there was nothing inherently self-limiting or
self-defeating about rapid growth of REITs. Indeed, the real problem proved
to be not the speed with which the trusts grew, but the fact that in many
cases the growth was more apparent than real. Some of the short-term C&D
REITs managed to appear a lot more profitable than they actually were. These
REITs took advantage of the standard business practice of including in project-
development budgets, which are used to determine the amount to be loaned, the
initial interest payments that the developer was obligated to make during the
construction phase of the project.
Construction-and-development loans are ordinarily structured in such a way
that only interest is paid during construction, with the entire principle coming
due upon completion of the project, when a long-term mortgage can be secured.
The C&D trusts were able to take advantage of this standard practice to improve
their apparent profitability by reporting as earned income the interest payments
they collected from the construction loans they made to developers. In effect,
they were insuring that any project, regardless of how shakey and ultimately
unprofitable it might be, would appear to be profitable during the one or two
first years.
Only later, after the illusory income had been paid out in real cash as div-
idends, or fees, would it become obvious that some of the projects financed
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in this way were in fact not profitable investments for the REITs; were not
credit-worthy projects in any sense. As the short-term loans matured, and the
principal-including the borrowed money used to pay the early interest- plus any
unpaid interest came due, the bad loans defaulted. The imprudent REITs were
left holding the empty bag, their cash flows impaired, unable to make their own
dividend payments.
As an example of a REIT that got into precisely this kind of difficulty,
Neubergers' describes the case of a trust that enjoyed the sponsorship and advice
of a major insurance company. In 1973 and 1974, the trust departed from its
earlier practice of concentrating on long-term mortgages, increasing its short-
term loan commitments fourfold. This sudden involvement in construction and
development loans coincided with the months of extremely tight money, so the
trust paid dearly in interest for the capital to finance its expansion into the
precarious C&D mortgage market. Using interest-rate data from the Federal
Reserve Board to estimate the cost of debt capital during the period in question,
it seems that at least some of the trust's new business was costing it more in
interest rates than it was yielding in rates of return on the shareholders' equity.
[Table 5]
Much of the trust's new debt was in the form of revolving loans from banks,
at rates ranging from 11.0 to 13.65 percent. [Table 5]7 The trust's return on
its equity, meanwhile, was only about 8 percent. In addition, the switch to
C&D loans from long-term mortgages significantly increased the REIT's risk, as
indicated by a measure called Percent Risk Impact-the percentage of the trust's




payments. Percent Risk Impact rises directly with both the volume and the
interest rate of the debt. In the case of the REIT in question, as it borrowed
more at higher rates of interest between October 1973 and July 1974, i-ts-Percent-
Risk Impact rose from 2.3 to 3.53, an increase of more than 50 percent in less
than one year.[Table 5] Even these assessments were based on the assumption
that the trust was borrowing at the lowest available rates. In fact, the cost of
money to the REIT under these circumstances was probably much higher than
the lowest rate for the period; therefore the PRI given actually understates the
case.
Even as the shareholders' risk was increasing, the same REIT was experienc-
ing other economic woes. Net income declined by 13.5 percent, while the share
price fell 44.6 percent, indicating uneasiness on the part of investors. Fees to
advisors, however, increased 13.7 percent.
In Dr. Neuberger's study, the case described above was typical of 17 REITs,
all specializing in short-term C&D loans. All indulged in the same headlong
portfolio expansion, without a prudent regard for the shareholders' interests.
And all encountered trouble when the going got rough.
The evidence from Dr. Neuberger's study and elsewhere suggests that "cre-
ative accounting" abuses were a common practice among REITs, especially those
trying to make their money in the risky, short-term C&D business. First, the
REITs were reporting the interest they were paying themselves as earned income.
Then they were paying out this illusory income in real fees to advisors and real
dividends to shareholders. Finally, they were using their apparently credible
earnings and dividend records to support their applications on Wall Street for
more debt capital, with which to make more loans. In this circular game of
deception, everyone was happy, everyone was apparently winning-until the cir-
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cle broke. Because too many of the loans made by the C&D REITs were not
adequately backed by truly productive assets, the game was bound eventually
to tuin winners into losers. The evidence suggests that the source of the prob-
lem was to be found in the conflicting interests of the REITs' sponsor-advisors,
which were a continuing invitation to uncontrolled abuse. 8
8
"Abuse" implies conspiracy and illegal intent, which cannot be proved conclusively by analysis
of commonly available financial data, of the kind used in this work. Conclusive proof would






SAMPLED REAL ESTATE INATESTMERNT TRUSTS LISTED ON THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1974
Trust Name 1974 Prices
High Low
- B.T. Mortgage 20-3/8 3
x Builders Investors 27-3/8 1-3/8
- Chase Manhattan 42-1/2 3-7/8
Citizens & Southern Rlty. 14 1
Colwell Mortgage 25 1-1/2
- Continental Mortgage 7-3/4 3/8
Diversified Mortgage 7-1/4 13/16
Equitable Life 22-5/8 10
Great American Mtg. 32 1
,/IDS Realty Trust 26-7/8 9-1/2
v Justice Mortgage 24-7/8 2-5/8
Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage 35 11-7/8
Midland Mortgage 12-7/8 1-3/4
Saul Realty 12-1/2 2-3/4
State Mutual Investors 16-1/8 1-3/4
Sutro Mortgage 12-3/8 2
Source: Audit Investment Research
152
TABLE 2





























































Source: Audit Investment Research
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TABLE 3A





















































Source: Neuberger's Testimony, Senate Hearings p. 60.
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TABLE 3B
VALUE OF REIT STOCK (continued)
Short-Term Mortgage Trusts Sponsored by:
Commercial Mortgage Miscellaneous
Banks Banks Independent Financial
December
1972 100% 100% 100% 100%
June
1973 87% 88% 85% 91%
December
1973 65% 64% 67% 75%
June
1974 35% 40% 34% 44%
December
1974 11% 16% 9% 13%
March
1975 11% 20% 12% 14%
Source: Neuberger's Testimony, Senate Hearings, p. 61.
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TABLE 4A





(Non-Convertible Debt) 26% 70%
Interest Expense 6% 2%
Depreciation and
Operating Expense 3% 4%
Advisor Fee 14% 6%
Loss Provision 2% 17%
Net Income 49% 1%
Total Income 100% 100%
TABLE 4B






(Non-Convertible Debt) 17% 47%
Interest Expense 8% 4%
Depreciation and
Operating Expense 18% 17%
Advisor Fee 9% 5%
Loss Provision 1% 4%
Net Income 47% 23%
Total Income 100% 100%





































The Context of Disaster
While many REITs certainly courted disaster by their methods of operation,
they were also in the wrong place at the wrong time, at the front of a general
economic stampede that was heading for a cliff. The economy in general and
the real-estate sector in particular, were affected by a variety of problems over
which the REITs individually or collectively had little or no control. Among
these:
High interest rates. Most REITs had borrowed capital at interest rates that
were pegged to the prime rate. In many cases the REITs were obligated to pay
130 percent of the prime. As lenders, on the other hand, in order to maintain
a profitable spread between the price of their borrowing and the price of their
lending, and to cover their high advisory fees, the REITs had to charge even
higher interest rates.
In their enthusiasm, the REITs-along with almost all other market observers-
failed to predict the course of prime interest rates. As the prime passed 10 per-
cent, the REITs began to get into trouble. When the prime rose to 11 and then
12 percent, and their effective borrowing cost rose to 14-1/2 and 15-1/2 percent,
the REITs had to charge their borrowers 16 to 17 percent interest just to break
even. Not many real-estate projects in 1974 could survive a 12 percent inter-
est rate for any length of time; fewer could pay 16 to 17 percent. In addition,
several states had usury laws, which prohibited interest rates from exceeding an
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artificially low rate. In Florida, where more REIT loans were made than in any
other state, the maximum rate was 15 percent; in Texas, 18 percent.
aterial Shortages. in the construction business, asin fewi others,ties
money. The interest clock ticks away inexorably, and in ther mid-1970s, with
the prime at 12 percent and a stiff premium tacked on, interest added up at an
insupportable rate. Construction was seriously delayed in 1973-75 by widespread
materials shortages. In many areas of the country, for months at a time, staple
items such as nails, bricks, glue, bath fixtures, and steel reinforcing rods were
virtually unavailable, while borrowers-those that could-kept on paying.
Material Cost Increases. Along with shortages came steep increases in the
costs of the things without which buildings cannot be built. Passed on to con-
sumers all along the line, the increasing costs of materials resulted in buildings
whose actual construction costs far exceeded the projections on which their
budgets-and their construction loans-had been based. Projects that could still
be finished often came in at prices their intended customers could not afford.
Tight Mortgage Money. A severe drought that dried up the pool of money
available for long-term mortgages in 1973 and 1974 made it difficult for poten-
tial customers to buy houses, apartments, and other commonly mortgaged real
estate. The money shortage also made it difficult for developers to arrange "take
out" mortgages on completed projects. Without such financing to allow them
to get their money out of completed projects, developers were impeded from
putting together new ventures.
Sewerage Problems. In the first flush of environmental awareness, many local
jurisdictions, as well as state and Federal agencies, had promulgated new, more
complex and costly sewer standards. In some cases, especially those in which
the costs of the sewer systems were somehow passed on to the developer or the
159
ultimate property owner, the increased costs acted as a depressant on sales.
The Energy Crisis. The advent of real shortages of fuel at the gas pump, and
the steep rise in the price of what fu-el1 was available, severely dampened consumer
enthusiasm for housing in the countryside, where much of the REIT investment
was. Rather, there was talk of a return to the relatively energy-efficient cities,
avoiding long commutes and high home heating costs. Few REITs, however,
concentrated on investing in center-city housing.
These problems of the general economy certainly had their adverse impact
on the REITs, as well as on the other sectors. The REITs were also affected by
factors inherent in the real-estate industry. The real-estate industry observes the
truism that construction gets hit first and hardest in a recession; the institutions
that finance construction and development get hurt as their debtors default.
At best, the real-estate business tends to progress in cycles of alternating
boom and bust. In good times, customers are anxious to buy and bankers have
plenty of money that they are only too anxious to lend; builders, understandably,
are optimistic. After a brief prosperity, however, the seemingly inevitable result
of all this good news is bad news: overbuilding, a glutted market, and, finally,
a precipitous decline in real-estate values.
The first sign of trouble is an increase in "FOR RENT" and "FOR SALE"
signs. Then borrowers slip into delinquency on their mortgage payments. Sooner
or later, some of the delinquencies slip into real defaults; the lenders, reluctantly,
foreclose on builders who can't pay their debts, becoming the unhappy owners
of surplus real estate. The lenders are increasingly saddled with a growing
burden of loans that aren't earning, maturing debts that are not being paid,
and buildings-even unfinished ones-that cannot be rented or sold.
This pattern was clearly playing itself out in 1974 and 1975. The housing
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industry had racked up more than 2 million housing starts in each of the preced-
ing three years. With plenty of new housing overhanging the market, conditions
within the industry were right for the worst housing slumnp since World War 11,
regardless of any influence from the general economy.
There were other factors peculiar to the REIT industry, however, that tended
to amplify the down phase of the normal real-estate- industry cycle and the
trouble in the general economy. A major problem for the REITs, especially
in bad times, was the limit the Internal Revenue Service put on the amounts
of income the REITs could earmark to cover anticipated loan losses. Because
REITs did not emerge as major factors in the real-estate industry until the late
1960s, they did not have adequate experience on which to base credibly reliable
data on "normal" rates of losses in their loan portfolios. Without such data for
at least five years, the IRS was unwilling to allow the REITs to designate more
than they had actually lost in the preceding year as reserves against projected
future losses. If they had been able to reserve additional income for this purpose,
the REITs would have been able to reduce - or at least defer - their tax liability.
(As it turned out, of course, the increased reserves would have been more than
justified by the REITs' ultimate losses.)
The question of estimating potential loan losses became troublesome for the
REITs in another context as well. According to a ruling by the Midwest Secu-
rities Commission Association, a regional regulatory agency whose decisions are
often followed nationally, a REIT's advisor was responsible for the REIT's ex-
penses in excess of a fixed amount. Any surplus, no matter how inadvertent, in
the reserve held for anticipated loan losses, or any income that was not accrued
on problem loans, would be charged to the account of the REIT's advisor. In ef-
fect, then, the REITs were hamstrung in their efforts to increase their provisions
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for anticipated losses.
This limitation had an immediate impact on the REITs' cash flows, in some
cases turning them from positive into negative. In 1974, many of the trusts,
whose books necessarily reflected the standard accounting practice of accruing
anticipated losses, were forced to pay out more in dividends than their books-
minus the accrued losses-indicated that they had earned. A trust with a net
income of $10 million and projected potential loan losses of $6 million, for ex-
ample, would report on its books a net income of $4 million, which would be
the maximum available for distribution to shareholders.
According to the IRS, however, in its tax calculations the trust could only
deduct from taxable income a much lower reserve against anticipated loan losses:
perhaps $1 million, if that was the amount of actual loan losses the trust had
experienced in the preceding year. In that case, the IRS would calculate the net
income of the REIT as $9 million. Of this, under the terms of the REIT Act
the IRS would require at least 90 percent, or $8.1 million, to be distributed to
shareholders, despite actual net earnings of less than half as much. The only
way to make such a payout would be to eat into capital-in effect, to return part
of the shareholders' investments as dividends.
Under the accounting rules insisted on by the IRS, it was even possible for
a REIT to report a real loan loss for the preceding year and still be required
to pay dividends or lose its trust status under the tax laws. Such a paradoxical
situation could arise, for example, if the REIT described above, with $10 million
in net income, also had $12 million in actual loan losses from non-earning loans,
write-offs, and foreclosures; while the IRS allowed only $1 million for anticipated
losses. In this case, by generally accepted accounting methods the trust would
report a deficit of $2 million in its net income account; but, by the IRS's rules,
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the impecunious REIT would still have to distribute 90 percent of $9 million,
or $8.1 million, in dividends.
No matter how it juggles its numbers or deludes investors and regulators, no
company can long continue to return its shareholders' capital without bleeding
itself dry; the REITs were no exception to the rule. It availed them not that
their books showed earned income from interest on loans that they were, in
effect, paying themselves. They could not hope to come up with enough real
money to disburse this income in the form of hard-cash dividends.
The vaguaries of the tax system began to have a mischievous effect on the
REITs in the mid-1970s, as the cyclical downturn in the real-estate industry
forced increasing numbers of REIT-financed projects toward default on the way
to downright bankruptcy. The cycle affected good and bad projects, but a high
percentage of REIT investments were especially vulnerable because they were
fundamentally faulted. Even as the market corrected the downturn, delaying
new construction until inventories were reduced, the REIT investments promised
to be the last to recover-if they could ever recover.
Because of their fundamental weakness, from December 1973 to April 1976,
REIT assets slipped into non-earning status at a rapid rate, from a low of 1.8
percent of total assets all the way to 54.5 percent. In one two-year period, the
increase in non-earning assets of all REITs grew at the average rate of $400
million per month.[Table I]
For the short-term C&D REITs, the growth in defaulted loans was ominous,
or worse. In the highly leveraged short-term trusts, the actual equity of the
shareholders represented only about 20 percent of total assets; four or five times
as much was borrowed. When non-earning assets reached 20 percent of a REIT's
portfolio, therefore, the defaulted portion equalled 100 percent of shareholders'
163
equity. All the shareholders actually owned, therefore, was non-earning assets.
In June 1975, out of 131 REITs, only 29 had non-earning assets amounting
to less than 24 percent of shareholders' equity. Fully 66 of the trusts boasted
non-earning assets in excess of-as much as 500 percent in excess of-shareholders'
equity. In short, these REITs, fully half of the group, were worth less than noth-
ing.[Table 2] Even these dismal statistics are based on very generous definitions
of non-earning assets, according to the liberal accounting practices applied to
the REIT industry. Things may actually have been much worse.
Accurate and complete inventories of the REITs' non-earning investments
during the period of the trusts' decline have never been compiled, and the raw
data can no longer be assembled. According to a survey of published 1975 data
by the National Association of Real Estate Trusts, however, the non-earning
investments were concentrated in condominiums, representing 23.4 percent of
the total; rental housing, representing 16.0 percent; and land development, 13.8
percent. Some 21 percent of the non-earning assets could not be identified for
this survey. [Table 3]
Another analysis, by Audit Investment Research, Inc., indicated that some 25
percent of the defaulted loans were for non-primary housing: second homes and
condominiums, and land development in resort areas. About 15 to 25 percent
of the non-earning assets were in rural projects.
The growth in non-earning assets-the decline in earnings, -was especially dis-
appointing to the small investors, for whom the REIT vehicle had been specif-
ically advertised by its inventors and supporters as a safe, modest entry into
the profitable world of real-estate investment, heretofore open only to the rich.
Small investors were attracted to REITs by the promise of secure income with
the potential for capital gains in addition. They were encouraged to believe
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that REITs invested in solid, income-producing projects. Evidently, they were
misled. What kinds of properties did the C&D REITs actually finance?
-- An example of one type of development favonred by the C&D REITs was what
the vacation trade likes to call "an offshore destination resort" in the roman-
tically named Palmas del Mar, in Puerto Rico.1 The developer was Sea Pines
Company, which had established its credentials as a responsible operator with
the successful, if environmentally controversial, Hilton Head Island, in South
Carolina. In 1969, on the east coast of Puerto Rico some 50 miles southeast of
San Juan, Sea Pines began by acquiring an old coconut plantation that included
no less than six miles of Caribbean coastline, complete with balmy tradewinds
to mitigate the unfailing tropical sun. Sea Pines ultimately assembled 2,777
acres, paying an average of approximately $4,500 per acre.
It was, boasted the company: "a place so removed from the problems and
frustrations of the urban environment that its fascinating blend of beauty and
leisure must be sampled to be truly understood. In terms of character and
feeling, it is closer to Portofino, Barbella, or St. Tropez."
The developer invested heavily in infrastructure and amenities to appeal to
prospective customers. There was, first of all, the kind of lavish master plan
without which no self-respecting resort community can launch itself. There
was a new harbor, dredged from the development's coastline; a main inn and
separate villas; tennis and golf facilities, an airport, even a 297-acre tropical
jungle. There were major expenditures, too, for such mundane necessities as
utilities, roads, and telephone service.
When sales began in January 1974, homesites were priced from $14,000 to
'Kenneth Campbell, "REIT Problem Loans: What's Ahead" and "REITs . .. What's Ahead,"
Seminar Papers, Hearings on REITs, p. 338.
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$116,000, with the villas priced at $50,000 to $130,000.2 Despite the sudden
onset of the energy crisis, Sea Pines was able to report 185 homesites and 191
villas sold in the first two months. As the economies of the mainland and the
island declined, however, so did sales. By the end of the first year, cash flow
was a trickle.
In February 1975, Sea Pines announced that it was restructuring the de-
velopment's debt, deferring or reducing its interest payments, and, essentially,
walking away from Palmas-Del-Mar. Sea Pines' largest lender, a REIT called
Chase Manhattan Trust, which had invested an estimated $60 million of the
total $90 million borrowed by the developer, was left with an option to buy 50
percent of Palmas-Del-Mar after January 1976 at a token price. In May 1976,
Sea Pines took a $13 million writeoff on its "idyllic site." 3
Another typical C&D REIT investment was a resort community in Sandestin,
Florida, where an Atlanta developer, Evans & Mitchell Industries, acquired 1,700
acres of Florida panhandle landscape, 60 miles from Pensacola, with frontage
on the Gulf of Mexico and the Intercoastal Waterway. EMI got the land for
approximately $1000 per acre, taking out a purchase money mortgage for $2.15
million, paying only $267,000 down.
Like all resort community developers, EMI had a plan: an equal balance
between permanent and seasonal residents, served by such niceties as a golf
course and a 64,000-square-foot club looking out over the bay. Townhouses,
villas on the fairway, and houses with patios were offered as condominiums for
$50,000 to $65,000.4
2 Campbell, Hearings, op. cit., p. 339.
3 lbid., p. 339.
4 Ibid., p. 345.
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EMI's big backer was the same REIT, Chase Manhattan Trust, that backed
Sea Pines in Puerto Rico. Chase Manhattan invested $13.5 million in the Florida
project; another REIT, Cabot, Cabot AM Forbes Land Truist? put in $6 million-
As an extremely active and ambitious developer with several projects in addition
to Sandestin, EMI had a healthy appetite for capital, consuming more than its
equity financing and short-term debt could satisfy. After restructuring its debts
with its major lenders in April 1974, EMI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
August.'
Not all the investments made by C&D REITs were as bad as these, or as
doomed to failure as these appear, at least in retrospect. It is clear from these
examples, however, that there were at least some REIT investments that were
beyond saving by any economic upturn, or change in the international oil trade,
or easing of inflation. It is also possible to see in these examples some of the
inherent problems that characterized too many of the investments of the C&D
REITs. The sheer size and complexity of these projects, for one thing, made it
inevitable that it would take years for them to get out of trouble, if they ever
could.
In general, too, the real estate involved in these dubious investments was
egregiously overpriced. Overpricing, in this sense, is defined purely in terms of
the market: if it costs too much for people to buy, it is overpriced. Sandes-
tin was never able to make sales; while Palmas-Del-Mar quickly exhausted the
buyer enthusiasm that ignored prices at the start. Overpricing was even more
characteristic of smaller projects, according to surveys by Audit Investment Re-
search. In many cases, the high prices of these projects were due to the inclusion
of expensive features that prospective buyers could not pay for.
5 Ibid., p. 345.
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Most of the projects that gave the REITs trouble had carrying charges rang-
ing from 12 to 15 percent per year. Such carrying charges represented deductions
from the project's future value, making it all the more difficult for arjct to
catch up to its own indebtedness.
Faced with such daunting red ink, REIT boosters argued that constantly,
inexorably rising land and building costs would eventually rescue even their
most improbable projects because their replacement costs-what it would cost
to build them again-would eventually rise to equal what it cost to build them
in the first place. When carrying costs were added into the equation, however,
inflation in real estate replacement costs would have had to approximate 20
percent per year in order to justify the original costs of the projects the REITs
were financing. Sustained inflation rates of 20 percent or more were not likely,
however; certainly they were not desireable.
The problem of cyclical oversupply that is characteristic of the real-estate
market in general was compounded in the case of the REITs by the particular
kinds of real-estate they were building. Between 20 and 25 percent of all REIT
loans were for condominiums; approximately 15 percent for apartment buildings;
and some 20 percent for land and recreational developments. These categories
of real-estate development are among the most erratic, volatile-and therefore
the most speculative for investors-in the industry.
The high risks associated with land development and condominium and
apartment construction are in large part due to the fact that they entail heavy
initial investments in the construction of large numbers of housing units and
other facilities. An apartment house or condominium, or a modestly scaled re-
sort development, can easily begin with 100 or 200 units, perhaps more; indeed,
very few began with less. The developer faces high costs, and high exposure to
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risk, from almost the first day. The developer of a single-family-home project,
on the other hand, can proceed almost one house at a time, as the market in-
dicates, without investing heavily in inventory or committing himself to the full
cost of the planned project.
Condominiums were especially problematic investments because they were
a new form of housing ownership in many markets. The complexities of con-
dominium ownership, management, and maintenance proved difficult to under-
stand or to accept for many potential buyers.
Yet another source of vulnerability for the REITs' investments was their
concentration in a few markets in certain parts of the country, most notably
in the so-called Sun Belt, which was undergoing a general economic awakening
during the period of the REITs' emergence. Florida, Texas, and California were
favorite states for REIT investment, just as they were favorites of other investors
and Americans looking for new areas in which to live and work.
Many of these typical problems afflicting REITs are illustrated by the case
of Associated Mortgage Investors, which in 1974 earned the unhappy distinction
of having been the first of the troubled trusts to ask the court for protection as
a bankrupt. The management company assigned by the court to manage AMI's
loan portfolio found more than $80 million invested in vacant land, apartment
buildings, recreational vehicle parks, and resort developments. More than 75
percent of the loans were in trouble. Among them: a $6 million loan made in a
rural area in California. The project promised to build-and sell-5,000 to 6,000
houses in fairly short order. The real-estate record of the area revealed, however,




Increasing competition among REITs in the early 1970s made the trusts
more willing to take risks to make deals. The more loans they made, the more
earned interest the REITs could report, and the bigger the REITs appeared. In
the process of relaxing their standards in order to chalk up more loans, however,
the REITs were also making themselves more vulnerable any reverses that might
be in store.
Some REITs began to make construction loans without takeouts- contrac-
tual commitments for long-term loans to pay off the construction loans and
enable developers to recover their investments and their profits without waiting
out the life of the project. Under ordinary circumstances, a takeout becomes
effective when the construction of a project is complete and rentals have reached
a specified percentage of capacity. Firm takeout commitments are required by
law as a condition for construction loans by commercial banks and savings-
and-loan associations. REITs, however, are permitted to make loans without
prior arrangements for takeouts, and they charge higher interest on such loans,
suggesting the greater risk involved.
Instead of third-party takeouts, some REITs resorted to a device called a
standby takeout: a mortgage commitment made by the trust itself in the expec-
tation that it would never be used, but written just in case a regulation takeout
could not be arranged. Standby takeouts, unlike the standard kind, usually have
short terms and high rates, making them attractive only in desperate situations.
For the REITs, the standby takeout was a transparent improvisation designed
to fatten their loan portfolios with projects of dubious merit.
The extent to which loans were granted without takeout commitments is
illustrated by the record of First Wisconsin Trust. In December 1971, only
16 percent of First Wisconsin's construction loans had been granted without
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takeout commitments. Little more than a year later, fully 86 percent of the
trust's loans lacked the support of takeout commitments. 7
As interest rates rose and long-term mortgage money got scarce, the lack
of real takeout commitments on REIT-financed projects became a problem.
Builders without takeout commitments paid interest 3 to 5 percent above the
prime rate on their construction loans, during construction and after completion
of their projects, until long-term financing could be arranged. With the prime
rate already above 10 percent-sometimes several points above-the premium in-
terest rate came to exceed the ability of most projects to earn, even if they were
generating healthy cash flows. As a result, even solid income-producing real-
estate began to fall behind on interest and principal repayment on their C&D
loans from the REITs.
The tendency for the REITs to lend money to projects that had not secured
long-term mortgage commitments also meant that in many cases a REIT was
deprived of a second lender's opinion of a project's value, most often in just those
dubious cases where a second opinion would have been most valuable. Viable
projects had relatively little trouble finding regular financing, even in times of
tight mortgage money. It was the least credit-worthy projects, of course, whose
builders would be least likely to risk looking for long-term financing, especially
if they could get standby takeouts from the C&D REITs.8
With their easy-going attitude toward lending, the C&D REITs were per-
fectly in character in relying heavily on outside consultants to do the crucial on-
site inspections of projects they were thinking of lending money to. Inevitably,
'Ibid., p. 335.
'Howard H. Stevenson, "What went wrong with the REITs?" Harvard Business School, Jan-
uary 1976, pp. 4-5.
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the lenders remained unaware of many inherent problems that their consultants
somehow didn't notice, while the REITs were too busy beating the bushes for
more borrowers to oversee properly those they already had.
In the same spirit many REITs used cost projections, budgets, and other fi-
nancial data supplied by loan applicants without making thorough attempts to
verify the figures. Such lackadaisical behavior tempted developers to work back-
wards from the bottom line in their loan applications, first deciding how much
they wanted to borrow, then adducing costs to justify the total. Appraisals used
to substantiate loan applications were routinely inflated out of any connection
with the real value of the property. Cash-flow projections were structured for
the purpose of securing loans.
In some cases, REITs permitted developers with whom they were closely
affiliated to submit appraisals that included the estimated value of their land
after the proposed development. At best, such appraisals were only speculations,
and the developers were tempted to overstate the value-to-be. In the West,
especially, raw land was bought or optioned at a value of as little as $300 per
acre, and appraised for loan purposes at $6,000 to $8,000. In the event of a
foreclosure, however, the real-estate would have to be liquidated at something
closer to the $300 price. The security of the loan, therefore, depended almost
entirely on the developer's eventual success, instead of being based prudently
on the developer's potential failure. 9
Developers were also encouraged to define their projects in fanciful terms-an
apartment building was invariably described as a "luxury townhouse concept"-
in order to justify financial predictions based on rental or sales prices that were
above the market. Such exaggerated appraisals led to excessive loans, compared
91bid., pp. 2-3
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to the real value of the projects. In these deceptions, as long as failure did not
force either the lender or the borrower to face the real world, both parties were
apparent winners. The developer got a bigger loan than his project deserved-if
it deserved any loan; while the REIT got to report another sure-fire investment
and claim the interest and fees. In some cases, indeed, developers were thus
able to borrow more than the entire value of their projects, relieving them of
any stake in their success.
In charge of their loan operations, the REITs generally had inadequate num-
bers of inexperienced people. Many REIT employees were beginners in real-
estate, recruits from other industries, who could be confused, overwhelmed, or
simply deceived, by canny and experienced developers. Many of the REITs'
credit officers came into the business during the 1950s and 1960s, when lending
activity was less feverish, and when it was virtually unheard of for a big building
project to default on its loans. In most REITs, too, there simply were not enough
officers to oversee the business. One major bank, which sponsored a REIT in
addition to maintaining its own in-house real-estate department, had only eight








































































































































































































SURVEY OF REIT NON-EARNING ASSETS (February 1, 1976)
Type of Non-Earning Assets Total of
Construction ($ millions) Survey Total
Mobile Home Parks 77 0.8%
Condominiums 2221 23.4%
Single-Family Homes 416 4.4%
Rental Housing 1513 16.0%
Office Buildings 481 5.1%
Shopping Centers 336 3.5%
Hotel-Motel 531 5.6%
Other Commercial 478 5.0%
Industrial 123 1.3%
Unspecified Land
and Development 1302 13.8%
Unidentified 1995 21.1%
TOTAL: 9471 100.0%




Among the factors that contributed to the downfall of the REITs in the mid-
1970s, none were more instrumental than the financial institutions that spon-
sored the REITs and profited greatly from their success, while it lasted. REIT
sponsorship was most attractive to the commercial banks, which effectively came
to own most of the industry. The emergence of the commercial banks as the
preeminent backers of REITs began in earnest late in 1969, and became full-
blown when Bank of America Corporation and Chase Manhattan Corporation
sponsored REITs in June and July of 1970.
Between 1972 and 1974, while the total assets of the REIT industry were
increasing by a robust 135 percent, the commercial banks' share of the industry
was burgeoning by 970 percent, seven times as much. In a 1974 survey of the
industry, 16 of the 50 largest REITs in the country were sponsored by banks.
[Tablel]
By the end of 1975, according to the National Association of REITS, of the
total assets of $19.4 billion held by the 261 REITs in operation, 54 percent was
financed by the commercial banks. Forty-three percent of the bank financing
was in the form of term loans and revolving credits; 11 percent was in the form
of bank lines of credit that had been called upon by the REITs. The REITs
themselves had ownership of only about 19 percent of their total assets. Of the
balance, 4 percent was financed by commercial paper, 9 percent by subordinate
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debt, and 11 percent by mortgage loans on real property.1
Close connection with the commercial banks fostered the rapid growth of the
REIT industry, and afforded the newborn trusts access to plentiful capital re-
sources. The advantage was definitely mutual: like bees to honey, the banks were
drawn to the REITs by the generous advisory fees. Following the pattern estab-
lished by the mutual funds, the REITs generally paid their advisors between 1
percent and 1.2 percent of invested assets for management services. In addition,
the typical trust paid bonuses for good results: high returns on shareholders'
equity, high capital gains, etc. With the promise of such fees and bonuses, the
advisors were encouraged to lead the REITs to increase their investments, even
to go deeply into debt in order to enlarge their portfolios, without being overly
careful of the quality of their investments. The more investments, the more fees.
For the commercial banks as trust sponsors, the fees they got for advising
their REITs were almost pure profit. A survey by Audit Investment Research 2
found many cases in which the advisors' profits amounted to 60 to 70 percent
of their total fees. Only 30 to 40 percent of their fees paid their total costs for
providing investment advice, underwriting and monitoring loans, and providing
other services.
As profitable as REIT sponsorship proved to be for the banks, it involved
relatively little risk or cost. Setting up a trust required no major capital invest-
ment from the sponsor; virtually the only risk was that the offering of shares in
the trust would not attract enough interest from investors to get the REIT off
to a running start and to validate the sponsor's reputation in the financial com-
munity. In the early 1970s, REITs' returns to their bank sponsors contributed
'Rate Statistics, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Annual Survey, 1975.
2
"REIT Advisory Fee Plans," Audit Investment Research, Inc., (1974), p. 5.
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as much as an estimated 5 percent of the banks' total earnings.3
In addition to the fees and bonuses they earned for advising the REITs, the
banks' handsome total returns from REIT sponsorship were largely derived from
a variety of ancillary business activities. It was not unusual, for example, for the
banks' advisory subsidiaries to arrange low-cost REIT financing for developers
in the expectation of selling the developers insurance or other services as part
of the package.
A bank's advisory subsidiary could also influence a REIT to borrow from the
bank, regardless of more favorable financing options that might be available; or
to maintain excessive cash balances on deposit in the bank, to the bank's benefit
and the REIT's detriment. The advisor could also require developers and others
doing business with the REIT to maintain deposits at the bank. Finally, the
bank would have the inside track to sell the trust it was advising a variety of
banking services at non-competitive prices.
The period of tight money in 1969 gave banks and bank holding companies
an incentive to use REITs to avoid the effects of interest ceilings. Under Reg-
ulation Q, the limits on interest rates applied to large certificates of deposit,
as well as to ordinary savings and time accounts of less than $100,000. These
constraints made it difficult for banks to attract sufficient deposits to provide
lendable funds for all would-be borrowers. Developers and other real-estate in-
terests were competing with non-real-estate borrowers for the available supply of
money. Free from the onerous interest-rate regulations, REITs were able to sell
equity or long-term debt, to issue commercial paper, and to borrow from banks
and other financial institutions. These financing devices enabled the REITs to
attract loan funds to satisfy the demand from the real-estate industry, freeing
3 Prof. Brian Neuberger's testimony, Hearings on REITs, p. 44.
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available bank funds for loans to non-real-estate borrowers.
Commercial banks and the REITs they sponsored also profited mutually in
the boom period from 1971 to 1973 by writing standby takeout commitments for
each other's projects. The generous fees for these modest efforts were virtually
pure profit. The banks profited again with little or no expense by charging the
REITs for lines of credit, which the REITs used to back their own issues of
commercial paper.
The REIT-sponsoring commercial banks and their bank holding companies
were able to profit at the expense of their own REITs because REITs-unlike all
other entities advised or controlled by the banks-are permitted to borrow from
the banks, while reporting their earnings separately. Bank holding companies
also advise investment companies, or mutual funds, for example, but mutual
funds rarely if ever leverage their investments; and when they do, they generally
issue preferred stock instead of incurring bank debt. Other bank subsidiaries,
such as mortgage-banking and consumer-loan companies, consolidate their fi-
nancial reports with their parent companies'. The REITs, however, were quite
separate entities; the sponsoring banks seldom owned significant amounts of
the stock of their trusts. In directing the REITs' affairs, then, the sponsoring,
advising banks were in effect enjoying the use of other peoples' money.
Some observers, including Kenneth D. Campbell, the president of Audit In-
vestment Research, have suggested that the REIT boom of the early years of
the 1970s was only the most recent manifestation of popular delusions and the
madness of crowds, like the Dutch tulip craze or the South Sea Bubble of past
centuries. The behavior of REIT sponsors, investors, and other participants in
the episode, according to this view, is only explicable in terms of a blinding
euphoria of greed, instead of in terms of cool economic calculation of rational
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self-interest. The REIT mania is thus understandable as a result of the optimism
engendered by the Housing Act of 1968, which set a national housing construc-
tion goal of 26 million units in ten years. REITs, therefore, were simply Wall
Street's response to the vision of 2.6 million housing starts per year, a patriotic
gesture to meet a national goal.
The rest, was salesmanship: as underwriters discovered that REIT shares
could be sold to investors all too ready to believe in self-enrichment schemes,
they began to compete with each other to offer trusts with the most impres-
sive sponsorship, the greatest promise of profit, the most credible prospects of
longevity. The banks and other financial institutions, encouraged by their ad-
visors in the investment banking community, were persuaded that REITs were
the hottest new investment vehicle on the road to riches, going fast and getting
faster, and that they-the banks- should go along for the ride.
For the banks that served the REITs in the dual role of sponsors and advisors,
however, there was a clear and perfectly rational profit motive for embracing
the REIT idea. As the advisor of the biggest of the REITs during its first
three years in operation, for example, Chase Bank earned total fees of $16.5
million. Assuming that one-third of the total fees represented profits, Chase
netted $5.5 million during the years of the REIT's fastest growth. While the
gross profit was very small in comparison to Chase Bank's total earnings, it
figured much more significantly as a percentage of the total profits of Chase's
real-estate department; it is in this light that the profits of REIT advisors should
be viewed. The bank personnel responsible for advising REITs were, in effect if
not in fact, attached to the banks' real-estate departments. 4
In that organizational context, robust profits from advisory fees would look
4 Campbell, Hearings on RETs, op. cit., p. 343.
182
very good on an employee's record, and would improve the employee's chances of
moving up in the bank, as well as in the real-estate department. With individual
careers riding on the production of advisory fees, the pressure on the personnel
advising REITs became intense. In a July 25, 1975 interview in The Wall Street
Journal, Wells Fargo's R. Holdman was quoted as saying: "...the biggest culprit
in getting us into our current problem (regarding the REITs) was the volume
goal that we all set to work to fulfill during the years 1971 through 1974."
The banks got trapped in the REIT quagmire one step at a time, lured
each step of the way by the promise of rich rewards. During the early years
of the boom, in 1972 and 1973, the banks were beguiled by the attractions of
commercial paper as a fund-raising device. Commercial paper-secured notes,
sold to investors either directly or through brokers, with maturities ranging
from 30 to 270 days - was mostly issued by the larger REITs, which could
establish the credit ratings necessary to make the paper marketable. Most of
the commercial paper issued by the REITs was supported by lines of credit from
commercial banks, which required the REITs to keep 10 percent of the value of
the notes on deposit lieu of fees.
This requirement, in addition to the expenses of marketing the notes, added
to the expense of issuing commercial paper to raise money. The REITs normally
paid approximately 0.5 percent above the prime rate on commercial paper [Table
2], affording them a comfortable margin as long as the total cost of the notes
did not exceed 7 percent, while the REITs were earning 10 percent on their
mortgage lending. As the prime rate rose, raising the rates the REITs had to
pay on their commercial paper, however, the trusts' profits suffered sharply.
Their problems were compounded when the weakness of many REIT assets
became evident. The major credit rating services, such as Standard and Poor,
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Moody's, and Fitch's, lowered the REITs' ratings, making it increasingly difficult
for the trusts to market their commercial paper. By June 30, 1974, the total
value of outstanding commercial paper, which had been $3.97 billion just six
months earlier, had fallen to $1.6 billion. As a share of total REIT borrowing,
commercial paper had dropped from 28 percent to 10 percent. The commercial-
paper borrowings of the Chase Bank's trust, the biggest of the REITs, fell from
$429 million at the end of August 1973 to $180 million just a year later. 5
The void left by the drop in commercial paper issues was filled by bank
lines of credit, which were converted into short-term bank loans. [Table 3] The
banks had little choice but to grant their REIT's applications for credit; if their
sponsors would not come to the trusts' aid, who would? Because they are
convertible into short-term loans, lines of credit may be appropriate borrowing
devices for short-term C&D REITs. By the same token, however, they were
inherently inappropriate for the long-term investments the REITs were using
them for in 1974.
The bank's lines of credit extended to the REITs were also used to back the
REITs' commercial paper. The banks' incentive to extend the lines of credit was
simple enough: they wanted the "compensating balances," which were pegged
at 10 percent of the potential borrowing represented by the lines. As for the
possibility that the REITs would ever convert their lines of credit into actual
loans-the banks assumed it was unlikely to happen.
It did happen, however: the rapid decline in the value of outstanding com-
mercial paper during the first half of 1974 was almost perfectly balanced by the
rise in bank lines of credit that had been converted into loans. [Table 3] As the
REITs ran into financial troubles, some banks, especially the smaller ones, tried
-
5 bid., p. 346.
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to call their loans. The REITs, deeply in debt, could not repay, especially since
in many cases the loans the REITs had made to builders were themselves in
default, or at least delinquent. Trying to make the best of the situation without
forcing the REITs into the bankruptcy courts, many of the banks, led by the
larger ones, converted the REITs' loans into revolving credit agreements. [Table
4]
Most of the larger REITs first got into revolving-credit agreements in 1974.
By mid-1975, $7.8 billion out of the total $10.6 billion owed to the banks by the
REITs was in the form of revolving-credit debt, which had totalled a mere $0.9
billion just two years before. These revolving-credit agreements represented 74
percent of the trusts' total indebtedness to the banks.
As conditions in the REIT industry deteriorated, even the revolving credit
agreements were no longer reassuring enough to the banks. The credit agree-
ments began to be written with increasingly stringent restrictions and increas-
ingly brief terms. In the mid-70s some loans were written for only eight months.
In some cases, the price of a revolving credit agreement was a promise by the
trust not to make any new loan commitments, or not to pay dividends more
often than annually, instead of quarterly. The banks also required the REITs to
limit their non-accrual loans and to maintain some minimum net worth.
The revolving credit agreements did not ordinarily require the REITs to
maintain compensating balances: the trusts needed all the cash they could get
just to pay current expenses and unfunded commitments. On interest, however,
the lenders were not so understanding. Rates of 130 percent of the prime rate
became the rule. The prime rate reached 12 percent as the REITs were expe-
riencing their worst difficulty, then rose still higher. The result for the REITs
was borrowing costs in excess of 15.5 percent. Almost from the first, the inter-
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est burden was more than most of them could bear, and many of the REITs
defaulted almost immediately on their obligations.
Those C&D REITs that managed to keep their heads above the financial
quagmire into which the industry was sinking owed their survival to the willing-
ness of their creditors to keep them afloat. For the most part, the banks helped
these survivors by acquiring some of their assets, either through outright pur-
chases or swaps. In the swap, the troubled REIT traded some of the loans they
had made on income-producing properties for some of the government-insured
loans the banks had made. With the government-insured loans in their port-
folios, the REITs were able to tap other sources of credit. With an FHA/VA
loan, guaranteed by the government, for example, a REIT could take advantage
of Title 12 of the Federal Reserve Act to discount a mortgage company note at
the Federal Reserve for 90 days.
The advantage in this type of transaction was that the REIT improved its
liquidity, picking up cash to maintain its assets and obligations, without suffer-
ing any net diminution of assets. The disadvantage was that the REITs were
giving up their most marketable loans-the only ones the banks were interested
in swapping for. The effect was to increase the ratio of non-earning assets to
total assets remaining in their portfolios, bringing the REITs even closer to
bankruptcy.
In other cases, banks simply bought assets from the strapped trusts as an
important part of the controlled liquidation of trust assets. When Fidelity Mort-
gage Investors ran into difficulty, for example, it offered $3 million of its assets
for sale at book value to the banks from which it had borrowed money.6 Fidelity
'First Boston Research, "Impact on Bank Earnings of REIT and Real Estate Loans", "Hearing
on REITs", p. 218.
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Mortgage agreed on a 3-to-1 ratio between sales price to debt repayment for the
best of the loans it was offering. Of the $3 million if received for its assets, there-
fore, Fidelity Mutual returned $1 million to the banks to repay loans, keeping
$2 million to add to its cash reserves. When lower-quality assets were sold, FMI
or other debtors had to agree to less attractive terms; in some cases, the ratio
of sales price to debt repayment was 1:1-all the proceeds were retained by the
banks to pay down the REITs' credit balances.
When a REIT advisor was a subsidiary of a bank holding company it was not
unusual for the bank holding company; the bank and the REIT advisor; and the
affiliated REIT, to swap assets and to forgive indebtedness among themselves.
Bank-connected advisors had other ways they could help their REITs: outright
cash payments; reduced fees for advisory services; putting up the compensating
balances required by the banks for extending lines of credit; or simply paying
the REITs' loan losses above a certain level.
It was not altruism that impelled banks to assist their trusts. The Federal
Reserve Board, for one, viewed with concern the crisis in REIT commercial
paper, when many banks became worried about the serious problems in the
industry and moved to cancel lines of credit, causing several of the larger REITs
to have difficulties redeeming their commercial paper as it matured. Andrew
Brimmer7 , formerly a member of the Federal Reserve Board, has said that the
Board actually gave the commercial bankers explicit instructions to protect the
REITs from failure. The motive imputed to the Board was a desire to switch
REIT borrowing smoothly from commercial paper to the conventional banking
system.
7Quoted in Richard R. Byrne, "Reit's: Their Past, Present, and Future," Unpublished Thesis,
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, June 1975, p. 68.
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The Federal Reserve denies that it made any attempt to influence the REITs'
fate or fortunes. Whoever tried to help the REITs, however, apparently assumed
that the trusts were in a fix merely because they had the misfortune to encounter
a recession and tight money. Believing this, it was also possible to believe that all
that was needed for the REITs' recovery was an upturn in the national economy.
For the banks, there was a clear, imperative self-interest in helping the REITs
to survive the commercial paper crisis. The banks already had heavy investments
in the REITs; if they did not think enough of their investments to back them
with additional funds, who would? If no additional investors were found, many
REITs would be forced into bankruptcy, taking many of their borrowers with
them. Some banks were so heavily invested in REITs that the simultaneous
failure of many REITs would have bankrupted the banks as well. Citibank and
Chase, for example, each had $800 million invested in their REITs, compared
to total capital of $2075 million and $1446 million respectively. Bankers Trust's
REIT investment was $600 million, compared to total capital of $576 million.
Of its total capital of $718 million, Chemical had $800 million in REITs.'
In the process of trying to help the trusts out of trouble, the banks themselves
incurred significant losses from principal amounts that were simply written off
and interest payments that were either deferred or waived outright. In a report
prepared for its clients, the investment banking firm of Drexel Burnham & Co.
estimated the extent of the damage to the banks' balance sheets.9 If the nine
major banks with the greatest involvement in the REITs had fully accounted for
all their REIT-connected losses in 1975, according to Drexel Burnham's survey,




the average reduction in earnings per share as a result of principal write-offs was
30.5 percent; the average loss from the opportunity cost of interest due but not
received was 6.9 percent. All told, the loss in earnings per share averaged 37.4
percent. First Chicago, the big loser, declined 73 percent in per-share earnings;
while Morgan only declined 16.9 percent. [Table 5]
The damage-and the abuses that led to the damage-was mostly limited to
the short-term C&D REITs and the commercial banks that sponsored and ad-
vised them. The other REITs, the equity and long-term-mortgage trusts, and
other trusts that were not sponsored by the banks, were not nearly as hard hit
during the downfall of the REIT industry. The trusts sponsored by large insur-
ance companies, for example, were much less willing than the bank-sponsored
REITs to invest in short-term construction and development loans, or in volatile,
high-risk housing schemes, such as condominiums. Instead, these REITs con-
centrated their investments in high-quality permanent first mortgages; equity
ownership of real properties; and commercial properties, like office buildings
and shopping centers.
As a result, the insurance companies' trusts maintained lower, safer ratios of
debt to equity; higher stock prices; and higher yields than the banks'. By putting
their money into permanent first mortgages, the insurance companies' REITs
were investing in projects that had already been completed. The C&D REITs
favored by the commercial banks, in contrast, were betting on developers' plans,
hopes, and good faith, with all the risks that such investment entails. When
they did lend to developers, furthermore, the insurance-company REITs made
sure that permanent takeout commitments were firmly in place. They could
be quite sure, then, that the money to pay off the development loan would be
waiting when the project was completed.
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The trusts sponsored and advised by insurance companies also enjoyed the
advantage of their sponsors' widespread involvement in many aspects of the na-
tional real-estate industry; especially their intimate experience in the thousands
of local markets that really make up the national industry. The bank-sponsored
trusts, on the other hand, suffered from the limited geographical range of their
sponsor-advisors, whose primary banking activities were limited by government
regulation to a single local market. Most of the bank-sponsored REITs, there-
fore, concentrated their lending in a few well-known, overworked markets, and






Rank Name of Trust (millions) Types
1 Chase Manhattan Mtg. & Realty* $940 C
2 Continental Mortgage Investors 851 C
3 First Mortgage Investors 684 C
4 Guardian Mortgage Investors 479 C
5 Great American Mortgage Investors 479 C
6 Connecticut General Mortgage & Realty 470 I
7 Citizens & Southern Realty Investors* 461 C
8 Builders Investment Group 429 C
9 Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage Investors - 410 C
10 Diversified Mortgage Investors 403 I
11 D.I. Mortgage Group 373 C
12 IDS Realty Trust 346 C
13 B.F. Saul REIT 343 1
14 Equitable Life Mtg. & Realty Investors 341 I
15 Cousins Mtg. & Equity Investments 327 1
16 Barnett Mortgage Trust* 308 C
17 Corporate Property Investors 298 1
18 Mass Mutual Mtg. & Realty Investors 297 I
19 Continental Illinois Realty* 296 C
20 MONY Mortgage Investors . 278 1
21 Wells Fargo Mortgage Investors* ? 278 C
22 BankAmerica Realty Investors*. 264 1
23 Alison Mortgage Investment Group 251 1
24 North American Mortgage Investors 250 C
25 Northwestern Mutual Life Mtg. 244 1





Rank Name of Trust (millions) Types
26 Tri-South Mortgage Investors* 244 C
27 Security Mortgage Investors 234 1
28 First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust* 232 C
29 Fidelity Mortgage Investors 213 1
30 Cabot, Cabot, & Forbes Land Trust* 213 1
31 Reitman Mortgage Investors 211 C
32 Larwin Mortgage Investors 200 E
33 C.I. Realty Investors 200 E
34 Wachovia Realty Investments* 195 C
35 American Century Mortgage Investors 191 C
36 Institutional Investors Trust 190 C
37 General Growth Properties 189 E
38 Colwell Mortgage Trust 188 C
39 Mortgage Trust of America 187 C
40 Continental Illinois Properties* 184 E
41 Capital Mortgage Investments 182 C
42 Cameron-Brown Investment Group* 176 C
43 First Pennsylvania Mortgage Trust* 172 C
44 B.T. Mortgage Investors* 169 E
45 Independence Mortgage Trust 162 C
46 UMET Trust 160 C
47 Atico Mortgage Investors* 160 C
48 Gulf Mortgage & Realty Investments 159 E
49 State Mutual Investors 158 E
50 PNB Mortgage & Realty Investors* 150 E
TOTAL ASSETS (50 REITs) $14,834
Trust Types
C: Short-term construction and development mortgage loans
I: Intermediate-term mortgages
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TOTAL COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK LINES
(in billions)
Commercial Paper Outstanding
Bank Lines in Use











Source: REIT Statistics, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts,
Annual Survey 1973.





























































































































Neuberger testimony, Hearings on REITs, op.cit., p.41.
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TABLE 5
COMBINED EFFECTS OF PRINCIPAL WRITE-OFFS, AND
"OPPORTUNITY COST" OF INTEREST NOT RECEIVED FROM REIT
LOANS ON THE EARNINGS PER SHARE OF NINE MAJOR BANKS
(UNTIL JUNE 1975)


















































The Failure of Regulation
The lack of adequate regulatory safeguards and of institutions to oversee the be-
havior of realty trusts was largely to blame for the collapse of the REIT industry
in the 1970s and the consequent injury to thousands of investors. Congress in its
wisdom endowed REITs with the same tax advantages theretofore reserved to
mutual funds; but Congress' wisdom did not extend to giving REITs the mutual
funds' regulatory protection.
Mutual funds-regulated investment companies-were protected by the regu-
latory provisions of the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisors
Act, both enacted in 1940. Among the legislative impulses that led to these
acts was Congress' desire "to ensure that investors who entrusted their funds
to investment companies would not be subject to undue risk due to imprudent
financial structures, self-dealing, and conflicts of interest generated by those
charged with the management of fund assets. By contrast, REITs were not in
1960, nor have they been at any time since then, subject to comparable regula-
tory safeguards.".
In fact, Martin notes, Section 3(c)(b) of the Investment Company Act ex-
empted from the provisions of the Act companies investing in real estate or
mortgages secured by real estate. The Securities and Exchange Commission in-
terpreted this provision to apply to most REITs. The use of "Blue Sky" laws to
'William L. Martin, "Federal Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Legislative
Proposal," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127, pp. 317-318, 1978.
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regulate REITs has been attempted by some states, but most have found these
laws inadequate to the task.
The REITs would have been well-served by a variety of regulatory mea-
sures, including some originally devised for mutual funds, and others especially
designed for the special conditions of the REITs. In the event, however, the
REITs did not even get the benefit of the ordinary regulations applied to more
traditional corporations and financial institutions. REITs are like mutual funds,
for example, in the way their managements are structured and in the objectives
they are created to pursue. Both aggregate capital from relatively large num-
bers of relatively small individual investors, seeking thus to afford small investors
the advantages usually available only to large investors, while minimizing their
exposure to risk. Like mutual funds, too, REITs are managed by outside in-
vestment advisors, under contract. The advisors are in effect the managers of
the business, guiding the investment and financial decisions of the trustees, and
generally managing the day-to-day activities of the company.
The REITs, it is clear, wanted regulation in at least four important areas.
They shared with the mutual funds the need for measures to guard against con-
flicts of interest in the transactions between the realty trusts and their advisors;
to maintain proper relationships when both advisor and trust were represented
by the same law firm; as well as to insure that the agreements between REITs
and advisors were proper in all respects. The REITs, in addition, proved to
require strict measures to curtail the temptation - apparently an overwhelming
one - to take imprudent risks, especially to leverage their debts too heavily.
Instead of strong, explicit, systematic regulation at the federal level, however,
the REITs were subject to an inconsistent, often unintelligible, and essentially
haphazard patchwork of federal and state statutes and rules, together with self-
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imposed regulations devised by the REIT industry. Self-regulation of the realty
trusts included primarily those provisions of the contracts between REITs and
their advisors that restricted activities that might involve self-dealing or other
improper behavior. Such contract provisions commonly stipulated that trans-
actions involving the trust and its advisor or any affiliate of its advisor required
the approval of a majority of the trustees unaffiliated with the advisor or its
affiliates.
The standard Declaration of Trust - the instrument creating a REIT - also
specified that transactions between the REIT and its advisor or its advisor's
affiliate should be "fair and reasonable" to the shareholders; and should be as
advantageous to the REIT and its shareholders as similar transactions conducted
at arm's length.2 To achieve these results, the standard Declaration included
specific clauses requiring the advisor to act as a co-lender on equal terms, pari
passu; or to give the trust the right of first refusal on any investment that the
advisor was considering for itself.
As reasonable and effective as these measures may have sounded in theory,
however, in actual practice they were ineffectual. The regulations included no
punishment for trustees who failed in their responsibilities to make sure that
all transactions between REITs and advisors were "fair and reasonable." If the
trustees failed to notice improper dealings, or failed to look for them in the
first place, no agency or mechanism was created to protect the interests of the
trust and its shareholders, much less to hold the errant trustees responsible for
their misfeasance, malfeasance, or just plain nonfeasance. Quite the contrary,
indeed: virtually all Declarations of Trust included specific language explicitly
exculpating all trustees and advisors from liability for their actions in connection
2 lbid., P. 325
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with the REIT, except in cases where intentional or "gross and reckless" errors
could be proved.'
Requirements for "pari passu" dealings and rights of first refusal in relations
between REITs and advisors were far from universal.4
State regulation of REIT management and operations largely follows the
policy statement adopted in 1970 by the Midwest Security Commissioners As-
sociation (MSCA). The principal features of the MSCA statement include a
requirement that the majority of any REIT's trustees be independent of any
affiliation with the REIT's advisor or any affiliate of the advisor. Also included
was a prohibition against any purchase or sale of any trust asset by any trustees,
officers, or advisors of the trust, except under certain specified circumstances;
and even then only with the approval of a majority of the unaffiliated trustees.
These regulations, too, were largely feckless, because they were not adopted
by most states, and because they were far too limited in their scope to embrace
many of the most prevalent conflict-of-interest situations and other abuses. The
MSCA policy, for example, applied only to new security offerings by the REITs.
The rules did not apply to REIT financings through commercial paper and
3 lbid., p. 326
4 By 1978, only seven states (Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming) and the American Stock Exchange had enacted rules modelled on the Midwest Se-
curity Commisioners Association, (MSCA), guidelines. Six other states (California, Florida,
Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, and Washington) had adopted rules more limited in scope, with-
out any provisions for self-dealing transactions. (Where they did exist, often only one or the
other was included, creating serious lapses in effective protection of shareholders' interests.
"pari passu" provisions were often written to require advisors, as ostensible co-lenders, to put
up as little as 10 percent or less of a loan, making their participation little more than window
dressing. Finally, the non-affiliated trustees' required scrutiny of investment activities involv-
ing REITs and their advisors in potential conflicts of interest was often more sham than real,
since the number and complexity of the activities to be overseen far outstripped the trustees'
available time, energy, and inclination.
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bank lines of credit; the very situations in which self-dealing and other conflicts
of interest were most likely to arise. The MSCA policy also ignored the inherent
conflict of interest in the sale of services to the REIT by its advisor and its
affiliates - the same sales that were the main reason why many REITs were
created in the first place - or the common occurrence of a REIT competing with
its advisor or its advisor's affiliate for a lending opportunity. For protection
against such opportunities for abuse, the MSCA relied totally on the ability
and inclination of the independent trustees. With their limited independence,
their limited financial expertise, and the limited time and attention they could
or would spend on their trust, the efficacy of the trustees in this regard was
definitely limited.
The states had two other legal safeguards against improper behavior by REIT
trustees or advisors. Laws requiring "duty of care" could have had significant
application to the trustees' conduct of corporate affairs and supervision of the
trusts' management. "Duty of loyalty," contained in other laws, would have
required REIT trustees, as corporate directors and officers, to act in good faith
in all transactions involving the REIT and its assets, and to demonstrate good
faith and fairness in all personal dealings with the REIT. 5
These legal concepts, however, according to William L. Martin 116, had lit-
tle practical application to the situation of REITs and their trustees, and little
effect in regulating conflicts of interest, self-dealing, and other abuses involv-
ing REIT trustees, advisors, and officers. The concept of "duty of care" was
traditionally limited in its application to bank directors; "duty of loyalty" did
not apply to independent REIT investment advisors, who were not officers or
'Martin, op. cit., p. 331
rlbid., p. 330
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employees of the corporation. Many of the major REITs, in addition, were estab-
lished and governed under the laws of Massachusetts, which limits the liability
of REIT trustees to cases in which "gross negligence" can be proved. Under
the protection of such a statute, REIT trustees could be held accountable only
for relatively flagrant, clear-cut offenses of which they could be shown to have
had actual knowledge. In effect, therefore, trustees were virtually immune from
accountability for abuses under their ostensible stewardship.
Most of the Federal laws applying to the operation of REITs are found in the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The provisions
of these acts applying to disclosure by corporate directors apply equally to REIT
trustees. Under these provisions, all trustees, but especially those who purport
to be independent, are required by law to investigate and to insist on disclosure
of all conflicts of interest or instances of self-dealing in which the relationship
between the REIT and its advisors is materially involved. 7
Despite the laws' positive requirements that trustees diligently determine the
adequacy and accuracy of full disclosure, there was still room for abuses. The
trustees' duty under the law, for example, only applies to the REITs' original
offering documents; it does not require the trust to make subsequent disclosures
to its shareholders or potential investors as circumstances change.8 The courts
have been unwilling to hold independent REIT trustees liable for abuses, there-
fore, merely on the grounds that they failed to investigate or to require full
disclosure of conflicts of interest or self-dealings.
Ironically, there was at least one law on the books that might have forced
the REITs to adhere to strict standards of fiduciary responsibility, if it had been
7 bid., p. 333.
8 Ibid., p. 333.
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applied. The law in question is the Investment Company Act, whose Section
36(a), designed to bolster the position of independent directors, requires strict
disclosure by advisors in all transactions where there exists so much as the
possibility, much less the actual fact, of any conflict of interest, however slight.
Acting on such disclosures, the independent directors are required to give careful
consideration to all relevant factors before deciding whether to permit such a
transaction.
In cases involving investment companies, courts have consistently ruled that
Section 36(a) makes independent directors liable not only for their own self-
dealing, but also for their negligent failure to ferret out self-dealing by advisors,
officers, and non-independent directors. Section 17 of the Investment Com-
pany Act goes further, requiring review and approval by the Securities and
Exchange Commission of many kinds of transactions between a mutual fund
and its advisors.' Intended to regulate mutual funds, however, the Investment
Company Act was never extended to include the funds' close cousins, the RE-
ITs; which therefore escaped the salutary surveillance of the Federal courts and
the SEC in these matters. As a result, REIT advisors frequently neglected to
disclose important facts involving real or potential self-dealing and other con-
flicts of interest to the trustees; who had no need to be overly concerned about
being kept in the dark, since they were virtually immune from liability for abuses
about which they could not be shown to have known.
The Investment Company Act pays particular attention to the problem of
advisory fees in mutual funds. The Act prescribes detailed rules for the com-
panies, their directors, and their advisors in setting fees and making contracts
for advisory services. However, REITs and REIT advisors were not similarly
gIbid., p. 344
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regulated. In fact, there were no Federal laws directly addressed to the trouble-
some question of REIT advisory fees. In only a single case, and only in 1978,
the SEC brought an action against a REIT advisor, charging failure to disclose
what it called "exorbitant" profit margins in its fees. As a result of this lack
of regulatory zeal, predictably, the most prevalent abuse of REIT management
was in this very area.
Even the strictures applied by law to ordinary corporations were almost en-
tirely lacking. Ordinary corporations, for example, publish the salaries and other
compensation paid to top management, directors, and officers in a form that en-
ables shareholders and other interested parties to make informed judgements.
REITs, however, disclosed only their aggregated management costs, in which
operating expense, other expenses, salaries, and profits were lumped together.
With no more information to go on, shareholders were unable to make rational
evaluations of the remuneration that was being paid to advisors.
If shareholders were effectively kept at a distance from the process by which
advisors' fees were determined, the advisors themselves were not. The prepon-
derance of advisors' representatives on many REIT boards ruled out the kind
of arm's-length bargaining over compensation that is standard practice in ordi-
nary business situations. The advisors were quite free to influence the setting of
their own fees and bonuses, and to make other decisions regarding the REIT's
affairs, with more of an eye to the advantage of their own corporations than to
the well-being of the REIT.
Nor did the common law protect the shareholders' interests. Indeed, under
common law, the contract between the REIT and its advisor, and the fees agreed
on for advisory services, were subject only to the most limited review by the
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courts. In the case of Sane v. Brady10 , the court held that approval of a
contract by the majority of shareholders constituted convincing evidence that
the fee set by the contract is neither unreasonable or excessive.
Another potential regulatory influence was the limitations on advisory fees
included in the Statements of Policy issued by the Midwest Securities Commis-
sioners Association. The policy statements, belatedly promulgated in 1970, set
limits on the total operating costs of REITs, and on the fees they could pay their
advisors. The limit on total annual expenses, not counting interest, was 1.5 per-
cent of the REIT's total invested assets, without deducting liabilities. Advisory
fees were limited to 1.5 percent of assets less liabilities; or 25 percent of the
REIT's net income before payment of advisory fees; whichever was higher."
According to the MSCA formula, a REIT with $200 million in total invested
assets, $100 million in liabilities, and $4 million in net income would pay a
maximum of $1,500,000 in advisory fees (1.5 percent of assets less liabilities);
while total expenses, including the advisory fee but excluding interest expense,
could not exceed $1.5 million.
The MSCA policy was aimed directly at the problem of advisory fees, and its
explicit terms seemed to make abuse difficult, if not impossible. Since liabilities
- including leveraged debt used to purchase assets - was deducted from total
assets in calculating advisory fees, advisors could not inflate their fees by urging
the REIT into heavily leveraged investments. Under the alternative method of
calculating fees, since fees could not exceed 25 percent of net income, advisors
could not increase their own profits simply by recommending imprudent, un-
101bid., p. 353.
"Roy Schotland, "Real Estate Investment Trusts," in "Abuse on Wall Street," by Twentieth
Century Fund Steering Committee, Quorum Books, Westport CT, 1980, p. 181.
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profitable, or excessively risky investments. Improved advisory fees were thus
directly tied to improved REIT net income. The apparent effect of these MSCA
regulations was to marry the advisors' profits to the profits of their REITs.
Martin, among others, has explained the failure of the MSCA policy state-
ments to control the rampant abuses in the REIT industry. First was the failure
of more than a few states and one stock exchange to adopt the MSCA standards.
As late as 1974, several years after the MSCA had spoken, five of the ten largest
REITs were ignoring its standards.1 2
Even within the standards, according to Martin, "...under certain circum-
stances, it [was] quite possible that an advisor to a trust that was earning no
income on its investments and that was only modestly leveraged would neverthe-
less have an incentive to increase the trust's borrowings and invest the proceeds,
notwithstanding the quality of the additional investments or the prudence of
increased debt leverage."' 3
The same critics also point out that the MSCA limits do not include non-fee
compensation received by REIT advisors. Among the excluded, but lucrative,
sources of income: income from borrowers connected with loan origination; and
Income received by the advisor or an affiliate of the advisor for services in-
volving acquisition, operation, maintenance, protection, or disposition of trust
properties.
In practice, the MSCA guidelines were simply abrogated when it suited the
affected parties. When the REIT business became unprofitable, and the guide-
lines spelled huge operating losses for the advisors, many REITs simply agreed
to underwrite their advisors operating deficits. In effect, then, the REIT ad-
"Martin, op. cit., p. 355.
"Martin, op. cit., p. 356.
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visors were insured against losses in bad times, without giving up any of their
generous profits from good times. It was, for the advisors if not for the advisees,
a no-lose situation.
Finally, notes Martin, the MSCA policy proposed formulas for fixing the
maximum fees for advisors. As substitutes for the kind of "reasoned evaluation"
that should go into any deliberation on appropriate fees for advisory services, the
limitations were at once too approximate and too rigid to be very satisfactory."
The REITs' inherent propensity for taking risks - sometimes imprudent risks
- was another problem area in which regulation would have been helpful. In this
area, too, the Investment Company Act protects mutual funds, restricting the
leveraged debt that a regulated investment company can incur. Section 18 of
the Act, for example, prohibits open-end investment companies from issuing se-
nior securities. The same section limits borrowing from banks by both open-
and closed-end companies to a fixed percentage of the amount by which the a
companys' assets exceed its total bank debt. Section 18 was included in the
Investment Company Act after an SEC study 5 showed a decided negative rela-
tionship between a fund's leveraged debt and its overall performance.
Despite the lack of diversity, and the consequently greater risk, that charac-
terized the REITs' assets compared to those of the mutual funds, it is remarkable
- and unfortunate - that no such law as Section 18 applied to realty trusts. The
only control on excessive debt leveraging by REITs was the MSCA policy guide-
line against "unreasonable" borrowing. The MSCA did not offer any definition
of "unreasonable." The only other restrictions were those written into the Decla-




to the highest standards of responsible borrowing. Indeed, Declarations of Trust
permitted REITs to burden themselves with debt-to-equity ratios as high as 8:1.
REITs were also vulnerable to conflict-of-interest problems because of their
common practice of permitting one law firm to represent both the REIT and its
advisor. Indeed, it was typical for the same firm to include the REIT's sponsor
and its supposedly independent trustees on its client roster. Representing all
sides in any conflict that might arise among the REIT's leadership, the law firm
could not possibly fulfill its obligations to protect the legitimate interests of its
clients simultaneously.
The potential for conflict in the not-uncommon case of a dispute involving
a REIT and its advisor, with both parties represented by the same law firm, is
suggested by Schotland:
...the REIT's counsel would know that the advisor controlled the
REIT and, thereby, the lawyer's continued employment. But even if
the lawyer feared that certain actions might cost him the REIT as
a client, he would be concerned about the loss of only one account:
the REIT. If the same law firm represented both the advisor and the
REIT, actions interpreted as unwarranted solicitude for the REIT's
interests could lead to the loss of both accounts.16
If the scenario seems obvious, it was evidently missed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, and
the American Bar Association, none of which indicated by any action that the




6 Schotland, op. cit., p. 204
Chapter 13
Conflicts
Abused and exploited by their sponsors, advisors, and trustees; and neglected by
the regulatory agencies with the mandate and the jurisdiction to protect them;
the REITs were practically doomed to disaster.
Certainly the banks were the most culpable factors in the REITs' decline,
since it was the banks that sponsored the REITs in many cases, and thus had the
primary responsibility - in both the moral and the fiduciary sense - to protect
them. In fact, however, most bank-sponsored REITs owed their very existence
to their sponsors' appetites for generous fees for advice and other services. The
nature of the bank's interest in their REITs was indicated by the fact that few
of the banks invested very heavily in the REITs they themselves started. While
such a hands-off practice might appear admirable in some sense, it also indicated
that the banks did not anticipate that the largest profits would come from the
increasing values of the trusts; instead, they looked for the best returns to come
from fees.
The fees were assured because the REITs' sponsors, or their affiliates or sub-
sidiaries, were invariably the REITs' advisors as well. This cozy certitude was
never so much as challenged by the REITs' supposedly independent trustees,
who sat right across the table from the sponsors' representatives at board meet-
ings. Effectively in control, the bank-sponsors dictated REIT policy, influenced
REIT investments in order to increase their own profits, encouraged imprudent
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leveraging in a push for apparent growth, and avoided accountability to the
REIT shareholders in whose name they purported to act.
The banks' lack of rigorous interest was indicated also by their failure in
most cases to insist on first-rate management for the REITs. Despite the fact
that the REITs' managements were inevitably going to be handling immense
amounts of other peoples' money, under high pressure; and despite the fact that
the shareholders whose money the REITs were using had been assured that their
interests were protected by the banks' own highly competent managements; in
fact, REIT managements were often selected without adequate care and allowed
to manage without adequate controls.
Meanwhile, to make the REITs as attractive as possible to potential in-
vestors, the shares were commonly touted heavily, often with dubious claims. A
banker described the steamy atmosphere on Wall Street:
The stock market was dull in 1969 and 1970, with few attractive
issues. REITs provided the market sex appeal during this relatively
dry period. The selling pitch was earnings - leverage, greater earn-
ings per share - higher stock values. Magically, an income security
turned into a growth stock... .the way to increase per share earnings
was to borrow and increase investments. The Wall Street pressure
for this result was tremendous.
With this go-go atmosphere prevailing in 1965, two revenue rulings2 made
it legal for a REIT's trustees to do double-duty as officers, employees, or share-
holders of the REIT's advisory organization. Specifically, the first ruling allowed
'Schotland, op. cit., p. 168
2 Rev. Rul. 65-65, 1965-1 CUM. BULL.
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a REIT's trustee to be an officer, an employee, or a direct or indirect propri-
etor of an independent contractor whose sole business was the servicing of the
REIT's real-estate loans. The second ruling allowed a REIT's trustee also to be
an employee, officer, or stockholder of a supplier of "legal or investment advisory
services to the trust pertaining to the trust property." In effect, these rulings
encouraged conflicts of interest among REIT trustees: a trustee with loyalties
divided between the stockholders and the REIT's advisory organization might
well find himself torn between competing interests.
Despite their potentially conflicting interests, however, the trustees enjoyed
extraordinary latitude. Indeed, their powers were broad enough to overcome
the legal strictures against "active" development dealings by a REIT, which was
designated by law as a "passive" investor. With the power to set rental terms and
to enter into leases, combined with the power to use capital for improvements
to REIT property, the trustees were perfectly positioned to transform passive
investment vehicles into active development trusts, buying unimproved property,
developing it, and then renting or leasing it.
Section 1.856-4(b)(3)(1)(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, for example, re-
quired REIT trustees to contract out the management and operating services for
REIT-owned property, as well as services provided to tenants of the property;
but allowed the trustees to manage the trust itself. As managers of their trusts,
of course, the trustees were in a position to make unilateral decisions on capital
expenditures. And Section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code specifically defines
capital expenditures to include payments for new construction or permanent
improvements intended to increase property values.
These powers clearly put the REIT trustees in the position of active real-
estate developers, rather than merely passive investors. In their active role,
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the REITs became much more risky for their investors than they were intended
to be as passive entities. Without fair warning, REIT investors were actually
engaging by proxy in relatively high-risk real-estate development schemes.
The availability of generous advisory fees to trustees acting in a dual capacity
provided the trustees with an incentive to commit trust resources to specula-
tive property development, violating the spirit of the trusts' original mandate
as passive entities and exposing their shareholders to unanticipated risks. The
standard REIT advisory-fee, intended to compensate outside investment advi-
sors for management services, became a major conflict of interest in the common
case of a trustee who was simultaneously an employee of the sponsor-advisor.
In such an incestuous relationship, proper arm's-length negotiation of fees was
doubtful. Since the standard basis for computing advisory fees was the total
value of a REIT's assets, the trustee-advisor was encouraged to urge the REIT
into debt in order to buy assets and bolster fees.
Even such a clear-cut conflict of interest was not necessarily blameworthy,
however, if the investment activities and advice of the trustee-advisor were in
the best interests of the REIT shareholders. Presumably, one way to assure an
identity of interest between the trustee and the shareholders would have been for
the trustee himself to become a major investor in the REIT. In actual practice,
however, the investments of most advisors in their REITs were too small to
create any compelling common interest.
The potentially conflicting interests of REIT trustees, and their potential
for reaping generous profits from advisory fees without investing significantly in
the REIT, were often concealed from the REITs' shareholders by obscure and
incomplete disclosure of management expenses. REIT prospectuses and other
reports to shareholders commonly omitted any breakdown of total management
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fees to show actual costs borne by the advisors and the advisors' profits. Without
such information, shareholders were unable to make proper judgements of their
REITs' true operation, management, and financial situation.
As Schotland notes, quoting an industry observer:
Unhappily, very few REITs are reporting to their shareholders on
a regular basis the results of operations of their advisor. When
this is done, it is usually contained in proxy statements support-
ing expense-only fees. Thus the REIT shareholder remains largely
in the dark about how the dollars of advisory fees are actually being
spent. Perhaps it will take some evolution toward greater maturity
among REIT trustees to elevate disclosure standards in this area. 3
The issue of advisory fees was described in a 1975 survey of industry fee
practices, conducted by Audit Investment Research:
[The question is whether] fees were not $100 or $110 million too high
during [the REITs'] halcyon days.
Some trustee boards have implicitly answered that question in the
affirmative by requesting their advisors to stay on the job with little
or no fee. In effect, they are asking the advisor to give back some of
the profits it earned in the lush days....
A second group of answers comes in reaction of trustee boards to the
ancillary question of whether advisors should make profits from their
trusts in these troubled times (when shareholders are seeing red ink
and banking no dividends)....
3Schotland, op. cit., p. 183.
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A third group of answers has come from the trustees who have de-
cided to internalize management and operate without an investment
advisor....
The industry's trauma has raised this $100 million question forcibly.
It will not go away.
About $170 million...is needed to operate the REITs whereas the
higher expense ratios in the most profitable heydays of the REITs
in early 1973 would produce $280 million in annual expenses. 4
The clear answer to the question initially posed by Audit Investment Re-
search: REITs typically paid their advisors profits of some 65 percent for in-
vestment guidance that was often not worth such a generous permium, if any.
Over-generous advisory fees were only one prevalent abuse in the REIT in-
dustry. There were also hefty fees for non-advisory services: fees paid by the
REITs to their advisors and other consultants for originating and servicing mort-
gages and for managing REIT properties; as well as fees exacted from the REITs'
borrowers for sundry services such as loan commitment, placement, and broker-
age. These bounteous fees for non-advisory services, moreover, were usually
reported as part of an aggregated total expense figure, without any indication
of who got paid how much for what. Both the REIT shareholders, who are pay-
ing the fees, and the independent trustees, who hire the advisors and negotiate
their fees, therefore, lack complete information on advisors' costs and profits.
For the same reasons, the available information on the fees paid by REITs
for advisory and non-advisory services is often fragmentary and unreliable. The
4Audit Investment Research, REIT Advisory Fee Plans - 1975: The $100 Million Question,
Quoted in Schotland, ibid, p. 179.
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well-substantiated data that do exist, however, tend to support the inference
that fees were typically substantial, sometimes difficult to justify, and often
improperly diverted from the REITs assets. In 1973, for example, IDS Realty
paid its advisor - a subsidiary of the same parent company, Investor Diversified
Services - fees totaling $2,463,000, not counting fees connected with an issue
of subordinated debentures, out of a total operating income of only $5,940,000.
In the following year, total fees amounted to $4,176,000 out of total income of
$7,500,000. The total assets of the trust ranged from some $50 million at the
beginning of 1972, to an average of about $180 million in 1973, to about $300
million in 1974. In 1973, IDS realty paid fully 41 percent of its total operating
income in total fees to its advisors; in 1974, the percentage swelled to 56 percent.
[see Table 1, Table 2].5
While these figures make it clear that total fees were blatantly dispropor-
tionate to income, the most striking impropriety is in the munificience of the
non-advisory fees diverted from the REIT to an outside advisor affiliated with
the sponsor. In effect, the trust's income was being diverted from its sharehold-
ers to its sponsors.
IDS was hardly an isolated case. In 1972, another REIT, Justice Mortgage
Investors of Dallas, was able to reward its advisors with $754,406 in origination
fees from its borrowers; as well as more than half as much in ordinary advisory
fees; despite the fact that the REIT's total assets were less than $15 million at
the beginning of the year and $42.5 million at the end. A year later, with its
assets grown to an average $70 million, Justice Mortgage Investors paid advisory
fees of $951,000, while generating origination fees of $809,000.
There was more from Justice Mortgage: "incentive" fees to its advisors of
'Schotland, op. cit., p. 186, Table adapted.
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$36,000 per year. And more: $46,000 in 1972 and $133,000 in 1973 to the
advisor's insurance affiliate in premiums paid by Justice's borrowers to insure
their loans. In all, Justice's advisor and the advisor's affiliate recieved about 4
percent of the REIT's average net assets in 1972, and almost 3 percent - of
greatly increased assets - the following year.'
The most suspect of the fees for other than advisory services, those most
susceptible to abuse and conflict of interest, were those charged by a REIT's own
trustees or trustees affiliates for services to the REIT's borrowers or prospective
borrowers, services that were required as a condition of the loan. It is customary,
for example, for the borrower in a real-estate loan to bear the lender's costs for
such services as brokerage appraisal. When the service is required to be provided
by an officer or trustee of the lender, however, the situation is inescapably and
fundamentally tainted. The same officer who is charged to protect the REIT
from potential damage from unwise investments is also in a position to profit
only if the loan is made.
In the case of Associated Mortgage Investors, for example, the chairman of
the REIT's advisory firm also owned a firm that prepared and reviewed budget
projections for projects under consideration for loans from Associated Mortgage.
In 1972, this service earned the chairman's firm $215,000 from Associated's
borrowers and prospective borrowers. Another Associated trustee was the head
of a service company that performed "brokerage appraisals" for Associated's
borrowers and prospects to the tune of $97,000 in 1972.7
At Alison Mortgage, three of the trust's officers were also partners or as-
sociates in the law firm that acted for the trust in many of its loan closings,
c Ibid., pp. 186.
7Ibid., p. 187
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for which the law firm earned $103,703 in fees from Alison's borrowers in 1973.
The law firm of the chairman of the advisor to Dominion Mortgage billed the
REIT's borrowers $146,700 in 1972 and $278,087 the following year. A trustee
of North American Mortgage, that same year, got his law firm $259,000 in fees
from North American's borrowers; two officers of Republic Mortgage's advisory
firm did almost as well by their law firm.'
Fees in most cases were not contingent on profits or any other measure of
actual performance, but were keyed simply to the total assets of the REIT,
including even uncommitted funds. Under these conditions, advisors stood to
make handsome profits in fair weather and foul; and the greatest profits of all
came from spurring the REITs to headlong growth and the unrestrained use of
leveraging. The REITs and their advisory firms were not slow to see where their
advantage lay and to prosecute it to the fullest. The results were profit margins
for advisory services alone that often exceeded actual costs by 60 percent or
more. When fees for non-advisory services were added, the total remuneration
of advisors reached extreme proportions. [Table 3]
The claim has been made that the REIT advisors were entitled to fat prof-
its during the boom years to indemnify them against the high risks of the real
estate business and the certainty of lean years to come. Such self-serving ratio-
nalizations are belied, however, by the high fees and profits realized by many
advisors even during the REIT industry's disaster years during the 1970s. As
Schotland points out in the most convincing detail, the persistent profitability
of REIT advisory services through good times and bad often entailed a certain
amount of financial legerdemain and deception.
Continental Mortgage (CMI) paid its advisors, a partnership headed by two
8 lbid., p. 187
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brothers named Wallace, fees of almost $88 million in 1975. In previous years
the fees had come to approximately $10 million per year. In March 1976, CMI
filed for bankruptcy, revealing that fully 90 percent of its outstanding loans
were no longer paying interest. According to a complaint filed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1978, the Wallaces' advisory firm had concealed
for two years the trust's "true" financial condition, which would hardly have
justified such generous fees - or any fees at all.9
In another SEC civil action, in September 1975, First Mortgage (FMI), its
advisors, and certain of its officers, including its founder and chairman of the
board, were charged with failure to disclose significant facts about the REIT, as
required by law. According to an article in Forbes that year, FMI had taken care
to conceal defaults and other problems, in order to be able to boast of increased
earnings each quarter. Specifically, the SEC charged that FMI had: set up
a dummy corporation to funnel new loans from FMI into projects that were
already in trouble with their existing loans; offered large loans at below-market
interest rates to developers who would agree to take over troubled FMI-financed
projects; and hired appraisers to exaggerate the value of FMI-financed projects.
On the basis of such transparent deceptions, and despite the hard fact that half
its loans were in default, in 1974 FMI paid advisory fees - to a firm more than
one-third owned by its founder-chairman and his brother, another FMI trustee
- of more than $5 million.10
By mid-1974, suffering from tremendously reduced cash flow and sharehold-
ers' equity, many REITs reformed their fee policies in a desperate effort to sur-
vive. The 1970 Midwest Commissioner guidelines that had governed advisory




fees for many REITs were largely abandoned. Most REITs either abandoned
their reliance on outside consultants and created internal management offices,
or limited their payments to outside advisors to reimbursement for actual ex-
penses. Some trusts, including those sponsored by Chase Manhattan, Manufac-
turers Hanover, and First Wisconsin, elected not to reimburse their advisors at
all.
The Investment Company Act of 1940's prohibition against self-dealing be-
tween REITs and their outside advisors without prior clearance from the SEC
was effective against one kind of potential abuse - the direct sale of property
between REITs and advisors - that was rarely, if ever, attempted. The law
failed utterly, however, to check the kind of self dealing that was rampant in the
REIT industry. In other kinds of transactions between trusts and their advisors,
the law only required that the terms be fair, with the REIT required to prove
fairness only when the transaction is challenged. Understandably, there were
few successful actions against REITs on the score of self-dealing, despite the
well-known prevalence of self-dealing in the industry.
For many REITs, self-dealing began in the pages of the initial prospectus,
issued in compliance with the laws of many states to provide potential investors
with honest information about the uses to which their money, faithfully en-
trusted, is to be put. The purpose of the prospectus, clearly, was to protect
investors from acting blindly; but in the hands of profit-seeking sponsors, in
many cases REIT prospectuses became glib, glossy catalogues for insider deals.
In its initial prospectus in May 1972, for example, U.S. Bancorp Realty and
Mortgage Trust promised investors to begin its investment career with an insider
deal that would buy a group of industrial, office, and commercial real estate from
the Dan Davis Corporation, of which some 97 percent was owned by Dan Davis
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and his wife. The same Dan Davis was nominated and served as a trustee of
U.S. Bancorp Realty and Mortgage Trust; he later resigned. According to the
prospectus, the purchase price for the properties, $14,139,340, was "determined
by arm's length negotiations between the Trusty and Dan Davis," as well as
an independent appraisal; and included "an expected return to the Trust on its
investment," as well as a gross profit of $6.36 million to Dan Davis. Davis, an
insider, received 56 percent of the trust's total initial assets of $25 million."
Inadequate protection against such flagrant self-dealing was usually provided
by the terms of the REIT's Declaration of Trust and its prospectus, which cur-
tailed but did not altogether rule out purchases, sales, or loans between the trust
or its advisor and the trustees, officers, or employees of the REIT. The strengths
and weaknesses of the regulatory devices are illustrated by Chase Manhattan's
Mortgage and Realty Trust. The REIT, like many others, stipulated in its
prospectus that purchases, sales, or loans could not take place between the trust
and its trustees, its officers or employees; or between the trust and any officer,
director, or employee of the trust's advisor, an affiliate of the advisor, or an
independent contractor of the trust.
There was, however, a very significant exception to the apparent prohibition:
transactions between the trust and its advisor - in this case the Chase Man-
hattan Bank, the REIT's sponsor - were allowed if the terms of the deal were
properly disclosed, if they were approved by a majority of the trustees; or by a
majority of of the investment committee (excluding members affiliated with a
party to the transaction other than the REIT) after the trustees had agreed that
the transaction was fair and reasonable. The rules also required an independent
appraisal of the property being transferred.
"Ibid., p. 196
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The extent to which a REIT was liable to become nothing more than a
mechanism for self-dealing is illustrated by the case of Flatley Realty Investors,
a small equity trust organized in 1972 by Thomas J. Flatley, a Boston real-
estate developer. Flatley was a trustee of his REIT; he was also its president
and treasurer. At the same time, Flatley was president, treasurer, director, and
sole stockholder of an entity called Gibbs Management Corporation,' 2 "The
Trust," it insisted, "had retained the Management Company as an independent
contractor...."
According to a prospectus issued in 1974, when Flatley Realty Investors'
total assets amounted to more than $30 million, Flatley himself was active in the
acquisition and development of properties for his own account, and was likiely
therefore to be competing directly with the REIT of which he was founder,
trustee, president, and treasurer. The REIT did not have first refusal rights
on investment opportunities. "It may.. .be more profitable to Mr. Flatley," the
prospectus politely allowed, "to take an investment opportunity for his own
account or the account of the Operating Company [Gibbs Management] rather
than presenting it to the Trust."
The prospectus also noted that Flatley Realty Investors could buy property
and sell property and lend money to and from Flatley, Gibbs Management,
and other companies with which trustees, officers, management, or employees
of the REIT and its advisors and affiliates were connected. Finally, even the
unaffiliated trustees of the REIT, according to the prospectus, were permitted to
do business as individuals in competition with Flatley Realty; "and therefore,"
allowed the prospectus, "it is possible that situations may arise involving a
12 Ibid, p. 198. ..
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conflict of interest."1 3
In fact, the Flatley Realty situation was a conflict-of-interest minefield in
which abuses were impossible to avoid. There was an inherent conflict of interest
every time the trust made a loan to Flately or to Gibbs Management; or paid
either an advisory or service fee; or borrowed money on its advisor's advice to
increase the trust's assets, also increasing the advisor's fee; or paid Flatley or
the advisor their fees.
The abuses began with the initial establishment of Flatley Realty Investors,
when Thomas Flatley provided an initial investment of $3,081,000 in shares
and warrants and realized a taxable profit of $344,485 on the transfer of some
properties. The tax was not paid by Flatley, however, but was deferred pending
the disposal of the properties by the REIT, when the tax would be paid out of
the proceeds - paid, in effect, by the shareholders.
Also in 1972, according to the prospectus, Flatley Realty bought the land
under an apartment complex in Taunton, Massachusetts; then in 1973 sold the
land back to its owner, who immediately resold the land and the buildings
on it - this time to Flatley's own company. The REIT also made generous
loans to Flatley and to companies in which he held an interest. In 1972, in
association with a commercial bank, the REIT made Flatley a construction
loan of $1 million, The following year, the REIT made two more construction
loans to a development company in which employees of the Flatley company
owned an interest; and a $160,000 loan to a limited partnership in which the
same developer was the general partner. The prospectus assured any cynical
readers that all these transactions had been duly approved by a majority of the
REIT's independent trustees, "and are considered by those trustees to be on
'
3 Ibid., p. 198.
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terms fair and reasonable to the Trust and in no event less favorable to the trust
than terms available for comparable investments with parties not so affiliated."
In fact, as long as the fairness of the transaction was reasonably assured, the
law smiled on those provisions of trust instruments or corporate organizational
documents that permitted self-dealing by trustees or corporate directors. As far
as the law was concerned, there was nothing necessarily wrong with, for example,
dealings between a REIT and a bank owned by officers of the REIT's advisory
firm, who also happened to be trustees of the REIT. In such cases, which were
the rule rather than the exception, of course, the oversight responsibilities of
the supposedly independent trustees were severely strained, to say the least.
It must have been difficult for these trustees, even assuming that they were
disposed to be truly disinterested, to uphold the abstract interests of the REIT
and its shareholders against the interests of their colleagues and friends and of
the sponsor.
The prevalence of flagrant abuses in regard to fees and self-dealing was en-
couraged by the laxity and neglect practiced by the regulatory agencies charged
with oversight of the REIT industry. The REIT Act had been passed in great
haste in Sept., 1960; Congress was in too big a hurry to get the legislation on
the books to be too fussy about some of the details, so the REIT industry was
born without the built-in regulatory safeguards that protect other investment
vehicles, such as mutual funds, from many abuses. Congress also neglected to
assign any agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, to oversee
the new industry. The only regulations protecting the newly enabled REITs and
their shareholders from abuse, therefore, were the regulations that apply to all
publicly held companies.
By default, then, regulation of the REITs was left to the states, which had
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been regulating insurance companies and a number of other institutions for
decades. REITs, however, turned out to be difficult creatures for the states
to regulate effectively. The most important vehicle for state regulation of the
REITs turned out to be the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association
(MSCA), which included officials from 24 states. Policy statements emerging
from the MSCA's administrators became the core of regulation of the REIT
industry in those states that cared to follow the lead. By 1978, according to
Schotland, only eight states had formally adopted the MSCA's policy recom-
mendations; and several REIT security offerings in member states had violated
MSCA dicta.
Even full compliance with MSCA policies would not have completely fore-
stalled abuses, however, because the policies fell far short of offering the kind of
safeguards the situation required. A 1970 requirement that REIT prospectuses
make full disclosure of self-dealing, for example, dealt only with past occur-
rences, without requiring additional disclosures of self-dealing subsequent to the
establishment of the trust. The disclosure requirement also failed to include the
profits of REIT advisors among the data that should be available for scrutiny
by shareholders and regulators. 4
In 1970, the MSCA actually moved to weaken some of its most stringent
regulations. The requirement for independent appraisals of mortgaged property,
and for appraisals to be approved by the state securities administrator, were
deleted. So were the limits on advisory fees and on debt leveraging, which had
been adopted in 1961 and had become increasingly useful with time.
Indeed, in New York and some other states, state regulations inadvertently
encouraged self-dealing. The New York State regulation provided that a REIT's
14bid., p. 210.
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initial prospectus must specify the investments into which the initial sharehold-
ers' money was to be put. Sponsors, especially those who already had real-estate
investments they were anxious to get rid of, could easily transfer their unwanted
investments to the REITs. This was the course followed in the case of U.S.
Bancorp Realty & Mortgage Trust, cited above.
At the Federal level, where more effective regulation might reside, Congress'
initial failure to provide specific safeguards for REITs left only three agencies
with any real hope of controlling abuses: the Internal Revenue Service, the
Federal Reserve Board, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The IRS'
main weapon against abuses was the threat of revoking an offending REIT's
tax-exempt status. If a REIT was providing its own advisory and management
services, it could be defined as an "active" trust in terms of the REIT Act and
treated as an ordinary corporation for tax purposes. The same result would
follow an IRS finding that a REIT had failed to pay out 95 percent of its net
income in the form of dividends to shareholders. In such a case, the IRS was not
even obliged to allow the REIT to rectify the error. By not allowing the REITs
to hold adequate reserves to provide for loan losses, the IRS was actually forcing
the trusts into a dangerous position that would lead to widespread failures as
economic conditions for REITs and their investors turned increasingly perilous
in the 1970s.
The Federal Reserve's purview on the REITs derives from their authority
over bank holding companies, which control the banks that sponsored many of
the major investment trusts. Even before the REIT model had been devised, the
Federal Reserve had taken steps to guard against the abuses that might develop
if banks strayed from straight banking into untraditional activities. Among other
activities prohibited by the Fed's rules were participation by bank affiliates in
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bond issues on which the affiliate had advised the issuer; and the use of a bank
or bank holding company by a closed-end investment company that had been
advised by the bank or bank holding company.
Bank holding companies were required to give their shareholders consoli-
dated annual reports of all their subsidiaries. When it came to REITs, however,
the Federal Reserve Board seemed to develop a blind spot. As far as the Fed
was concerned, banks were free to sponsor REITs, lend them the dignity and
putative integrity of their names, and act as their advisors in relationships that
fairly demanded the closest imaginable self-dealing, without being required to
consolidate and report the REITs' financial activities and performance with the
banks'.
When the bank-sponsored REITs began to get into financial difficulty in
1973-1974, moreover, the Federal Reserve Board went even further in serving
as a de facto marriage broker-counsellor, encouraging the banks to bail out the
trusts. The Federal Reserve Board has staunchly denied that it was directly
involved in the decisions of any individual banks in this regard; but Andrew
Brimmer, a former member of the FRB, asserts, "The Fed gave commercial
bankers instructions not to let the REITs fail."" Of the three Federal agencies
charged with examining banks - the Controller of the Currency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board - none appar-
ently found it curious that as late as September 1975, when the REIT industry
was virtually flat on its back, not a single major bank had admitted suffering a
loss on a loan to a REIT.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, under the terms of the Securities
"Richard Byrne, "REITs: Their Past, Present and Future." Rutgers University, Brunswick,
NJ, 1975 (Stonier Thesis File), p. 56.
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Act of 1933, had the authority - and the obligation - to require REITs to
disclose all significant facts to their shareholders and the public as a condition for
registering their shares for sale. Among the material information contemplated
by the disclosure requirement, presumably, would have been any instances of
conflict of interest and self-dealing.
In 1972, nevertheless, the SEC's Real Estate Advisory Committee was com-
plaining that REIT prospectuse where chronically deficient in disclosure. The
committee asked for more information on a broad range of salient topics: the
capability of the REIT's management, and its previous performance; what kinds
of investments the REIT proposed to make, and what criteria would be used to
make investment decisions; the qualifications of the REIT's investment advisor;
the expected performance of the REIT's investment portfolio, including antici-
pated cash flows, vacancy rates, rent rolls, etc.; and rational assessment of the
real risks involved.
Having complained of these significant deficiencies in REIT disclosure, how-
ever, the SEC's advisory committee neglected to call for immediate corrective
action. It was satisfied to ask instead for further study of the issues. "On the
whole," notes Schotland, "the SEC has been less than dynamic in either pursu-
ing breaches of legal requirements or callikng for new safeguards." Specifically,
Schotland writes:
... the SEC made grave charges against First Mortgage Investors but
dropped them upon receiving assurances that the REIT would be-
have better in the future, and did not demand reimbursement for
stockholders' losses resulting from past misconduct. In may 1975
the SEC undertook a vast investigation of the now-bankrupt Conti-
nental Mortgage Investors, which led to the filing of suit nearly three
227
years later.
Apart from those two proceedings, the SEC role in protecting in-
vestors and the public interest in this unusually conflict-ridden, huge
speculative bubble has consisted of three measures: (1)setting up the
1972 advisory committee that considered REITs as an incidental as-
pect of the problems in wealthy investors' tax shelters; (2)in February
1975, after the disaster had struck, initiating an economic staff study
compiling data (taking inventory, so to speak, of the horses that were
gone from the barn) but supplying no conclusions or policy recom-
mendations; and (3)in spring 1976, soon after "asset swaps" began to
proliferate, taking the important and valuable step of strengthening
disclosure requirements.16
Given the SEC's well-deserved reputation for vigor, its record in this sphere
has been disappointing, despite the importance of REITs not only to investors
themselves (and investors in REITs seem at least as entitled as other investors
to active SEC oversight) but also, considering the effects of the REIT bust on
the construction industry and real estate markets, to the public interest.
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(*) With an additional $2,274,000 paid to an affiliate for the advisor for distri-
bution of subordinated debentures and debenture registrar fee.
TABLE 2
ADVISORY INCOME BREAKDOWN AS PERCENTAGES (IDS)
1973 1974
Total fees as a percentage of
total operating income
Total fees as a percentage of
total assets
Advisory fee as a percentage of
total fees






Source: Schotland op. cit, page 186, Table adapted.
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TABLE 3
REIT ADVISORY FEE PROFIT MARGINS (PRETAX INCOME OF




























66.3 68.6 68.6 69.1 64.5
$180 $321 $378 $335 $339
22.5 21.8 25.2 8.0
$246 $426 $466 $390









The disasters which befell the REIT industry in the 1970's were directly related
to the sometimes unorthodox and often inventive ways in which REITs raised
and managed money. In some ways, REITs resembled other kinds of financial
institutions - they served as financial intermediaries, like commercial banks
and insurance companies; they were conduits for income, like mutual funds; and
they were real-estate investors, like countless other individuals and corporations.
When it came to raising and managing money, however, the REITs were in a
class by themselves.
There was nothing outwardly unusual about the REITs' way of raising cap-
ital, by selling securities representing debt - in the form of long-term bonds or
debentures, or short-term commercial paper - or equity. What set the REITs
apart was their extensive use of leveraging of both equity and debt, in succes-
sion. This leveraging technique, according to the industry's promoters and the
true believers, made the REITs into perpetual-motion money makers.
Equity Leveraging The trick to equity leveraging was simply to market new
shares in a corporation at a price above the book value of the existing shares.
If, for example, a trust had 100,000 shares outstanding with a book value of
$10 per share, equity leveraging might involve the sale of an additional 100,000
shares at $20 each, without any change in the face value of the shares. Each of
the 200,000 outstanding shares resulting from this maneuver would have a book
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value of $15: the proportionate interest of each original shareholder would be
reduced, but the book value of his shares would be increased.
In some cases of this kind, to be sure, investors were justified in paying twice
the book value for REIT shares. There were trusts whose underlying value
was actually worth more than the aggregate book value of their shares, because
their assets had appreciated since they were acquired, while they remained on
the books at their original values; or because the book values of the assets had
been depreciated more rapidly than their actual physical deterioration. Investors
might also have been willing to believe, for good and sufficient reasons or for no
reasons at all, that the future performance of the REIT would eventually justify
the payment of a generous premium over the book value for the shares. If the
average stock in the market was paying investors 10 percent of its book value
per year, a REIT that promised to return 20 percent would command a price in
the neighborhood of twice its book value.
During the REITs' boom years, investor enthusiasm boosted REIT share
prices, making it relatively easy for trusts to raise huge amounts of capital by
marketing additional, heavily leveraged equity. In their haste to take advantage
of what seemed like a capital bonanza, however, many REITs succumbed to
the temptation to exaggerate the real values of their real estate. Some REITs,
to be sure, owned property that was worth more on the market than its book
value. Since real estate is inherently difficult to evaluate precisely until it is
actually sold, however, REITs found it irresistably easy to convince credulous
investors into believing that perfectly ordinary, even undesireable properties
were veritable gold mines. The selling was even easier when, as was usually the
case, the investor was hundreds or thousands of miles away from the little piece
of paradise he was sinking his money into.
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The future potential of REIT investment was also easy to make more of than
was actually there. If it was true that some REIT investments did outperform
the market, producing extraordinary returns, it was also true that such happy
anomalies tended to be self-correcting: successful real estate projects inspired
emulators; booms were almost inevitably followed by busts, as the latecomers
produced oversupplies, knocking prices and profits into a cocked hat. Florida,
Texas, and California were among the areas famous for repeated cycles of boom
and bust. While they were overstating the virtues of dubious real estate in-
vestments, zealous REIT promoters were also quick to understate the risks that
often went along with such developments. More realistic assessments of risks
would probably have dampened investor enthusiasm for many REITs.
REITs lent themselves to obfuscation salesmanship because of a very impor-
tant difference between their assets and those of other investment vehicles, such
as mutual funds. The simple fact that a mutual fund's assets are stocks and
bonds that are traded daily, publicly, in a well-regulated and orderly market,
means that mutual fund shares can be accurately and unarguably valued at any
time by any investor with enough initiative to pick up a newspaper. A REIT's
only assets, on the other hand, are in the form of real estate - buildings, or
land - that cannot be accurately valued at any given moment. There is no
single market, no universal medium of exchange. A real-estate asset is worth
what it sells for when it is sold, and until it is sold there is no way to be sure
what the price might be.
For a potential investor, therefore, a REIT is a much more problematic
creature than a mutual fund. Instead of a straightforward calculation of share
value, the investor must use other factors to tell him if the REIT is a good
investment. In actual practice, since REITs were a new entry in the market and
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had little history to go on,investors tended to put their faith in the reputation
of the trusts' sponsors and underwriters. Names like Morgan Stanley and Chase
Manhattan were enough to inspire faith in multitudes of prudent investors.
Another element of deception in equity leveraging of REITs was the assur-
ances offered by many promoters that the shares they were touting were "growth
stocks"; by which unwary investors were supposed to understand that they were
playing in the go-go game characteristic of the market in certain volatile issues.
Typical of true growth stocks is their lack of significant dividend returns to
investors. Growth companies ordinarily reinvest available capital to feed their
rapid growth; the money that might otherwise be paid out in immediate divi-
dends is conserved and invested instead in the company's future. By retaining
earnings instead of paying dividends, volatile, high-risk growth companies also
build up reserves against inevitable reverses.
By law, however, REITs were obliged not only to pay dividends, but to
distribute fully 95 percent of their net income to their shareholders. Because they
were practically barred from using retained earnings to fuel expansion, REITs
should not have been confused with conventional growth stocks. Nevertheless,
enthusiastic REIT promoters often oversold their shares as both income and
growth investments, with low risk to boot. As it turned out, of course, REITs
proved to be high-risk investments for both income and growth.
Debt Leveraging Equity leveraging's complement, debt leveraging depends
on a REIT borrowing money at interest rates lower than the rates of return the
REIT can earn on the assets it buys with the proceeds. The result is increased
income to the REIT, and ultimately to the shareholders. The effect of debt
leveraging can be illustrated by the case of a REIT that buys an asset valued
at $100, paying $50 out of its cash reserves and borrowing the other $50 at 7
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percent interest. Of the $10 return the asset pays the trust, the trust pays $3.50
in interest on its loan. The remainder, $6.50, provides the trust's shareholders
a 13 percent return on the $50 of equity invested in the asset.
The REIT may decide to repeat the maneuver with even more leverage. If
it buys another $50 asset with a 10 percent return, borrowing another $50 at 7
percent to finance the purchase, the REIT's gross income will increase to $15
(10 percent of $150), while its total interest expense will be $7 (7 percent of
$100). The shareholders, who still have only $50 of equity in the combined
asset, receive the remaining $8 of income, a 16 percent return. By leveraging
its debt, therefore, the REIT has significantly increased its rate of return on
shareholders' equity.
The almost inevitable effect of raising the rate of return on shareholders'
equity, of course, is to make the REIT's shares more attractive, driving their
price up. With the increase in the price of the shares, without a commensurate
increase in their book value, comes an opportunity for another round of equity
leveraging by issuing new shares. The new shares would not dilute the per-share
book value, since they would be backed by the new asset; but they would lower
the trust's debt-to-equity ratio by increasing the total equity holdings in the
REIT.
In practice, the effect of improving its debt-to-equity ration was to enable a
REIT to borrow money more cheaply - an invitation to debt leveraging. The
low-cost debt could then be invested in high-return assets, further enhancing the
REIT's per-share earnings, inviting further equity leveraging. In this manner,
taking full advantage of the opportunities to leverage both debt and equity, a
REIT could truly come to resemble a bottomless well of wealth.
In itself, neither debt nor equity leveraging is in the least illegal, immoral, or
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even strange: the urge to sell shares at the highest price and to borrow at the
lowest is close to human nature. In the REITs' case, however, the aggressive
use of leveraging was often pursued with an almost total disregard for the real
values of the trusts' underlying assets and an exploitation of the names and
reputations of the trusts' sponsors and underwriters.
Ultimately, inevitably, as the hollowness of the REITs financial facade be-
came apparent, their flimsy leveraging structures collapsed. A major factor in
the failure of many REITs to survive in difficult economic environments was the
fact that REITs, despite their debt-leveraging operations were actually paying
as much as 3 percent more for borrowed money than their competitors, the com-
mercial banks. Magnified by the much higher debt-to-equity ratios maintained
by the banks, the difference in interest rates translated into a lower return on
equity for REIT shareholders.
A typical REIT might maintain a 2:1 ratio of debt:equity, paying 9 percent
interest on its debt. On assets valued at $100, the REIT would have a debt of
about $66, paying about $6 in annual interest. If the asset yielded 10 percent
annually, or $10, the $4 remaining after interest payments would equal a 12 per-
cent annual return on the shareholders' equity of approximately $33. (Assuming
it conformed to the IRS' strictures, the REIT would pay no tax on the income.)
If a bank owned a similar asset, and maintained the same ratio of debt to
equity as the REIT, but paid only 6 percent interest, its interest payment would
amount to almost $4, leaving a little more than $6. If the bank paid corporate
income taxes of 50 percent, the net return on shareholders' equity would be $3,
or 9 percent of $33. In this case, evidently, the tax-free REIT would outperform
the taxpaying bank.
In the event, however, banks typically maintain debt:equity ratios much
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higher than 2:1 - more like 9:1. Under these conditions, with a $100 asset
the bank would have a $90 debt, and at 6 percent its annual interest payment
would be $5.40 out of the asset's yield of $10, leaving the shareholders $4.60, or
only $2.30 after taxes, as a return on equity. Because the shareholders' equity
is only $10, however, the rate of return is actually 23 percent, almost twice the
return from the tax-free REIT.
Even if the REIT were to maintain a 9:1 debt:equity ratio, like the bank, its
disadvantageous interest rate, applied to the much greater debt, would reduce
its tax-free return to only 19 percent of shareholders' equity - less than the
bank's. The REIT could equal or slightly best the bank competition only at
debt:equity ratios of 13:1 or 14:1, if it could find lenders who would go along
with such a perilous and imprudent course.
The only way the REITs could realistically hope to compete with the banks
for the affection of investors looking for high returns was to look for assets
that would provide better than 10 percent returns. The banks and other REIT
competitors, of course, were also on the lookout for high-paying assets with
reasonable risks. In this race for the gold-edged investment opportunity, the
REITs often found themselves in competition with their own sponsors and advi-
sors, who in most cases were under no obligation to serve their REIT's interests
before their own.
The REITs, therefore, had no choice but to go after glamorous but prob-
lematic propositions that the banks, as well as other more prudent investors,
would not touch. Commentators on the REIT industry and its problems have
persistently failed to give due weight to the role of high interest rates in forcing
the REITs to seek endless growth through high-risk investment strategies, out
of a desperate need to outperform the banks and other competitors with lower
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interest burdens.
The reason the REITs had to pay higher interest rates than the banks, and
therefore to accept higher risks in their investment portfolios, is simply because
the REITs were perceived, quite correctly, as inherently riskier investments than
commercial banks in the first place. REITs were new and untested in the mar-
ketplace; they did not conform to the traditional form and demeanor of a sober
investment vehicle. REITs, like any one-crop farming system, were also much
more vulnerable to market reverses than more diversified investment vehicles.
To make them still riskier, the REITs' one crop - real estate - is notoriously
risky, speculative, and vulnerable to corruption and chicanery.
The REITs also paid at least one extra point in interest above the rate they
would otherwise have had to pay because of their system of pegging advisors'
fees to total assets. By giving their advisors a fixed percentage of all assets, the
REITs in effect made the fees a part of the cost of borrowing money, practically
indistinguishable from the investors' point of view from interest. If the advisors'
fees were at least 1 percent of assets, as they typically were, therefore, an asset
yielding a nominal 10 percent was actually yielding 9 percent.
The REITs' difficulties in competing with the commercial banks for invest-
ment dollars were most apparent when the REITs went to the same commercial
banks, as they often did, to borrow money. The banks cheerfully loaned the
REITs money, charging them a spread of 3 percent or so over the prime rate for
the priviledge of borrowing from the competition. If the REITs sold commercial
paper instead of borrowing from the banks, the banks got their piece of the ac-
tion anyway: the commercial paper had to be backed by credit from the banks,
which had to be backed in turn by non-interest-bearing deposits. In addition to
the interest they had to pay on their commercial paper, therefore, the REITs
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were paying the banks 10 percent or so in interest they were not earning.
The REIT's problems in finding high-yield, high-risk investments were ex-
acerbated by the legal requirement that they pay out 95 percent of their net
earnings in the form of dividends to shareholders. The practical effect of this
requirement was to make it necessary for the REITs to maintain almost all of
their net income in cash, ready to be paid out. The REITs were constantly in
danger of being caught short of cash; they had to rely on short-term borrowing,
at high interest rates, to make their dividend payments. Ironically, in order to
raise more funds in the capital markets, the REITs had to improve their earn-
ings, which could often be done only at the expense of their cash flow. In effect,




Most critics of the REIT phenomenon have tended to blame the industry's
problems on its most obvious flaws - conflict of interest, poor management,
negligence-or on the bad luck of being the right idea at- the wrong economic
time. A more searching and far-reaching analysis of the REITs and where they
went wrong, however, raises fundamental issues that are overlooked in the search
for someone or something to blame. What public purpose, if any, did the REITs
serve? Were they a necessary or effective means to this end? In what context
would REITs have been the right idea? Was the REIT Act a proper legislative
expression of Congress' impetus and intent in passing it? Are the purposes for
which the REITs were originally designed still valid in today's very different
circumstances? If so, will any other social or economic invention do the job,
now that the REITs are in eclipse? All these questions should be answered.
Two salient features distinguish REITs from other corporate entities and
offer a starting point for any discussion of the industry's appropriateness and
relevance. Alone among all corporations, REITs are required by law to dis-
tribute 95 percent of their earnings to their shareholders; and, if they meet this
requirement, their income is exempt from corporate taxation. Each of these
characteristics, conferred by law, has its political and economic justification and
its legislative history, which must be understood before any valid assessment of
REITs can be made.
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For the REITs' freedom from corporate taxation, three possible justifica-
tions suggest themselves. Such special treatment might manifest the intent of
Congress to encourage the flow of investment capital into this particular sector
of the real-estate industry. Or the REITs could be the beneficiaries of a selec-
tive effort to do away with the so-called double taxation of corporate income.
Finally, tax exemption might be evidence of the populist purpose of Congress
to facilitate the participation of small investors in an area of economic activity
formerly accessible only to wealthier individuals and institutions.
The ostensible, original intent of Congress to encourage the flow of capital
to the real-estate construction industry can be surmised from the language of
the REIT Act:
...This is particularly important at the present time because of the
shortage of private capital and mortgage money for individual homes,
apartment houses, office buildings, factories, and hotels. At the
present time the financing of these real estate equities and mortgages
is dependent largely on government-guaranteed money, and invest-
ments by special groups, such as insurance companies and pension
trusts.
In divining the real intent of Congress, it is important to note that the
explanatory language of the REIT Act does not assert what it seems to imply:
that there is an actual shortage of new construction. In fact, the available
statistics on new home construction at that time would make such a claim
difficult to support [Table 1]. Had it been possible to claim that the entire real-
estate industry was suffering from a capital shortage, the obvious appropriate
remedy would have been tax relief for all segments of the industry, not only the
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new REITs. President Eisenhower had vetoed a REITs bill in 1956 precisely
because it created an incentive for taxpaying elements of the real-estate industry
to convert to tax-free status.
According to the testimony of the Act, in enabling the REIT model, Congress
intended to encourage new sources of private- sector investment in real-estate
development in order to dilute the concentration of capital from government-
supported sources or from the part of the private-sector spectrum described as
"special groups," seemingly the large institutional lenders. If this was Congress'
concern, it is legitimate to question whether the granting of tax exemption to a
new investment vehicle was the best way to do the job. The practical advantage
- virtually the only advantage - of creating a new tax-exempt institutional form
was that it avoided the intellectual and political effort of designing and enacting
new laws to change existing patterns of business to achieve the same end.
Otherwise, the establishment of the tax-free REIT as a means to achieve
Congress' ostensible purpose was fraught with problems. By establishing a
new and unique form of corporate entity, with peculiar rules and procedures,
Congress in effect defeated its own purpose, creating obstacles for the new in-
vestment it wished to promote, delaying any potential availability of new capital
to the construction industry. At the same time, the- unfamiliarity of the REIT
concept made adequate and appropriate regulation difficult, creating the condi-
tions for the abuses that ultimately brought about the REITs' downfall.
The creation of REITs also had unpredictable effects on existing segments
of the real-estate industry. Congress could not, even if it had tried, predict with
any degree of certainty what the effects of the tax-free investment vehicle would
be on traditional real-estate financing institutions, such as commercial banks
and insurance companies. No assessment was made, either before the fact or
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after, of how much investment capital the REITs would divert from existing,
traditional funding institutions, and how much new capital they would attract
into the real-estate industry from previously unavailable sources - e.g. from the
small investors to whom REITs were supposed to appeal.
Whatever problems the REITs entailed would tend to persist: once an in-
stitution is created by Congress, it takes on a life of its own; it is long lasting.
Whatever Congress meant to do when it established REITs, it had no plan to
abolish REITs once that purpose was accomplished. It is not in government's
political nature to bring down the curtain on an institution with employees,
shareholders, and powerful interests. Like every other vested interest in a demo-
cratic society, REITs inevitably developed powerful voices to lobby in their
behalf. At best, therefore, the REIT model was a permanent solution to a
transient problem. If all Congress wanted to do was to channel private capital
from non-traditional sources into the real-estate industry, or any industry, the
creation of a permanent new tax-exempt industry was probably not as useful
as some other methods, such as accelerated depreciation and tax-exempt bonds,
that would be faster, surer, and more flexible.
A second possible justification for exempting REITs from income taxation
was that taxation of REITs' income would constitute double taxation. Accord-
ing to this theory, REITs are fundamentally, inherently different from ordinary
manufacturing companies, for example, that invest directly in productive plants
and equipment and then pay taxes on the income produced by these invest-
ments. REITs, by contrast, invest only in securities that represent claims on
the income from productive assets - real estate, in this case - on which taxes
have already been paid. A tax on the REITs' income would therefore represent
a second tax on the same income, which would be unfair.
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In asserting the double-taxation rationale for tax exemption, the REIT Act
compares the real-estate trusts to mutual funds:
...The omission of the corporate income tax in the case of distributed
earnings, which present law provides for regulated investment com-
panies (i.e. mutual funds), secures for investors in these companies
essentially the same tax treatment as they would have received if
they had invested directly in the operating companies. H.R. 12559
extends this same kind of tax treatment to real estate investment
trusts specializing in investments in real estate equities and mort-
gages as distinct from the stock and security holdings of the regu-
lated investment companies. Thus this secures for the trust bene-
ficiaries the same type of tax treatment they would receive if they
held the real estate equities and mortgages directly and, therefore,
equates their treatment with that accorded investors in regulated
investment companies.
In the case of the mutual fund, this argument runs, the investor can buy
stocks and bonds directly or through buying shares in the mutual fund that owns
these stocks and bonds. Since he does not pay corporate taxes on dividend and
interest income in the former case (the corporation, of course, pays whatever
taxes are due on its profits) he should not do so in the latter case either. The
income of the mutual fund should pass, untaxed, directly to the investors, who
will then pay personal income taxes on their profits. What is good enough for
mutual fund investors, the argument concludes, should be good enough for REIT
shareholders too.
The claim of analogy between REITs and mutual funds is less than con-
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vincing to many observers. Most REITs, they point out, either own income-
producing properties directly; or specialize in mortgage lending to such non-
corporate entities as partnerships or sole proprietorships. In either case, no
corporate income tax has been imposed on the income received by the REIT;
and the imposition of corporate income taxation on the REITs' income would
hardly constitute double taxation.
The REIT Act actually seemed to recognize the dissimilarity between REITs
and mutual funds on this score of double taxation:
...It has sometimes been argued that real estate investment trusts
differ from regulated investment companies in that the income of the
latter already has been subjected to income tax while the income of
the former has not. This refers to the fact that the dividend income of
the regulated investment company already has been taxed as a part
of a corporation's income before it was received by the regulated
investment company while the rental income received by the real
estate trust has not.
Perhaps recognizing that its first two justifications for REIT tax exemption
were less than persuasive, the REIT Act finally advanced its third and best
argument. The reason for exempting the REITs from corporate income taxes,
said the Act, was to foster the success of an investment vehicle that - like mu-
tual funds - would enable investors of modest means to claim a share of the
investment profits that had always been available to wealthy individuals and
institutions through direct investment in conventional limited partnerships and
sole proprietorships. Implicit in this argument was the notion that the promo-
tion of real-estate investment by investors of modest means was a valid objective
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for public policy; and, conversely, that the concentration of real-estate invest-
ment among individuals and investments with money was a social problem that
required a legislative solution.
Whatever virtues the REIT may have possessed as public policy, it seems
clear that there was little need for such a device as an alternative to partnerships
and sole proprietorships. In fact, the role of such non-corporate financial struc-
tures in the real-estate market, in the late 1950s or since, has been practically
inconsequential. In every real-estate activity - land development, construction,
market, leasing, mortgage financing, etc. - the role of limited partnerships or
sole partnerships has long been insignificant compared to the dominant part
played by institutions.
In the real-estate world, the most important institutions include mutual sav-
ings banks, commercial banks, life insurance companies, and savings and loan
associations. In 1950, these four major financing sources held a total of 61.5
percent of all mortgage debt in the United States. Much of the remaining 38.5
percent was accounted for by other institutions, including government agencies,
pension funds, and mortgage banks. Private individuals held only a very small
share of the mortgage debt. [Table 2]
After a decade during which the total mortgage debt almost tripled, by 1960
the "big four" mortgage holders had increased their share to 76.2 percent. As the
total mortgage debt doubled again by 1970, the big four further increased their
share to 78.7 percent. By this time, total mortgage debt in the United States
was almost $500 billion; of which the REITs, which were supposed to inject
significant amounts of new money from modest investors into the real-estate
industry, had only $6 billion - slightly better than 1 percent. [Table 2]
From these statistics it is evident that if small investors needed some spe-
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cial inducement to take advantage of the opportunities available in real-estate
investment, REITs were not the right instrument for the job. If there were small-
investor dollars looking for a way to get into the real-estate business, moreover,
the stocks of commercial banks, insurance companies, and other traditional real-
estate lenders were readily available in amounts to suit any investor's pocket-
book. If investors of modest means could not invest in the partnerships and
sole proprietorships that a relatively few wealthy investors use to participate
in real-estate lending and ownership, this is only one of many differences - and
certainly not the greatest or the most onerous - that distinguish the rich from
the rest of the world.
If small investors still required tax advantages and professional management
to bring them into real-estate investing, the simplest and most equitable way
to provide these advantages might have been to exempt from corporate income
taxation the real-estate investments of the traditional institutional financiers.
In the 1950-1971 period, the major financial institutions included large and
fast-growing holdings of mortgage loans among their assets. Savings and loan
associations, which exist primarily to make mortgage loans, of course headed
the list with virtually 100 percent of their assets devoted to that purpose. Even
commercial banks, which had only 29.6 percent of their assets in mortgage loans
in 1950, had 34.4 percent of their assets in that category two decades later,
while mutual savings banks had 76.6 percent and life insurance companies had
34.4 percent.[Table 3] Relatively minor adjustments in the taxation of these
traditional mortgage lenders - the least of them many times more significant as
a channel for real-estate investment than the REITs could ever be - would have
afforded small investors most of the advantages ostensibly afforded them by the
REITs, without the problems entailed by creating a new and untested entity in
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the financial marketplace.
The forgoing discussion leads to the conclusion that the tax exemption
granted to REITs by Congress was neither necessary, appropriate to its ostensi-
ble purpose, nor justified by its rationale. The available evidence suggests that
REITs were not well-designed or likely to mobilize additional capital resources
for the real-estate industry, to avoid double taxation, or to make a critical dif-
ference to the investor of modest means.
The enactment of an inappropriate remedy for a problem that probably did
not exist required an all-out lobbying campaign in Congress. This lobbying
effort, instigated and backed by wealthy real-estate investors, was intended not
to attract modest investors to share the rewards of real-estate investment, but
to provide tax-sheltered investment opportunities for the wealthy.
The REIT lobbying effort was a response to the inability of wealthy investors
to shelter their income from other real-estate investments. In the years after
World War II, real-estate syndicates proliferated, mostly in the major cities of the
eastern United States, absorbing large amounts of capital that had accumulated
during the war. The syndicates were designed to profit from the pent-up demand
for new housing and other real-estate development that had been deferred during
the war. They were also intended to serve as tax shelters of a sort.
To minimize the corporate tax, many of these syndicates were set up as
corporations in which the investor would put up only 20 percent of his stake in
cash, while contibuting four times as much in the form of bonds or debentures.1
As the syndicate received income from its real-estate operations, the profits
would be passed through to the investors as a "return of capital" to retire the
S"Realty Investment Trusts and the Potential Investor," Richard H. Swesnick, speech published
in REITs: The First Decade, edited by John T. Hall, Mequon, Wisconsin (1974) P. 19.
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outstanding debt securities. This portion of the investor's income, therefore,
was exempt from Federal income tax. The syndicate, however, was liable for
corporate income taxes on its income, as well as on the eventual profits from
the sale of the income-producing property.
In an attempt to avoid these taxes at the corporation level, investors in
the 1950s turned increasingly to limited partnerships as real-estate investment
vehicles.2 Limited partnerships not only generated income undiminished by cor-
porate income taxes, they also permitted the partnerships' cash flow, derived
from the depreciation, to be paid directly to the partners. Despite their advan-
tages, partnerships also created problems of their own. For one thing, partner-
ships were limited in the extent to which they could incur debt. For another,
the unlimited liability of general partners for any and all debts the partnership
managed to incur made borrowing a dangerous business and partnership less
than carefree.
Limited partnerships also had the decided disadvantage of being illiquid. No
formal, open market exists for partnership interests comparable to the stock
markets that are available to investors in corporations. Transferring interests in
limited partnerships was often difficult, even impossible.
A further inconvenience of the limited partnership was that most of them
were set up for a single purpose, to purchase and own a particular piece of real
estate. Thus established, a partnership was rarely precisely suitable for another
deal. Any attempt to reconfigure an existing partnership for a new venture
would be dauntingly complex and might subject the resulting entity to taxation
as an active real-estate corporation rather than a partnership. An investor who
wanted to diversify, therefore, was obliged to go through the rigamarole of joining
2 Ibid., p. 18.
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multiple partnerships.
To these inherent liabilities of the limited partnership was added the threat
that the tax exemption enjoyed by such combinations would be abolished by the
Internal Revenue Service. Endangered real-estate investors got behind the REIT
idea as an ideal alternative to protect themselves from taxation. The assertions
that the new vehicle would somehow benefit the real-estate industry by bringing
it new capital, or benefit the small investor, were mostly propaganda, to win
political support for the REIT idea.
There is no inherent linkage between REITs' corporate tax exemption and
the requirement that 95 percent of the trusts' net income should be passed
through to investors. The two characteristics were coupled in the REIT Act
to validate the claim by REIT supporters that the new investment vehicle was
truly designed to benefit the small investor. The income passalong feature was
designed to appeal to the investor with modest cash flows and cash reserves,
the investor who depends on the income from his investments to meet living
expenses. This small investor, according to the prevailing view, cannot afford
to invest his capital in a corporation that will indefinitely defer his dividends in
the form of retained income.
The political appeal of such doctrine was not in the least lessened by the fact
that it was largely specious. In theory, and probably in fact, the market will
adjust the price of a corporation's shares to reflect whether income has been paid
out or retained. The position of the small investor, therefore, is not materially
altered by retaining the net income imputed to his shares, as long as he has the
right to realize that income or its equivalent by selling shares. Whether he takes
advantage of that right or keeps his shares, his net worth is the same.
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Indeed, in Principles of Corporate Finance, Brearly and Myers 3 have ar-
gued persuasively that the required payout of net income actually reduces the
investment value of the corporation and its shares; the investors are actually
better off if earnings are retained. The reason: investors pay higher taxes on
dividends than they do on long-term capital gains. It has been shown in earlier
chapters that the health of the REIT would be improved if it were permitted
to retain earnings instead of passing almost all net income along annually. Re-
tained earnings could buffer the corporation against bad times, when a fund of
retained earnings could save the REIT an expensive and time-consuming trip
to the Wall Street money markets. In the early 1970s, for example, REITs were
in the paradoxical position of paying out dividends, as required, even as they
were incurring increasing costs for capital in the money and bond markets. The
stock markets were effectively closed to them as sources of new capital; while
the prices of their own shares, reflecting their declining financial positions, were
sinking fast.
If there was no valid reason for the initial creation of an investment vehicle
that would be exempt from corporate income taxes and that would pass 95
percent of its net income directly to its shareholders - no reason except the self-
interest of the REIT's sponsors - there is no reason for the REITs' continued
existence today. REIT advocates are unable to adduce any valid, convincing
public purpose that is served by the REITs. The President's Committee on
Urban Housing, in its 1968 report advocating the construction and rehabilitation
of 26 million housing units in 10 years, considered in great detail the roles to
be played by the financing institutions that would be crucial to such an effort.
REITs were not even mentioned.
3Brearly, op. cit., p. 324, ff.
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Recent experience demonstrates that, while they serve no discernable public
purpose, REITs provide the opportunity for exploitation. They have most often
been used to enrich the rich and to hurt, not help, the unwitting small investor,
even as they undermine the banking system. As long as the REIT model con-
tinues to exist in the law, the possibility exists that the industry will outlive the
inhibiting effects of its current reputation and resume its mischievous ways.
252
TABLE 1
NEW RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES
















Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking and
Currency of U.S. Senate, March 21 and 22, 1968.
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TABLE 2
MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING BY TYPE OF HOLDER, 1950-1971
(Selected Years) (in Millions - Percentages in Brackets)
Mutual Savings
Savings Commercial and Life
Year Total Banks Loans Companies Insurance Others-
1950 72,800 7,054 10,431 13,657 16,102 25,536
(100.0) (9.6) (11.0) (18.8) (22.1) (38.5)
1955 129,988 17,457 21,004 31,461 29,445 30,621
(100.0) (13.4) (16.2) (24.2) (22.7) (23.6)
1960 206,800 26,935 28,806 60,070 41,771 49,218
(100.0) (13.0) (13.9) (29.0) (20.2) (23.8)
1965 326,100 44,617 49,675 110,306 60,013 61,489
(100.0) (13.7) (15.2) (33.8) (18.4) (18.9)
1970 450,400 57,948 72,882 150,562 73,345 94,686
(100.0) (12.8) (16.2) (33.4) (16.5) (21.0)
1971 499,900 61,978 82,515 174,385 74,700 106,322
(100.0) (12.4) (16.5) (34.9) (14.9) (21.3)
* Government agencies, individuals and other institutions (pension funds, mort-
gage bankers, et. al.).
Source: National Association of Mututal Savings Banks, "National Fact Book




























Source: National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, "National Fact Book
of Mutual Savings Banking," New York, 1972, pp.45, 52; Board of Governors,
"Federal Reserve Bulletin," Washington, D.C., February, 1972, pp. A39, A40,



































Risen from the ashes of the thoroughly discredited REIT industry of the 1970s,
the much-reformed industry of today has drawn approving notices from many
of its former critics "Unlike their highly leveraged, inexperienced cousins who
were massacred 10 years ago in short-term lending," says a Business Week re-
porter, "today's REITs are generally better managed and financed."' After the
rampant excesses of the past, writes Joanne Lipman in the Wall Street Journal,
today's REITs have become attractively and properly prudent about specula-
tive lending. Today's prospective REIT investor, Lipman notes, can confidently
choose between two different types of REITs, each aimed and managed toward
a specific, legitimate investment objective. Equity REITs, which count heavily
on appreciation in the values of the properties in which they invest, offer better
protection against inflation; while mortgage REITs offer dependable yields but
little opportunity for growth.2
William Balch, of the National Real Estate Investor, is especially enthusiastic
about a relatively recent innovation in equity REITs: the finite-life trust, which
features a fixed date for the liquidation of its equity interests. As liquidation
approaches, Balch believes, the market price of the REIT's shares will inevitably
approach the true market value of the underlying properties. As this adjustment
'Business Week, "The Redesigned REIT is bringing Investors Back Again," April 16, 1984
2 Lipman, Joanne, "Real-Estate Investment Trusts Cultivate Fresh Image and New Crop of
Investors," The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1985
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occurs, REIT investors will be relieved of the uncertainty about share values that
stems from the inherent uncertainty of property values when sale of the property
is not imminent.'
The reforms and innovations that have been noted approvingly by knowl-
edgable REIT observers in the trade press only suggest the even more pervasive
and dramatic changes in investment strategy adopted by many of the older RE-
ITs that survived the mid-70s debacle. As early as 1976, for example, Connecti-
cut General Mortgage and Realty began reducing its commitment to short-term
mortgage loans. As these loans matured, Connecticut General reallocated the
funds to more stable investments: direct equity ownership, partnerships in eq-
uities, and purchase-and-leaseback arrangements. The REIT's new investment
posture earned it an A rating from Standard & Poors, and enabled it to place
$40 million in unsecured debt with six institutional lenders in 1978, only two
years after the new policies were instituted.4
One of the very newest REITs, EQK, which made its debut in the market in
March 1985, has clearly been designed specifically to allay the fears of investors
who know what went wrong with REITs the last time around. J. Steven Manolis,
Managing Director at Salomon Brothers, set up EQK as a finite-life trust to
buy three specific properties, hold them for twelve years - no more, no less
- then sell them. To reassure potential investors, Manolis selected top-quality
properties that were virtually fully occupied. He also pegged the management
fees that EQK would pay to the price of its shares rather than to the value of
its properties, giving management no incentive to pile up risky investments, but
3Balch, William, "New Wrinkles Revive Popularity of REITs: Self-Liquidation Feature In-
creases their Credibility," National Real Estate Investor, Vol. 26, No. 9, September 1984
4 Business Week, "A REIT Breakthrough to the Capital Markets," January 9, 1978
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every incentive to build solid values. 5
Despite the significant attempts of many REITs to address the problems
that threatened to kill the entire industry just a few years ago, there is still a
legitimate question whether the real-estate investment trust is a viable, valid
institution. From the point of view of consumer protection, certainly, the REIT
today is only marginally safer than its precursor of a decade ago. If some
potential investors today are more sophisticated than they were then, many
- perhaps most - are not. (Indeed, as the REIT debacle fades into ancient
history, a new generation of investors has emerged with no more idea of what
happened in the 1970s than a child of the 60's has of the Depression.)
Similarly, while there are many investment bankers who address themselves
only to educated investors, there are also many - perhaps more - who pitch
investment schemes at the less sophisticated consumer. With sponsors still in
control of the way REITs are organized and structured and the way they make
their investments, there is no guarantee that the troublesome features of the old
trusts will not persist in some of the new ones.
Even if REITs were thoroughly reformed, however, it is not at all certain that
they would be able to operate effectively in the real-estate environment of the
1980s. Real-estate markets have changed, and financial institutions have been
forced to change right along with them or get out of the real-estate business.
There are now more institutions making real-estate investments than there were
ten years ago; therefore there is more competition for prime properties to invest
in and for prime talent to manage the investments. As mixed-use properties
have become more popular the size and complexity of development projects
have grown; and limited partnerships and syndications have emerged as effective
5Fortune, "A REIT to Right All Wrongs?", Vol. 111, No. 3, February 4, 1985, p. 25
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devices for aggregating sufficient capital to satisfy the gargantuan appetites of
such projects for investment.
The initial emergence of the REIT as a vehicle for assuring adequate invest-
ment in housing can be understood as a response to a unique set of circum-
stances, which were the product, in turn, of a unique historical development
that began half a century ago. In the early 1930's, as the shadow of Depres-
sion lengthened across the land, the Federal government created a number of
institutions - among them the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation - and a much greater number of regu-
lations, all to a single end: to make sure that enough money would be available
to fund mortgage loans for residential construction. Among the most signif-
icant innovations was Federal control of interest rates on savings, with thrift
institutions - the savings-and-loans - allowed to pay slightly higher rates and
required to channel most of their assets into residential mortgages.
As inflation, accompanied by nominal interest rates, began to climb in the
1960s and continued to climb at an accelerating pace in the 1970s, the mortgage-
lending system established in the 1930s began to break up. Borrowers, lenders,
and regulators alike came to believe that rapid price inflation might be a per-
manent fact of economic life. If so, then ordinary bank deposits, the traditional
source of mortgage lending funds, were no place for the smart individual in-
vestor to be. If nominal interest rates in the marketplace were higher than the
government-controlled rates that banks and S&Ls could pay on deposits, what
sane citizen would leave his savings to languish in the bank or the savings-and-
loan?
As savers withdrew their money from depository institutions in favor of in-
vestments offering market rates, investment banks were quick to oblige. In the
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late 1970s and early 1980s, money-market funds became the safe investment for
smart investors. Assets of money-market funds burgeoned from less than $11
billion in 1978 to more than $200 billion in 1982.6 The inescapable result of
wholsale disintermediation - withdrawal of funds from depository institutions
- was a dramatic drop in mortgage lending, and a concomitant drop in housing
construction. 7
In the search for investments that would keep up with inflation, the bank-
ing institutions and other traditional mortgage lenders were not far behind the
individual investors. If land values and rents were rising with the inflation in-
dex, then direct ownership of real-estate was a better investment than fixed-rate
mortgage loans. The only mortgage loans that made much sense in an era of
infinite inflation were the kinds whose variable rates were periodically pegged
to the inflation index, or renegotiable at regular intervals.
Other institutions were drawn to equity real-estate investments. Pension
fund managers were increasingly receptive to a new investment, as their tradi-
tional favorite of the 1960s and 1970s - corporate stocks - took a beating in
the 1974 recession. The Federal government, worried by the poor performance
of pension funds and by the volatility of their asset values compared with those
of life-insurance companies, showed the pension fund managers the way to go
with the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The
act required pension funds to diversify their investments. What more attrac-
tive vehicle for diversification could fund managers find in the 1970s than real
'Downs, Anthony, "The Triple Revolution in Real Estate Finance," Real Estate Review, 13,
No. 1, 1983, p. 2 1
'Hale, David D., "What Financial Deregulation is Doing to the U.S. Economy," The Banker.,
133, No. 692, October 1983, p. 30.
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estate?8
Real estate investments by pension funds have indeed increased in the past
10 years, although not as much as some observers predicted in 1974. In 1976,
according to Money Market Directories, which conducts an annual survey of
senior officers of the largest United States corporate and government pension
funds, just under 60 percent of the respondents thought real-estate investments
could make a consistent contribution to their fund's performance. By 1981,
those favoring real-estate investment had increased to 83 percent.9
Actual increases in real-estate investment by pension funds have come more
slowly, however, beginning - but only very slowly - in 198010, and concen-
trating conservatively in equities rather than mortgages. By 1981, according
to the 205 respondents to the Money Market Directories survey, pension-fund
investments in real-estate equities averaged 5.8 percent of total portfolio assets,
representing an average investment of $25 million per fund. A year later, the
funds owned an average of $37 million each in real-estate equity, representing
6.5 percent of their assets. In 1983, 248 funds reported average real-estate in-
vestments of $44 million. A year later, as the number of respondents rose to 279,
the average investment was $55 million. By then, however, the percentage of the
funds' total assets represented by real-estate equity had eased to 5.1 percent."
Despite the funds rather timid entry into real-estate investment, many bro-
kers, pension-fund advisors, and other experts expect them to have a major
'Fogler, H. Russell, "20% in Real Estate: Can Theory Justify It?" Journal of Portfolio Man-
agement, Vol. 10, No. 2, Winter 1984
9Pension World, "Real Estate Investing by Pension Funds," 17, No. 9, 1981
"Lewis, Stephen E., "U.S. Pension Funds Join Hunt for Prime Property; Foreign Investors Still
Acquiring Real Estate," National Real Estate Investor, Vol. 22, No. 10, September 1980
"Pension World, "Real Estate Investing by Pension Funds - 1984," 20, No. 9, September 1984
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impact in the future, venturing into mortgage as well as equity investments."
The apparent slackening of interest in real-estate assets by the funds over the
past year or two is attributed by these observers to a number of factors: the
relatively strong performance of alternative investments, especially stocks and
bonds; the easing of inflation; and the overbuilding of nonresidential structures
during a surge of construction activity between 1978 and 1982.13
If these experts are right, and pension funds get into real estate in a big
way, there should be no shortage of mortgage money or equity capital for a
long time. Pension fund assets are expected to exceed $5 trillion by 1995."
Even a fractional percentage of such huge assets would have a tumultuous effect
on the availability of mortgage credit and on the demand for prime real-estate
investment opportunities.
While the heralded entrance of the pension funds into the real-estate mar-
kets was postponed, waves of inflation and disintermediation continued to rock
the banks and S&Ls in the late 1970s. Federal regulators rode repeatedly to
the rescue. In mid-1978, they authorized the S&Ls to offer a $10,000 savings
certificate with a term of six months and a yield pegged slightly above the rate
offered by Treasury bills. While this innovation had the desired effect of stimu-
lating deposits in S&L's, or at least slowing the disintermediation, it also took
the lid off the price the S&L's had to pay for deposits. At the end of 1978,
fully 80 percent of the liabilities of all S&Ls were subject to fixed interest rates.
Three years later, only 27.7 percent of liabilities were protected by fixed rates.
12 Fossett, Fran, "1984: Industry Leaders Predict Plenty of Money; Strong Office Leasing, Bol-
stered Retail Sector Foreseen," National Real Estate Investor, Vol. 26, No.2, February 1984
"Stephens, Paula S., "Pension Funds Coming Back into Realty Market, Following Quiet Year for
Domestic, Foreign Investors," National Real Estate Investor, Vol. 25, No. 10, September1983
4 Pension World (1984), Op. Cit.
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The S&Ls' assets, meanwhile, were roughly 66 percent invested in fixed-rate,
long-term, low-yielding residential mortages." With fixed, low rates on their
assets and eternally rising rates on their liabilities, the thrift institutions were
squeezed, as the saying goes, between a rock and a hard place.
The Federal government offered more regulations. The thrift institutions'
discretionary control over their assets was increased; though not, according to
some observers, enough to make a decisive difference. Late in 1979, in an effort
to put the brakes on what threatened to become runaway inflation, the Federal
Reserve instituted major changes in its conduct of monetary policy. The Fed's
new strategy entailed setting targets for growth in the money supply, regardless
of the inflation rate. The next year, in the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act, Congress commanded the gradual phaseout by 1986
of all ceilings on interest rates on deposits.
Even as these government interventions were affecting real-estate markets,
the erratic behavior of interest rates and the continuing jumpiness of prices
made mortgage lending - especially long-term lending - increasingly risky.
Lenders resorted to new devices that shifted risks to borrowers. In many cases,
traditional mortgage lenders were no longer willing to incur the risks associated
with being the sole financial backers of major projects. Would-be entrepreneurs
were forced to sell some of their own equity in their projects to raise the capital
they needed.
The more difficult it became for developers to raise capital, the more capital
they needed. Inflation drove up the costs of labor, materials, land, and pro-
fessional services, as well as the cost of money. Taxes and utilities and other
"Colton, Kent W. and David F. Seiders, "Financing the Housing Needs of the 1980s," Federal
Home Loan Bank Board Journal, 15, NO. 7 1982
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operating costs also rose. At the same time, projects became bigger - and more
expensive - than ever." In the absence of easy mortgage loans, developers
needed institutional backers. Institutional backers became institutional part-
ners. Everyone wanted to get in on the game; everyone wanted to make money
in real-estate. The REITs were no longer playing on an empty Monopoly board.
As new institutional players have been getting into the real-estate game,
changing the rules in the process, traditional mortgage lenders have begun to
diversify their own formerly specialized operations. For'the S&Ls and other
traditional mortgage lenders, diversification is the only response to the classic
squeeze between rising costs for new funds and large portfolios of low-rate, long-
term liabilities. The thrift institutions find themselves unable to make enough
new investments in traditional residential mortgages, even at higher rates of
interest, to cover losses on long-term investments made in balmier times.
Of 42 of the largest United States savings and loan associations surveyed
in 1983 by Robert Charles Lesser & Co., a real-estate management-consulting
and market-research firm, fully 86 percent were involved in joint-venture part-
nerships. Nearly 70 percent were involved in mortgage banking; 52 percent
in real-estate development; and 20 percent in syndication.17 Not much of this
would have been considered activities befitting a proper savings and loan a few
short years ago.
The recent diversification of S&L real-estate investments has had unsettling
effects on the residential mortgage field, to which the S&L's formerly devoted
"Lewis, Stephen E., "Major Projects Require Institutional Partners, Says Developer; Sees
Pension Fund Move Imminent," National Real Estate Investor, Vol. 22, No. 10, September
1980
"Leinberger, Christopher B., "S&Ls in Transition: New Real Estate Routes," Mortgage Bank-
ing, 44, No. 3, 1983
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virtually all their investment resources. It is probably safe to say that every S&L
dollar that goes into one of these unorthodox investments is a dollar withdrawn
from the mortgage pool. As S&Ls have diversified their real-estate activities,
their share of the total outstanding mortgage debt has declined from 43.8 percent
in 1976 to 40.5 percent in 1981. At the same time, the share of total residential
mortgage debt held by mutual savings banks fell from 10.2 to 7.2 percent.
Hand-in-hand with the pension funds, life insurance companies have also
found their way into nontraditional real-estate investments. The insurers' ini-
tiation came about because the pension funds, to save themselves the costs of
doing it themselves, hired the insurers to manage their real-estate assets. As
the funds, encouraged by Federal regulations, invested increasingly in real es-
tate, the insurance companies' management fees became increasingly lucrative.
In the late 1970s, looking for profitable investments to absorb their new income,
the life insurance companies invented a hybrid, hyphenated creature called the
construction-permanent loan.
As its name suggests, the new lending device married the construction loan
- often at fixed rates - with the pemanent loan in a single package. With
the new loan, developers for the first time could predict their interest costs
during the delicate construction phase of a project, without trying to read future
interest rates in a crystal ball. One-stop shopping for start-to-finish financing
also allowed developers to save significantly on legal, origination, and appraisal
fees. For their part, the insurance companies profited handsomely from the
increased volume of loans at gratifying yields, while they increased their risk
exposure by financing entire projects.18
18Poe, Ronald F., "Life Insurance Companies Plunge Into Construction Lending," Real Estate
Review, 9, No. 4, 1980, p. 72-5
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The diversification of S&Ls and life-insurance companies into the construction-
loan market has come largely at the expense of commercial banks. Between
1982 and 1984, according to a survey by the American Banking Association
(ABA), commercial banks with assets under $100 million lost 14 percent of
their construction-loan business to S&Ls and their subsidiaries; and another 1
percent to insurance companies. Bigger banks, with assets between $100 million
and $500 million, lost nearly 19 percent of their construction-loan business to
savings and loans and approximately 5 percent to insurance companies. Large
banks, with assets up to $2,500 million, lost 14.6 percent of their market to
savings and loans, 2.5 percent to insurance firms. The largest banks, the survey
found, lost 6.5 percent of their construction loans to S&Ls, 5.8 percent to in-
surance companies, and 10 percent to pension funds, conglomerates, and other
intermediaries. 19
Most of the commercial banks told the ABA that their losses were due to
their new competitors' offers of fixed-rate construction loans and/or bundled
construction and permanent loans. Only some of the largest banks tended to
ascribe their competitors' success to below-market, fixed-rate construction loans.
In any case, the commercial banks were quick to respond to the invasion of their
construction-loan territory by the S&Ls and the insurance companies by going
after the thrift institutions' traditional business in residential mortgages. Be-
tween 1976 and 1981, as the thrift institutions' share of the residential-mortgage
market was declining, the commercial banks' share was increasing from 14.3 to
16.1 percent.
"ABA Banking Journal, "The Nonbanks Encroach on Construction Loans," 76, No. 7, 1984.
The survey was conducted in late 1983, and the sample was comprised of 535 commercial
banks
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For the commercial banks, residential-mortgage lending promised attrac-
tively high returns as well as opportunities to deepen and strengthen their identi-
fication with local communities. The commercial banks also found a comfortable
role for themselves in the growing secondary market for residential mortgages,
serving as intermediaries between borrowers and ultimate lenders. For this activ-
ity the commercial banks earned healthy origination and servicing fees, incurred
minimal risks, and gained a leg up on marketing checking accounts, personal
loans, credit cards, and other profitable bank services.2 0
As the forgoing review of the recent history of real-estate mortgage financing
suggests, today's REITs operate in an environment that is very different - and
very much more difficult and dangerous - than the wide-open field of the 1970s.
It is certainly appropriate to ask whether the REIT, even in its reformed, 1980s
model, is an appropriate investment vehicle for the new landscape. The first
question that must be asked is whether REITs will be able to command enough
investor confidence to raise the very large amounts of capital required to operate
in the 1980s market. Until that fundamental question is answered, it would be
putting carts before horses to worry about whether the REITs will be able to
best the new competition for projects and properties of worthwhile quality and
for the people to manage them successfully.
There are some signs that REITs are coming back strong: in the first six
months of 1985, trusts raised $880 million in equity capital; 19 new trusts were
born.2 ' It is not clear, however, that investors are truly convinced. Some of the
"Tenges, Robert E., "Secondary Mortgage Market Can be the Better Way for Banks," ABA
Banking Journal, 71, No. 7, July 1979; and Quinn, Richard M. and David A. Cramer,
"Refinancing can Redouble Profits for Mortgage Lenders," ABA Banking Journal, 75, No. 4,
April 1983
2 1Lipman, Joanne, "Real Estate Investment Trusts are Enjoying a Rebirth, but New Issues
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new trusts were unable to raise as much initial capital as they wanted. Many,
including EQK, which was designed specifically to allay investor uncertainty,
have subsequently traded at well below the prices at which they were initially
offered. What acceptance the new REIT offerings have enjoyed in the mar-
ketplace, moreover, has apparently been among individual, retail buyers rather
than more sophisticated investors.
Responding to a 1984 survey by Alex Brown & Sons, portfolio managers
admitted to serious misgivings about REITs. They noted, for example, that
the liquidity of REIT investments, which is often touted as protection against
sudden swings in underlying asset values, may be less of an advantage than it
seems, because it is largely offset by the propensity of REIT share prices to swing
with general stock prices. The managers also complained that REIT assets were
generally of less-than-institutional quality.
For institutional portfolio managers, the REITs' relatively small size was
a problem: sizeable purchases or sales of shares could not be made without
producing large-magnitude movements in the market.22  At the beginning of
1985, there were 60 REITs with assets of less than $50 million; another 23 trusts
had assets of between $50 million and $99 million; 17 had assets of between
$100 million and $199 million; only 9 had assets between $200 million and $499
million; and a mere 2 had assets in excess of $500 million.2 3
Both of these troublesome issues - the size of REITs and the quality of
their assets - were met head-on by the architects of two new trusts, EQK
Have Growing Pains," The Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1985, p. 63
2 2See Strategic Real Estate, "Qualified REITs Improve Investment Performance But Still
Plagued by Negative Historical Perception," 6, No. 4, April 1984
2 3See NAREIT Factbook, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Washington,
D.C., 1984. Assets are valued on gross book basis.
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Realty Investors and ICM Property Investors. In an effort to make potential
institutional investors comfortable, both funds set out to achieve significant
size at their births. EQK Realty set out to raise an initial $185 million; ICM
Property wanted to open for business with $125 million." Both proposed to
invest only in top-quality real estate. ICM was able to raise only $115 million in
initial capital25 , while EQK was almost immediatly criticised for having a poorly
thought-out management fee and for being generally boring and overpriced."
The REITs' relatively small size may well prove a disadvantage in more than
their inability to absorb large investments. When it comes to competing for
assets, REITs in the 1980s will be competing for the first time with very large
financial institutions. In earlier days, between 1970 and 1974, the REITs had
only as much as 20.2 percent and as little as 16.5 percent of their total assets
in equities. REITs were not major players in the market for equity in quality
properties. Instead, the REITs specialized in making mortgage loans that were
too risky for the banks and S&Ls.2 7
Now, however, the REITs are competing head-on with the pension funds
and S&Ls for high-quality equity assets. Between 1978 and 1983, equity has
never been less than 53 percent of total REIT assets. In this new environment,
competing not only with pension funds and S&L's but also with syndicators
and foreign investors, the REITS are bidding on blue-chip assets at inflated
prices. Even if they have the resources to stay the course, the REITs will
"Fortune, Op. Cit. and Lipman, Joanne (June 25, 1985), Op. Cit.
2 5Lipman, Joanne (June 25, 1985), Op. Cit.
"Westerbeck, Mark, "REITs Making Comeback Among Funds," Pensions and Investment Age,
13, No. 1, January 7, 1985, p. 13
2 7Schulkin, Peter A. and David M. Petrone, "The C&D REIT Experience and the Risks of
Construction Lending," The Journal of Commercial Bank Lending, 61, No. 4, 1978
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certainly be tempted to lower their sights, to that segment of the market where
the assets are cheaper and the only real competition is from syndicators, whose
ability to assemble investment capital is unmatched by an ability to analyze
properties. These syndicators have been hailed as the "new REITs," because
they supposedly offer the small investor a safe entry into the real-estate market.
In reality, however, to the extent that they pay inflated prices for properties they
do not fully understand, the syndicators - and their investors - are extremely
vulnerable to any downturn in the market.28
If they can't buy the equity assets they want, the REITs may try to build
them, seeking higher returns in the construction-loan market. Here too, however,
the REITs will meet competition that was not there when they had the field
pretty much to themselves a decade ago. This time, too, the competition - the
life insurance companies and the S&Ls - has some very real advantages that
the REITs will be hard put to overcome.
In a game that demands huge amounts of money just to get in, not to mention
to play and to win, the enormous financial assets of the life insurance compa-
nies can be decisive. In 1983, the financial assets of life insurance companies
amounted to almost 20 percent of the total financial assets of all private, non-
bank financial institutions. REITs' financial assets, by comparison, amounted
to a mere 0.2 percent of the assets of all private, nonbank financial institutions;
and equalled only 1.2 percent of the life insurers' assets. For REITs, as for
commercial banks and most other institutions, the cost of funds is decided in
the volatile short-term money markets. With their enormous financial assets
derived from their other businesses, however, life insurance companies can offer
28 Lewis, Stephen E., "More Investors Being Drawn to Partnerships; Industry Maturing, Be-
coming More Institutionalized," National Real Estate Investor, 23, No. 9, 1981
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long-term loans at fixed rates and be assured of making profits. The growing
share of the construction loan business commanded by the insurance companies
is ample evidence of the competitive advantage they enjoy.
The savings and loan associations enjoy a more subtle, intangible advantage
in competing with REITs for development projects. Many S&Ls have deep, long-
standing ties to the communities in which they do business. Local developers,
especially those with relatively risky projects, or with propositions that sound
plausible only to an understanding ear, often prefer to deal with local lenders.
The savings and loan may in fact be better able to evaluate a project in its own
backyard than a giant financial institution far away would be."
Faced with what may prove to be unbeatable competition in the upper end
of the real-estate markets, the new REITs may be tempted or forced to try to
set up shop again at the other end, where they used to do business and where
they got into trouble before. All that may be left for them, however, may be
the risky deals: land loans; loans without takeouts, presales, or preleases; and
loans in unfamiliar areas.
If it can't stand against the competition, the REIT as an institution may
simply disappear, to reappear in a different form to serve a different function in
a different real-estate market. Recently, some real-estate developers have been
experimenting with a new form of REIT as a device for avoiding domination by
large financial institutions. These developers suggest that a new entity, called
a single-purpose REIT, be created by the developers for the sole purpose of
making a permanent mortgage commitment on a particular new project. The
"However, S&Ls have played active development roles outside their communities as well, some-
times making commitments that have not been altogether prudent. They too have been
likened to REITs. See Stephens, Paul S. (1983), Op.Cit.
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loan would carry a below-market interest rate, in return for which the trust
would take a "kicker" - a share in the ownership of the project. An alternative
version of the single-purpose REIT would be set up by the developer with a
committment to buy the project upon completion. Such a commitment would
presumably assure the developer of construction financing from conventional
sources that he would not otherwise be able to get." If they were ever to grad-
uate from developers' pipe-dreams into reality, such self-serving, single-purpose
REITs would inevitably invite abuses.
Faced with competition for capital and for investment opportunities, the
new REITs also face competition for talented management. The huge institu-
tions that have entered the real-estate arena have absorbed great numbers of
experienced, talented managers with the skills necessary to carry out ambitious
projects successfully. The REITs still bear the stigma of their troubled past.
There is little incentive for a successful manager to go to work for a REIT.
According to one knowledgeable observer of the real-estate scene:
Presently, few REIT managements are appropriately skilled in the
requisite talents to achieve investment distinction in the real-estate
markets of the 1980s. The critical missing elements - strategic
planning and property investment analysis - are in short supply in
the real estate sector, but particularly for the REITs. 3 1
soRealty, "'Single-Purpose' REITs Seen As Growing Financing Tool," Feb. 12, 1985, p. 7
31Roulac, Stephen E., "Strategic Challenges for REITs in the Eighties," The Real Estate Secu-
rities Journal, Spring 1983, p. 67
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Chapter 17
The Birth of the New REIT
The 1980's have spawned new REITs. In fact during 1985 alone the REITs
will raise over a billion dollars in public offerings. These REITs have many
similarities and some differences with the old REITs of the 70's. Three of the
"best of the 80's" are discussed.
Grubb and Ellis Realty Income Trust was founded in 1985 from the proceeds
of a 25 million dollar public offering. It typifies the smaller new trusts of the
80's.
G&E was sponsored by Grubb and Ellis, a 27 year old New York Stock
exchange company. The sponsor is the largest real estate services company
in America that is still independently owned. During 1984 its mortgage loan
placements exceeded one billion dollars. Its services include mortgage brokerage,
property management, asset management, consulting services to institutional
investors, and commercial space brokerage services. The company has over
3000 employees and agents in over 100 offices in Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah,
Washington and in the United Kingdom. Geographical focus is not its goal.
A subsidiary of the sponsor, Grubb and Ellis Realty advisors will provide
the day to day management for G&E REIT.
The purpose of G&E REIT is to invest in office buildings, shopping centers,
retail facilities, industrial plants, warehouses, and even apartment buildings. Not
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wanting to be all things to all people, it won't invest in single family residences
or construction loans. These investments although not excluding equity partici-
pation will emphasize mortgage loans, land purchase-leasebacks, and from time
to time equity investments in income producing commercial properties. The ori-
entation of the REIT is clearly to provide mortgages for commercial properties
that are already income producers.
Unlike many of the newer REITS, G&E did not have a set of properties
identified before it raised money. This is not surprising if one views the REIT as
an opportunistic arm of its sponsor which already has many types of subsidiary
affiliates and appears to want "one more" to use when business opportunities
arise that don't lend themselves efficiently to one of the pre-existing affiliates.
The REIT intends to provide an array of mortgages including first mortgages,
leasehold mortgage loans, and junior mortgage loans including wraparound
mortgages. Following the trend of the 80's, the REIT will seek equity kick-
ers and will even require mortgage payment increases if commercial tenant net
income levels are higher than expected. In the event that equity enhancements
are part of the terms of the mortgage, lower interest rates will probably be ne-
gotiated by the commercial borrowers. This will result in lower dividends to the
REITs shareholders in the early years but higher capital gains in the later years.
Another characteristic of this particular REIT is that it will specifically seek
borrowers who will take mortgages that require interest payments only until the
end of the mortgage when a lump sum (or balloon) payment will be required.
This type of mortgage has the advantage of keeping the constant debt service to a
minimum. (In fact if equity kickers are included, resulting in lower interest terms
for mortgage, then debt service will be competitively low, a real bonus for the
property owner). This low debt service will yield higher operating incomes for
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the property owners and consequently should mean lower risks for the property
and concomitantly the lender. There is a major caveat though. Lump sum
repayments usually require the owner to build a "nest egg" from which to make
this payment. Short of this, he must sell the property when the loan principal
becomes due. If the economic environment is not a healthy one, he may have
difficulty. Therein lies the risk to the mortgager lender, G&E REIT. So, much
like many REITs in the seventies, G&E is investing in mortgage debt in possibly
risky ways: namely, new unproven projects, junior loans, wide geographical
distribution, and mortgage debt structures that don't emphasize conservative
cautions.
It is interesting to note that while the REIT did not have pre-selected prop-
erties as many of the newer REITs do, it planned on investing all of its assets
during its first twelve months of operation. Furthermore, G&E REIT admitted
up front that it might invest in properties adjacent to those of its sponsor G&E
Realty and vice versa. This could create situations where the REIT would fi-
nance buildings next to the sponsor's property whereby the latter's real estate
value would be enhanced by the mere virtue of the added development. This
would be even further magnified by the possibility of joint participation in the
mortgage by both parties. At the very least, this set of possibilities gives the ap-
pearance of the REIT being just a convenient tax-exempt tool for the "parent"
(sponsor) company.
An additional feature of G&E REIT is its intended liquidation in 10 years.
In fact the REIT will not likely make new mortgage commitments after its fifth
year, except for investments in properties in which it already has commitments.
A significant benefit to the REITs shareholders will accrue from this strategy
since in the second half (5 years) of the REIT, dividends will be primarily capital
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gains rather than ordinary income (of the first five years).
G&E has another "au courant" twist. Shareholders will be allowed the option
of taking their dividends or reinvesting them in more shares of the REIT. This is
an attractive opportunity for the REIT, especially since it has promised not to
borrow funds to increase its lending capability. Presumably this aversion to debt
leveraging can provide added safety to the shareholders - a feature noticeably
missing in the REITs of the seventies.
In another superficial attempt to limit risk, G&E will not invest more than
30% of its assets in any one project. If up to 30% of its income derived from a
project that failed, the likelihood of the REIT failing is of course high, though.
Yet, on the positive side, G&E is positioned to offer variable rate mortgages as
well as to write interest and equity kickers into the terms of its loans.
The issue of potential conflict of interest is a large and looming one. The
REITs of the eighties all concede this in a variety of ways. The potential for
conflict of interest to arise has been somewhat contained by G&E through a
number of provisions:
" it will not invest more than 10% of its assets in unimproved land or non-
income producing property.
* it will invest in mortgages up to a maximum of 90% of the property's
value.
" it will not invest more than 50% of its assets in properties where an "af-
filiate" has an interest.
In order to pare down potential conflicts of interest G&E has pre established
fees and incentives to its advisor. The advisor will be paid a fee for services
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up to 8% of the adjusted net income of the REIT after, and only after, the
shareholders have received at least a 10% dividend. Additionally the REIT
will not incur operating expenses of more than 2% of invested assets or 25%
of net income, whichever is less. This puts a cap on the amount of money the
advisor has at its disposal. Any exceptions to this formula must not only be
approved by a majority of unaffiliated directors but must also be submitted to
the shareholders.
As far as fees go, the advisor is amply provided for. The annual fee for oper-
ating services is 8%. In addition there is a pre-established 1% loan origination
fee paid to the advisor from developers who place loans with the REIT. When
properties are sold by the REIT, a 15% incentive fee will be paid based on net
gains. Most surprising, if the REIT changes advisors without cause, the first
advisor (also sponsor) still will get the 15% incentive fee when property is sold
or refinanced. Courts have repeatedly shown that cause is difficult to prove. In
sum, the advisor appears to have the closest thing to a guaranteed income that
a "consultant" can have.
Finally, it should be noted that the G&E REIT has agreed that there would
be a majority of unaffiliated directors on their board. However, although three
of the four founding directors are not officially affiliated with the REIT or the
advisor, one of these 3 "unaffiliated" directors uses the parent Grubb and El-
lis's commercial brokerage services in his own business. This is hardly a clear
unaffiliation. So for practical purposes one-half of the directors have common
business interests broader than their role as directors of G&E REIT. So G&E
REIT, which is an incorporated entity unlike most REITs, seems destined to
continue the conflict of interest patterns of its predecessors.
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Mellon Participation Mortgage Trust is a medium-sized REIT with approx-
imately $ 80 million in assets. Sponsored by Mellon Real Estate Investment
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mellon Bank, it has few differentiat-
ing features from the mainstream older REITs. Hence, it appears to have been
able to raise its money on the basis of the blue chip name of its sponsor and its
sponsor's parent. Mellon Bank is the eleventh largest commercial bank in the
U.S. While this REIT shares a few features of the 80's REIT's, such as finite
life, its major drawing card is its name, which projects security and financial
prudence.
Further enhancing the value of name recognition, the affiliated trustees of
Mellon REIT are complemented by unaffiliated trustees from large brand name
Wall Street firms. The Mellon Participation Mortgage Trust has eight trustees.
The Chairman (and trustee) is Robert Kinney who is also president of Mellon
Real Estate Investment Management Corporation, the advisor to the REIT.
Prior to this position he was with Merrill Lynch's institutional asset management
group under which the real estate investment management group operated. The
president of the board of trustees is also an executive vice president of the
advisor corporation, Mellon Real Estate Investment Management Corporation.
He too was with Merrill Lynch before joining the advisor. Elmer Oniffrey, a vice
president of the advisor, is also a trustee.
Irving Cohen, an independent trustee, is an executive vice president of E.F.
Hutton and prior to that was with Security Pacific, a prominent financial in-
stitution on the West Coast. Mercer Jackson is a second unaffiliated trustee.
He was an executive vice president of the National Association of Real Estate
Investment Trusts, the large association that represents the REIT industry. His
career includes stints with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
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opment and various staff positions with the U.S. Congress. Arthur Karlin, a
third independent trustee, is also with E.F. Hutton, while Patrick McCarthy is
a Chancellor of the University of Maine. McCarthy is also an urban planner,
which apparently qualifies him to be a trustee of a real estate trust. Finally, of
the independent trustees, is James Mooney who is an executive vice president of
Landowner Associates, a respected and quite prominent real estate consulting
firm. Thus the trustees are a blue chip "face" for the REIT.
Mellon Participation Mortgage Trust, as its name suggests, is primarily fo-
cused in mortgages but more specifically in mortgages with equity enhancement
rights including participations in property appreciation and income generated
by the property over predicted levels.
The REIT will invest most heavily in first mortgages, at least 60%, but
also in land purchase-leasebacks, junior mortgages, wraparounds, and accrual
mortgages. Accruals allow some of the interest rate payments to be accrued to
the end of the mortgage or even paid in a lump sum. The REIT can require
this money to be put in escrow by the property owner but this may not in fact
be required of any mortgage, thereby increasing the risk.
The bulk of the REITs assets will be invested in mortgages in commer-
cial property such as retail space, offices, warehouses, industrial sites, medical
buildings and research parks. The REIT expects to include residential and
construction loans and to avoid having ownership of property unless through
purchase-leasebacks or the bankruptcy takings. The trust, refreshingly, will not
invest in a project in which its advisor, or any of its trustees, have any ownership.
This does not remove the conflict of interest potential though. The advisor,
for example, will be allowed to invest in properties adjacent to the REITs and
vice versa, which could enhance the advisor's real estate value. The advisor
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has over 80 properties worth over half a billion dollars scattered throughout the
U.S. Their heaviest concentration is in the West and Southeast, the very area
hit hardest during the mid seventies recession.
The advisor is on a one year contract to service the REIT and can be fired
with or without cause on two months notice. Their fees are ample enough
to accept this "risk." The advisor will select mortgages to invest in. These
borrowers will pay the REIT a 1%-1.5% commitment fee. The REIT will in
turn pay the advisor a 1.5% acquisition fee (thereby coming out even at best or
losing up to .5%). The advisor will also get a .5% administration fee on assets
up to 45 million with a smaller percent of additional assets plus an additional
.5% of the value of the mortgages based on a 10% capitalized cash flow. When
investments are sold the advisor will be paid a 1% disposition fee plus 10% of
the gains minus the 1% they had been paid as disposition fees. So the advisor
has a hybrid payment structure. He is guaranteed a certain amount based on
just the size of the trust (not its profitability) but receives additional incentive
fees if the trust is successful.
The Mellon Participating Mortgage Trust does intend to liquidate in ten
years. New investments are not likely to be made in its second five year period.
However if reasons prevail to prevent this ten year termination (for example a
particularly good or bad economic climate) the REIT will automatically be self
liquidated in twenty years.
The advisor has the right not only to work with competing real estate groups,
but it admits that it may offer deals to other groups first that could be suitable
to Mellon REIT. The only protection for the Mellon REIT that the advisor of-
fers is that it won't work for another REIT until 60% of Mellon's funds have
been invested. The advisor does offer some comforting service though. In ad-
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dition to the traditional real estate project evaluation that they (and others)
do, this advisor has sophisticated computer models that enable it to compare
any individual mortgage possibility with a wide number of competing mortgage
investment opportunities. Only those which are favorable to the average invest-
ment possibility, as defined by the model, will be made. While economic models
do not preclude bad decision making, it should provide a level of sophistication
in deal analysis that the REITs of old claimed they had, but really did not.
This REIT, as in the old days, promises to be a bit too much of "all things
to all people." Its goal is to concurrently provide current income, plus capital
appreciation through an investment portfolio that will be secure, based on the
geographical diversification of the mortgages and sophisticated management by
the advisor. While it will invest approximately 60% of its money in the more
secure first mortgages, it will finance up to another 25% in wraparounds, up
to 10% in accruals, the riskiest. No project, however, will garner more than
25% of its assets. To further assuage the shareholders fears, it promises to use
independent, certified appraisers for each of its deals.
On balance, Mellon Participating Mortgage Trust, based in New York, spon-
sored by a Pittsburgh-based financial holding company, and poised to make
investments in the high growth regions of the U.S. is a very close sister to the
REITs of the seventies with just a few modifications. The investors that are
drawn to this entitity appear to be attracted mostly by the sponsor's name,
certainly not by the historical track records of similar entities.
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The most prestigious REIT to be formed is EQK. It is also the largest new
trust.
EQK Realty Investors I, a Massachusetts business trust, was formed to ac-
quire substantially unleveraged income-producing properties with an asset base
of $185,010,000. It is the largest new trust to be formed since the seventies. The
Trust will retain its properties for a period of approximately 8 to 12 years and,
after the twelfth year, will dispose of any remaining properties within a period
of approximately two years. The REIT will be closed-end (i.e., it will not issue
any additional shares without the approval of holders of three-quarters of the
shareholders. By and large, it will not make any additional real estate invest-
ments beyond its first three acquisitions and will distribute to its shareholders
the net proceeds from each sale or financing of properties. Consequently, the
REIT will be self-liquidating. The REIT, as required by law, will make quarterly
distributions of all available cash flow generated in each year from operations.
The advisor to the trust EQK Partners is its original sponsor and was formed
two years before the trust itself. EQK Partners is interesting in that it was
formed by two of this country's strongest real estate entities to acquire and
manage deals. The fact that it took these two powerhouses several years before
they could launch their REIT reflects the apathy of the capital markets until very
recently toward REITs. It is plausible that with the Dow Jones reaching record
highs in 1985, that Wall Street salesmen see real estate investment vehicles as
ripe for another run.
EQK's parentage is unassailable. EQK Partners is 50% owned by a sub-
sidiary of The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States and 50%
owned by Kravco Partners, Ltd. Equitable and Kravco, Inc. are each 50%
owners of Kravco Company, a major manager of shopping malls and other com-
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mercial real estate in the United States that was formed in 1983 out of what once
was Kravco, Inc.'s property management and development business. Equitable
is the third largest life insurance company in the United States and manages
more than $19 billion in real estate investments, of which more than $8 billion
are invested in real estate equities.
Equitable has been active in real estate investments for over a century. Real
estate managed by the Assurance Company includes over 50 million square feet
of office space, about 40 million square feet of shopping mall space, a similar
number of square feet of industrial park space, and 48 hotels with over 20,000
rooms. Equitable and its subsidiaries employ over 40 real estate professionals
who oversee analysis, acquisition, management and operations review for real
estate investments.
Kravco Company is a major manager of shopping malls and other commercial
real estate in the United States. Kravco Company manages more than 40 malls
and shopping centers with a combined gross leasable area in excess of 26 million
square feet. It also manages over 3.3 million square feet of office and industrial
space. The company works in 15 states.
EQK Partners makes recommendations concerning the REIT's investments
and administers the REIT's day-to-day operations, subject to the supervision of
the trustees, a majority of whom are unaffiliated with the advisor. For perform-
ing these services, the advisor receives (a) initial fees for organizing the trust
and for the trust's acquisition of the properties described below, (b) a subor-
dinated annual portfolio management fee based on the sum of the aggregate
market value of the REIT's outstanding shares, as reflected on the New York
Stock Exchange, and the outstanding balance of its long-term indebtedness, (c)
a real estate disposition fee and (d) a subordinated incentive disposition fee.
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The Declaration of Trust provides that the number of trustees must be a
minimum of five and a maximum of 12, a majority of whom must be unaffil-
iated. There are seven trustees, including four unaffiliated trustees. Trustees
continue in office until the next annual meeting of shareholders. Vacancies may
be filled by a majority of the remaining trustees, except that a vacancy among
the unaffiliated trustees must be filled by a majority of the remaining unaffili-
ated trustees, or by the REIT's shareholders. Any trustee may be removed with
cause by all the remaining trustees, or with or without cause by holders of a
majority of the outstanding Shares.
The Declaration of Trust provides that shareholders will not be subject to
any liability for the acts or obligations of the trust, which is in effect saying the
trust is like an incorporated entity. In fact the Declaration virtually requires
that each written agreement of the REIT contain a provision to that effect.
The terms under which the advisor works includes clearly spelled out fees.
The REIT will pay three fees to the Advisor: a) an initial fee equal to 1% of
the purchase price of each of the Properties; b) an annual portfolio management
fee equal to .85% of the sum of the average daily per share closing prices of the
Shares on the New York Stock Exchange, multiplied by the average of the total
number of Shares outstanding on each day plus the average daily outstanding
balance of the Trust's long-term indebtedness; c) a real estate disposition fee
equal to 2% of the gross sale of each property sold. While b) is a novel form of
fee it has met with a mediocre reception on Wall Street. On the surface, this
type of fee appears to mirror the quality of work done by the advisor, which is
a good way to calibrate fees. But experience has shown that the stock market
price of a REIT's shares can ignore the real health of the REIT or the value of
its assets.
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However, that caveat aside, the REIT has more experienced and senior mem-
bers on its board of trustees than the 1970's REITs did. While EQK is a newly
organized entity and has no operating history, the trustees and the executive offi-
cers as a group have substantial real estate investment experience. The trustees
collectively have ultimate control over the management of the Trust and the
conduct of its affairs. Unaffiliated trustees will at all times comprise a majority
of the trustees and of each committee of trustees. The term of a trustee is one
year and of course the trustees elect the officers of EQK Reit.
Some of the trustees include:
Myles H. Tanenbaum who is President of EQK Partners, the advisor. Prior
to that time, he served as Executive Vice President of Kravco, Inc.
Henry C. Beck, Jr. is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Henry C.
Beck Company, a general building contractor.
Robert F. Froehlke is Chairman of the Board of Equitable.
Howard Gittis is a partner in the law firm that is counsel to the REIT and
also the advisor. This clear area of potential conflict of interest has not been
addressed by even this prestigious board of trustees.
Alton G. Marshall is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
Lincoln Savings Bank and was President of Alton G. Marshall Associates, Inc., a
real estate investment firm. He was also President and a director of Rockefeller
Center, Inc.
Russell E. Palmer is Dean of the Wharton School of the University of Penn-
sylvania.
Raymond H. Wittcoff is a director of Equitable.
Phillip E. Stephens has been Senior Vice President of EQK Partners from
its inception.
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Mr. Tanenbaum and others own one third of Kravco Partners, Ltd., a 50%
partner in the Advisor. Mr. Tanenbaum owns over a quarter of the common
stock of Kravco, Inc., a 50% partner in Kravco Company. Trustees are respon-
sible to the REIT's shareholders as fiduciaries and are required to perform their
duties in good faith. However, the Declaration of Trust provides that no trustee
or officer shall be liable for his or the trust's actions, except arising from his own
bad faith, willful misfeasance, gross negligence or reckless disregard of his duties.
The Declaration of Trust also provides for indemnification of the trustees and
officers against expense or liability in any law suit against him or the Trust.
Typical of a REIT's board during the seventies, the trustees and officers of
this Trust are permitted to engage in other similar business activities and are not
required to present to EQK any real estate investment opportunities presented
to them. So in sum, the conflict potential is still strong and the remedy for
abuse (court action) is doubtful.
Not surprisingly, the trust is subject to potential conflicts of interest arising
from its relationship with the advisor and its affiliates. With a view toward
protecting the interests of the EQK REIT's shareholders against such potential
conflicts, the Declaration of Trust provides that a majority of the trustees (and a
majority of each committee of trustees) must be unaffiliated, and all transactions
between the trust and the advisor or any of the affiliates of the advisor must be
approved by a majority of the unaffiliated trustees. This is simply in keeping
with normal SEC rules, although these rules are not binding on the REITs.
Moreover, the annual renewal of the advisory contract between the trust and
the advisor requires the approval of a majority of the unaffiliated trustees, who
may terminate the advisory contract at any time on 60 days' notice.
The Trust acquired Harrisburg East Mall from an affiliate of the Advisor.
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The Trust acquired Peachtree-Dunwoody Pavilion from an affiliate of the un-
derwriter that acted as an intermediary in passing this property to EQK. The
terms of these acquisitions were not based on arm's-length negotiations, and in
the case of Harrisburg East Mall, the trust and the seller were represented by
the same legal counsel. The terms of these acquisitions were approved by all the
unaffiliated trustees. To give credit where credit is due, EQK hired Landauer
Associates, Inc., an independent and respectable real estate appraisal and con-
sulting firm, to make appraisals showing that the current fair market values of
the real estate exceeded the purchase prices.
In addition,the amount of the fees payable to the advisor who will perform
property management services for the EQK trust were not determined by arm's-
length negotiation. The fees, however, were approved by all the unaffiliated
trustees.
As has been discussed, there is generally no limitation on the right of the
advisor or its affiliates to engage in any other business where there may be
conflicts of interest. For example, the advisor intends to sponsor future real
estate partnerships or REITs that may own properties that are competitive
with EQK and affiliates of the advisor may act as managers of these properties.
The REIT is not prohibited from selling any of its properties to the advisor
or its affiliates. A majority of the unaffiliated trustees and a majority of share-
holders must approve these sales, which must be accompanied by an independent
appraisal of the real estate.
The REIT and the advisor are represented by the same legal counsel and
retain the same accountants. When disagreements occur between the trust and
the advisor, then and only then will EQK retain separate counsel. This is very
much a case of closing the barn door after the horses have fled.
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On the one hand, the Trust limits itself to 3 properties, all of which are
known up front and are of high quality. But then it provides a "contingency"
to make additional investments if it elects to.
Apart from its initial investments in the three sites, the trust may make addi-
tional real estate investments involving the expansion of existing improvements
or purchase and develop additional sites that are in the immediate vicinity of the
three primary sites. Prior to making additional investments, a majority of the
unaffiliated trustees must determine how and whether the project will affect the
original three sites and the value of the REIT's assets as a whole. This simply
serves to forewarn the unaffiliated trustees that they have extra responsibility.
If investments other than the original three are made, the REIT maintains that
it will do so without diminishing the routine dividends that the initial investors
will be collecting. In addition, EQK limits itself in its subsequent investments
to a maximum of 50% of its then asset base.
The Trust may borrow (secured or unsecured) to make distributions to its
shareholders, to make permitted additional real estate investments, and to ob-
tain working capital such as for the repair and maintenance of properties in
which it has invested. The Declaration of Trust prevents EQK from borrowing
more than 75% of its total asset value.
EQK's three properties are all high quality prime locations and almost fully
rented: The Peachtree-Dunwoody Pavilion office park includes seven multi-
tenanted, general purpose office buildings which have a total building area of
about 800,000 square feet. The Pavilion is located at a major intersection in
the center of suburban Atlanta. The Pavilion is approximately 34 acres with
parking and was acquired by Equitable in 1978. Equitable added five buildings
by 1984. Equitable Real Estate Investment Management, Inc., a wholly owned
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subsidiary of Equitable, had been the manager and would continue to do so after
EQK's purchase, for another five years minimum.
Castleton Commercial Office Park is a large multi-use office complex of 47
single- and multi-tenanted office buildings, mixed-use office/warehouse buildings
plus food facilities in the northeast section of Indianapolis near two major inter-
states. EQK will buy all but two of the existing buildings, which comprise 1.2
million square feet of space. A future office building of approximately 35,000
square feet will be purchased by EQK REIT when it is completed.
Approximately 78% of the total net rentable area of Castleton is designed for
use as office space and the balance is used for both office and warehouse purposes
(including related purposes, such as operation of light manufacturing, product
assembly, showroom and distribution facilities). Castleton Commercial Office
Park is located on 128 acres of land and man made lake with ample parking.
Once again, an affiliate of the seller will stay on as property manager, but only
for a guaranteed two years.
Harrisburg East Mall is a sixty-two acre regional mall shopping center situ-
ated near the central business district of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the state cap-
ital. The two-story Center has 900,000 square feet and is tenanted by three ma-
jor department stores, J.C. Penney, Hess's and John Wanamaker. The Kravco
Company, one of the 50% owners of EQK Partners (the advisor), developed the
property in 1969 and will continue to manage it for at least five years after the
EQK purchase. This clearly establishes the link betwen the advisor using the
REIT as a tool to enhance its own property, in this case by having the REIT
buy the property and guarantee the seller additional operating income for at
least five years.
EQK, a large blue chip REIT of the eighties may indeed provide a mechanism
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for the small investor to participate in quality real estate ownership, but it does
not protect the investor from conflict of interest. In fact, the investors could
just as easily have bought shares in Equitable. The net gain to the economy or
society is certainly not evident.
The three exemplary REITs of the eighties indicate that the investor memory
is a short one. Over a quarter of a billion dollars flowed into these three groups
during a six month period. Yet many of the risks of the past are still ignored.
The lack of regulation, the potential for conflict of interest abuses, and the
uncompetitive nature of the trusts have not changed. The changes are primarily
in the finite life of the newer trusts, the emphasis on higher quality deals, and
the aversion to debt that each trust shares. So while the risks may have in part
diminished, they are still lurking beneath the surface to contribute to another
crisis when economic conditions are again shaky.
It is hard to change, let alone dismantle an institution even if it doesn't serve
a good purpose.
The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presented here is that the
REIT as financial institution could disappear completely from the scene without
being missed by real-estate investors or consumers. REITs served no valid and
necessary function for either real estate or investment. As the marketplace
reacted to the emerging news of the REITs' flaws, the total assets held by the
trusts declined from $21 billion during the go-go days of 1974 to just over $7
billion. The index of REIT share prices, calibrated so that 1972 prices equal
100, had plunged to a mere 17 by late 1975. Most REIT stocks were selling
below their book value. 1
Despite the industry's well-deserved difficulties, however, a number of REITs
INAREIT, "Investment in the Eighties: The REIT Concept," Washington, D.C., 1981, p. 8.
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have survived to witness at least a partial revival of their fortunes. From 17 in
1975, the share-price index rebounded to 38 by mid-1980, then to 43 by 1983.
Dividends, which reached their nadir in 1974, almost doubled by 1980 to total
$210 million.2
The industry's generally improved outlook reflects the strengthened financial
position of the surviving REITs, which inspired the Boston Globe to announce
in a headline: "REITS MAKING A STRONG COMEBACK." 3 One sign of the
sounder financial footing of the reborn trusts was the fact that by early 1980, the
REITs total mortgage holdings represented less than 35 percent of the industry's
total assets; 60 percent of total assets were in equity investments.
Boasted NAREIT, the industry's trade association: "Bank borrowings and
commercial paper comprise less than 39 percent of total liabilities. Long-term,
low rate mortgages on trust-owned properties, on the other hand, amount to 41
percent of all liabilities. In fact, the industry debt-to-equity ratio is 1.5 to 1,
a substantial improvement from the year-end 1976 ratio of 5 to 1."4 By 1982,
total REIT shareholder equity, $3.8 billion, was a healthy 11 times the amount
set aside to cover potential losses from bad investments.5
Indeed, by 1981 REITs had regained sufficient financial health to do better
than either the Dow Jones and the Standard and Poor's share price indices. The
following year the Dow Jones Industrial Average outperformed the REIT index
by 19.6 to 16.2 percent; but the REITs, paying a 9.9 percent dividend, did better
overall by their investors.' By April 1983, one respected investment advisor was
2 Ibid.
3 Boston Globe, April 25, 1982, p. 62
4NAREIT, op. cit., p. -24.
'Ibid., p. 25.
6
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quoted as advising its clients to "pick up REIT stocks on the downswing."
Schotland, perhaps the most prominent critic of the REITs during their most
culpable period, assured the world, "Anyone staying away from REITs because
of the 1970s disaster is fighting the last war." 7
While they may admit that everything was not always as it should have been
in the industry, insiders like to point to the evidence suggesting that REIT self-
regulation has been a success. "The REIT industry," NAREIT president Allan
H. Glidden boasted in 1982, "is a wiser and chastened industry which [sic] has
learned a lot of things about development and construction and has put its own
controls on how investments should be made."'
It is also a leaner industry: many banks and insurance companies who rushed
into the REIT business when the boom was on, have prudently withdrawn when
business turned bad. Chase's REIT, forced into bankruptcy in 1979, has been
reborn and rechristened as the Triton Group Ltd., an independent, publicly
held company that no loonger operates as a REIT. In other cases, bank- and
insurance-company-sponsored REITs have been reconstituted as independent
entities; some have departed the real-estate business entirely, in favor of other,
perhaps less exciting pursuits.
Among those REITs that have weathered the storms, industry supporters
point to salutory reforms in management style and technique as symptoms of
new virtue. In the 1970s, some 75 percent of all REITs depended on outside
advisors; today that percentage is less than half as high. With the decline in
70.
7Ibid.
'Boston Globe, op. cit., p. 62
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the use of consultants has come a drop in management fees.9
The surviving REITs have also learned to be more prudent with their in-
vestments. Permanent takeouts are now required before construction loans are
approved. Equity ownership has assumed a much greater importance in the
spectrum of REIT activities: 92 REIT's were recently counted as specializing
in property ownership; while the 20 trusts counted as continuing to concentrate
on mortgage lending are confining their activities to well-established borrowers
and engaging in joint ventures that include equity participation. Many trusts
are now characterized as owners of "prime real estate projects with rapidly ap-
preciating values."1 0
In the effort to restore the faith of investors, some REITs in the 1980s are
offering new kinds of trusts. Among the innovations: REITs that are self-
liquidating, returning both principal and profits to the investors in eight years;
trusts whose profits rise with the rent rolls of the apartment buildings they
invest in; trusts tailored for Individual Retirement Accounts; trusts designed to
appeal to the most upright investors, such as university endowments."
Apparently, the new REITs are enjoying considerable success in overcoming
their bad image and record in the marketplace. While many institutions seized
the opportunity to divest themselves of REITs, or otherwise distance themselves
from disaster, other institutions have more recently begun to reinvest in REITs,
either by buying large amounts of stock, or by outright acquisition of trusts.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company and Equitable Life Assurance
Society, two major insurers, have both acquired the REITs they originally spon-
9 NAREIT, op. cit., p. 35
'
0 Newsweek, op. cit., p. 70
"Leslie Wayne, "The Return of the REITs," New York Times, 5 December 1982, p. 2, Sec. D
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sored. Prudential Insurance Company has bought Connecticut General Mort-
gage and Realty Investments; while the British National Coal Board bought the
Continental Illinois Real Estate Investment Trust.
The reformed REITs are beginning to find renewed access to the traditional
capital markets they had been excluded from during their downfall. The REITs
of the 1980s, both survivors of the 1970s and new entities, are selling stocks and
bonds to fuel the rapid growth of their earning assets. [Table 1]
"There will be more emphasis on size," John A. Cervieri, managing trustee
of Property Capital Trust told The New York Times in December 1982. "Those
that don't grow just won't be able to compete successfully. The advice to smaller
REITs that lack access to capital that would enable them to compete in the big
leagues: "Merge or liquidate."' 2
For big-time operators, real as well as would-be, REITs are once again a good
reason to go into the marketplace to raise capital. American Hotel & Realty
Corporation, a REIT sponsored by the Bass Brothers, Texas oil billionaires,
raised more than $113 in its first public offering, using much of the proceeds to
acquire hotels from the Bass Brothers.
Mortgage REITs, the leaders in both the rise and fall of the industry, are
once again rising to prominence, emerging as the biggest trusts, commanding
a substantial share of the total assets of all REITs. It is the mortgage REITs
again, as it was in the 1970s, that are the most profitable class of trusts. It
seems inevitable that the mortgage trusts are ready for another period of strong
growth.
Of the five largest REITs - all of them publicly held - four are over-
whelmingly devoted to mortgage lending. Only one - albeit the largest, Gen-
2Ibid., p. 2 (sec. D) col. 5 and 6.
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eral Growth Properties, is primarily involved in equity participation. General
Growth is 100 percent invested in ownership; but Lomas & Nettleton is 91 per-
cent in mortgages; Wells Fargo is 51 percent in mortgages, MONY Mortgage
is 85 percent in mortgages, and Mass Mutual Mortgage & Realty is 83 percent
in mortgages. The superior profitability of mortgage trusts is clear: General
Growth boasts a rate of return of less than 0.5 percent, earning $2.1 million on
an asset base of $478.3 million. The smallest of the trusts, Mass Mutual, scored
an 11.5 percent return, earning $23.2 million on assets of $202.6 million. The
other mortgage trusts did similarly well. [Table 2]
On the one hand, the mortgage REITs, with their history of mischief and
mayhem, seem poised for a resumption of their former strong growth. If so,
the resurgent REITs may well be encouraged to resume their former practices,
including debt and equity leveraging, that got them into trouble in the first
place. On the other hand, however, the regulatory mechanisms that are the
major defense against abuses in the REIT industry have changed little from
the 1970s, when the regulatory process proved wanting in so many respects.
Without meaningful revision and strengthening of both federal and state REIT
statutes and regulations, there are not many obstacles in the way of another
outbreak of overbuilding, uncontrolled lending, and other abuses, with their
certain retribution.
There is no doubt that the REITs have every incentive to get into dubious
practices. While outside advisors run fewer of the REITs of the 1980s, they
include the larger growth- oriented reits. The fees of these managers remain
linked to the size of total assets, placing a premium on growth at all costs.
The incestuous ties among sponsors, advisors, and trustees are still a hallmark
of realty trusts. Trusts still share law firms with their advisors, setting the.
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stage for conflicts of interest. Debt leveraging, unrestricted, is still a dangerous
temptation. Investors, especially those looking for an easy killing, are once again
being tempted to believe that the REITs promise high income and high capital
appreciation, without much risk.
"If the times were right," warned Newsweek, "there is nothing to stop the
construction REITs from leaping over the brink again."
The search for adequate preventive regulations to keep the REITs from re-
peating the past leads Schotland, perhaps the leading commentator on the in-
dustry, to advance a number of suggestions. "Congress needs to enact a variant
of the Investment Company Act tailored to the special characteristics of the
REITs," Schotland says.13 Specifically, he notes that the use of outside man-
agers has done little to help and much to hurt the interests of both the trusts
and their investors; outside management might well be prohibited by the kind
of legislation Schotland recommends.
In particular. situations where outside management is desireable, Schotland
believes, the consultants should be required to disclose fully any potential or
actual conflicts of interest. Because it is inevitable that REITs will be in compe-
tition with their outside advisors, as well as with their own sponsors, Schotland
adds, such devices as "pari passu" and "right of first refusal" should be standard
equipment for REITs. Shareholders should be privvy to accurate reports of an
outside advisory firm's costs and profits. The independent trustees, meanwhile,
should be revitalized as an active, preventive force, required to oversee all trans-
actions carefully. The trustees would be assured of the conditions necessary
to do their job properly; and they would be legally liable for misfeasance or
malfeasance in discharging their crucial responsibilities.
"Schotland, op. cit., p. 213
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At the same time, total assets should be done away with as the basis for
calculating management fees, in order to eliminate the constant temptation to
use excessive leveraging and to pile up low-quality assets. Instead, fees should
be on a sliding scale, keyed to the profits actually realized by shareholders.
There is also a need to safeguard REITs and REIT shareholders against the
banks and insurance companies that traditionally sponsor REITs. Self-dealing
all but inevitably entails abuse of the relationship that should exist between
a trust and its sponsor. Full disclosure and independent appraisals as part of
all REIT dealings, would do much to remove the suspicion of misbehavior that
clouds trust-sponsor relationships. To regulate the relationship between REITs
and their law firms, Schotland wants the American Bar Association to take a
hard look at the propriety of the same firm representing trusts and their advisors
or sponsors.
From the evidence presented in this investigation of the REIT situation, how-
ever, it seems clear that Schotland's proposals, while they are unexceptionable
as far as they go, simply do not go far enough. Their major shortcoming is
that they fail to comprehend the underlying competitive forces that condition
the REITs' behavior and their ultimate success. As long as these fundamentals
remain uncorrected, it is unlikely-that the problems that plague REIT activity
can be effectively corrected.
A most important, though subtle, fact of life in the REIT industry as it
emerged in the 1970s was the separate financial reporting of the realty trusts
and their sponsors, usually the large bank holding companies. With consolidated
reports, any financial advantage accruing to the bank at the expense of its
REIT would be immediately apparent. More important, such a trade-off would
have no net effect on the overall performance of the consolidated operation; the
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bank would have no reason, therefore, to beggar its REIT to enrich itself or its
affiliates.
A final reform, seemingly superficial but actually addressing the consumer-
abuse problems of the REITs, would forbid sponsors to lend their own names to
their REITs. This simple measure would deprive over-enthusiastic salespeople of
one of their most potent selling tools, with which they persuade unsophisticated
investors that a high-risk REIT has all the rock-solid safety and risk-free return
of a well-known, strictly regulated bank or insurance company.
All these seemingly innocuous, matter-of-course reforms - most of them ac-
complishing nothing more than forcing the REITs to reveal their true financial
nature and performance to their shareholders and the public - would prob-
ably be serious in their effect on the REIT industry. Only creative financing
and accounting, in combination with questionable marketing, create the illusion
that REITs are hot investments, suitable for unsophisticated profit-seekers. As
this paper has demonstrated, the simple fact is that, when their conditions are
accurately disclosed, REITs are inherently uncompetitive: their true profitabil-
ity is inferior to that of alternative investments that have to pay less for debt
capital; while REIT assets lack the clearly established market values of mutual
fund shares.
The indeterminate values of REIT assets are what make it possible for REITs
to indulge in excessive leveraging; while the REITs' relatively low profitability
made such techniques necessary for survival. Without leveraging, or with lever-
aging limited to reasonable levels, the only REITs that could be sure of surviving
would be those lucky enough to hit a run of abnormally good investments.
It is a fair assumption that REITs could not survive in the full light of
day, without slight-of-hand bookkeeping or slight-of-tongue salesmanship. If in-
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vestors and sponsors were accurately and fully informed on such crucial matters
as the true values in all REIT transactions, the fees and profits garnered by
REIT advisors, and the real nature and worth of REIT assets, they would be
able to make less euphoric appraisals of the REITs. Such appraisals would lead
to the inescapable truism that in well-functioning capital markets, safe divi-
dends and sure capital appreciation do not often accrue to the same stock at
the same time. Stripped of such unrealistic expectations, judging REIT invest-
ment prospects in the cold light of day, investors and sponsors would be led to
consider the real implications of the cripplingly high cost of capital paid by the
REITs.
Ultimately, investors would be forced to conclude that as long-term prospects,
REITs are at a severe disadvantage in comparison with commercial banks or in-
surance companies. Either REITs and their investors have to accept higher
risks to achieve a given rate of return, or they must settle for lower returns from
a given level of risk. In the highly competitive investment markets, therefore,
REITs - when they are completely understood for what they are - are not
viable as investment vehicles. With the understanding that full disclosure and
rational, effective regulation are necessary conditions of doing business, poten-
tial realty trust sponsors would similarly conclude that REITs are not attractive
opportunities.
In a rational world, therefore, REITs would not survive.
The more fundamental problem of the REITs, though, is that they never
had a real purpose, a clear goal. Consequently, their performance could not be
easily monitored, evaluated, measured.
REITs are neither fish nor fowl.
In sum, ambiguity leads to abuse. It was not the high interest rates, the
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conflict of interest relationships, the debt-equity leveraging, or the institutional
competition per se that hurt the REITs. It was the overlap and intersection of
these problems on an aimless institution which couldn't be fine tuned to meet
objectives.
The REITs neither substantially increased the flow of funds into real estate
nor gave small investors access to sophisticated, profitable investments previ-
ously available to only big investors. Yet a complex institution has evolved
with a life of its own. Institutions are hard to change, even harder to disman-
tle. Incentive mechanisms such as tax incentives can be fine-tuned, recalibrated,
enhanced, or abandoned if their purpose isn't being served or is no longer valu-
able. The REITs Act created a bold new institution when elegant refinements
to traditional incentives would have been more powerful.
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